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2ABSTRACT
Although in many regions of the U.S. the least expensive electricity
is generated from light-water reactor (LWR) plants, the fixed (capital
plus operation and maintenance) cost has increased to the level where the
cost plus the associated uncertainties exceed the limits deemed
acceptable by most utilities.
The operation and maintenance cost has increased about 25% annually
during the early 1970s. The main causes are increased requirements due
to safety, environmental, and security considerations. The largest
improvement is co-location of units, which gives up to 37% savings in O&M
cost.
The rising trend of LWR capital cost is investigated. Increased
plant requirements of equipment, labor, material, and time due to safety,
environmental, availability, and financial considerations and due to
lower productivity and public intervention are the major causes of this
rising cost trend. An attempt is made to explore the elements of a
comprehensive strategy for capital cost improvement. The scope of the
strategy is divided into three areas. The first includes improving the
current design, project management, and licensing practices. The second
area, standardization, is found to reduce cost by 6 to 22% through
Duplication and Reference System options. Due to lack of commercial
experience, the status of Flotation is not clear. Replication presents
no significant improvement. The third area is improved utility structure
and finance. Electric utilities with improved organizational structure
can save up to 30% of their regional average capital cost. A proposed
option of Ultra-accelerated Depreciation (UAD) financing is
investigated. In addition to increasing the availability of capital,
this UAD financing, unlike other financial schemes, is expected to
decelerate future rise of electricity prices. A computer code, ULTRA, is
developed to assess this option.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
By fall of 1976 the U.S. Energy Research and Development
Administration (now the Department of Energy) announced its concern about
the future development and acceptance of Light Water Reactor (LWR) power
plants in the United States. The ERDA concern was expressed in several
studies that were launched immediately. One of these studies is the MIT
LWR Study (M3)* which was conducted during the following two years. The
effort was divided among three major groups. Technical issues that
affect the price of electricity produced from LWR power plants were
investigated by the Technical Group. Nontechnical issues were the
concern of the Institutional/Regulatory Group. Part of the effort of
these two groups was to develop the appropriate input needed by the
Economics Group, which was concerned with the economics of the overall
U.S. electric energy supply and demand for the next two decades. The
joint effort of the three groups is an examination of the large set of
possible issues and alternatives that influence the future role of the
LWR as a source of electricity.
The price of electric power paid by the consumer reflects the
contributions of generation, transmission, and distribution. Costs of
transmission and distribution are independent of the type of generating
*This indicates that the relevant information is found in reference
number M3. (see the bibliography at the end of this report.)
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facility. This leaves the cost of generation, or the busbar cost, as the
only one sensitive to the choice of the power plant equipment.
Consideration of the factors that contribute to the busbar cost can be
made by utilizing the following expression for the busbar cost, Cb:
C = [R + 0 + F (1.1)
where
K = capacity factor, actual kWehr/rated kWehr,
R + 0 = fixed (capital plus operating) cost, mills/kWehr, and
F = fuel cycle cost, mills/kWehr.
One section of the Technical Group working on this project was involved
in studies of the capacity factor. Another section examined the fuel
cycle cost. The work presented in this fixed cost assessment report is
the contribution of the third technical section. Parallel to other
activities associated with the overall project, the Fixed Cost Assessment
Section investigated the fixed cost status, current trend, the factors
contributing to this trend, assessment of possible improvement
alternatives, and the factors that limit the range of improvement. As
shown above, the fixed cost is the sum of two terms. The first term, R,
represents the return requirement on capital investment. This investment
is associated with the total cost of building the nuclear power plant and
placing it into commercial operation. The value of R represents both
direct and indirect costs. Direct costs are those associated on an
item-by-item basis with land and land rights, the physical plant
(structures, equipment, and materials), and the labor involved. Indirect
costs include expenses for services such as engineering and design,
15
construction facilities, taxes, insurance, and interest during
construction, and general items such as staff training, plant start-up,
and general and administrative overhead of the owner. The first core
loading investment cost is not included in the capital cost; it is
considered part of the fuel cost.
The second term, 0, represents the operation and maintenance
charges. It includes the operating costs of plant staffing and nuclear
liability insurance. Maintenance costs include coolant/moderator makeup,
consumable supplies and equipment, and outside support services. In
addition to these major items, there are miscellaneous O&M costs
associated with staff replacement, operator requalification, annual
operating fees, travel and office supplies, the owner's other general and
administrative costs, as well as working capital requirements.
The cost of plant backfitting due to evolving safety and
environmental regulations and, to a lesser extent, due to enhancing plant
performance, is of a capital cost nature, but in some cases it has been
included in O&M costs. As we will see later, some utilities find it
expedient to expense the backfit costs rather than capitalizing them.
With the preceding discussion in mind, one can see that the fixed
cost components are no longer fixed with time. The adjective "fixed"
indicates that the relevant cost is independent of the quantity of power
generated. This is true for the capital cost term and the operation part
of the second term. Although the cost associated with the maintenance
activities is highly variable in theory, it is practically confined, on
the average, to a narrow range for any given power plant. Because the
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fuel charges are variable, theoretically or otherwise, and for the lack
of a better term, all the non-fuel charges have been called Fixed Cost.
In 1977, a typical set of figures related to the details of the
busbar cost is as follows (El):
capital investments $764/kWe
fixed operation cost $2.62/kWe yr
variable maintenance cost $0.66/MWehr
fuel cycle cost (1977) $0.53/MBtu
Assuming 65% as the value for the capacity factor and 18% for the
levelized annual fixed charge rate, the following table can be produced
capital return requirement
O&M charges
fuel charges
Busbar cost
mills/kWehr %
24.15 78.95
1.12 3.66
5.32 17.39
30.59 100.00
The various sources described in Chapter II report the following ranges:
capital return requirement 68-80%
O&M charges up to 10%
The fuel charges take the balance of the busbar cost.
The aim of this discussion is to assess the relative importance of
each of the two (fixed cost) components. It is apparent that the capital
cost carries almost all the fixed cost weight. It turns out that because
of the nature of the activities involved in constructing and operating
such projects, capital cost is more controllable. This is because the
1:
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number of key people involved in the construction stage is limited
relative to that in the O&M stage; the expenditures are much larger, and
therefore more cautious planning is attainable. In the case of operation
and maintenance cost, every power plant has its own team, the
expenditures are relatively low, and decisions are more of a reactionary
type, reflecting instantaneous circumstances.
Because more attention has been paid to capital cost in the
literature (as indicated in the later chapters) compared to the several
detailed studies that were done related to capital cost, so the author
encountered only one short, and in some sense incomplete, study of O&M
cost (Al). In any case, the relative importance led, at an early stage
of this work, to the decision to concentrate most of the effort on the
treatment of the capital cost. In this report, topics related to the
discussion of the two components (R and 0) are tested in a parallel
fashion wherever possible.
Work on this study has involved extensive literature search,
utilization of computer codes (both available and newly developed), and
assessment of data obtained by surveying the U.S. nuclear industry and
utilities. This report consists of ten chapters and an appendix. The
following chapter deals with survey data. It offers a background for the
motivations that guided the rest of the report. The next six chapters
reflect the bulk of the study in the area of capital cost assessment.
Chapter III discusses capital cost estimation and the base case. Chapter
IV presents the trend of capital cost. Chapter V investigates the
contributions of capital cost elements. Chapter VI discusses the causes
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of capital cost behavior. These four chapters lay the background for the
major goal of this study, which is the to assess the possible
alternatives for capital cost improvement presented in Chapter VII. The
factors that may limit such improvement are presented in Chapter VIII.
Assessment of the other fixed cost component, the operation and
maintenance cost, is presented in Chapter IX. The flow of material in
Chapter IX is parallel to that of Chapters III through VIII. The last
chapter gives a summarizes the report and discusses recommendations for
future work.
Throughout this study, sources of data other than the survey are
utilized, as indicated and cited in the text. When data samples are
used, no statistical effort is made beyond evaluating the mean value and
the standard deviation in order to identify the data spread. More
sophisticated steps can be used to assess the data. Such effort,
however, is sacrificed to give attention to more profound issues.
Unlike several other studies, especially in the capital cost area,
the main objective of this part of the MIT LWR Study is not merely to
assess the current status of LWR fixed cost, its trend, and the causes of
this trend. This study addresses, for the first time, the different
fixed cost improvement strategies, their effectiveness as based on
analytical and historical evidence, and the limiting factors that may
impede such improvement. In Chapter VII three sets of possible
improvement alternatives are investigated. Most of these alternatives
have been proposed and exercised for a period of time. In order to reach
a comprehensive improvement strategy this report proposes improvement in
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two additional areas: periodic regulatory freezes and financing. The
latter received more attention. A computer code to investigate the
Ultra-accelerated Depreciation financing has been developed and is shown
in the appendix.
As presented in Chapters III through VI, LWR capital cost involves a
large amount of funds to be spent over a long period of time before
economically produced electricity is generated. LWR project lead times
have become longer than the conventional planning horizons of electric
utilities. Capital investment has become too large for many utilities to
procure the necessary funds, internally or externally. This means that,
while LWRs remain economically attractive as electricity sources, as
shown by the output of the Economics Group, they tend to price themselves
out of the market. This situation is shared by all new or improved
technologies, such as the breeder reactor, whose capital cost is
estimated to be 50% higher than that of LWRs (S5), future fusion
machines, and even current coal-fired plants whose capital cost is
catching up with LWRs. Therefore, a comprehensive strategy for capital
cost improvement is the major objective of this study. The aim is to
improve the electricity busbar cost. This can be done by improving
capital cost in a controllable way that does not allow for undesirable
changes in other busbar cost components to dominate.
It is important to remember that the capital cost assessment in this
study is a technical study made primarily for the purpose of assessing
the relative sensitivity to various options. The absolute capital cost
values are derived to be reasonable but are not the primary goal of the
20
study. This study is only concerned with matters relevant to the
technological, environmental, financial, and managerial aspects
determining nuclear power plant capital investment. The study therefore
concentrates on areas that are important as input to the "global system"
economic sensitivity studies.
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CHAP TER II
ASSESSMENT OF U.S. SURVEY DATA
This study is concerned with the assessment of the various
strategies that the U.S. Department of Energy may pursue or assist in
implementing, to improve the Light Water Reactor power plant industry's
current status and future trend from the vantage point of fixed costs.
The span was taken to be 20 years, i.e. 1977 to 1997. As the problem was
formulated and the means of solution were sketched, a number of unknowns
were identified. These unknowns are called variables. Each of these
variables was expected to have a range of possible values, the choice of
which depends on relevant conditions.
The lack of sufficient and up-to-date information in the literature
made it necessary to survey of the nuclear industry to develop a data
base for this study. In addition, the nuclear industry is the most
sensitive sector of the society to the outcome of the study and obviously
the opinion and judgment of those in the industry are the most
knowledgeable on related matters. Hence their assistance was solicited
in evaluating the variables and also in carrying out the overall study.
The survey was made in the form of a numerical questionnaire, with
provision for comments in some specified areas. The text of the
questionnaire included a defined list of variables, answer sheets, and
instructions. The variables were divided into groups, according to the
specialty and experience of the information source, with some overlap
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between groups. Consequently the answer sheets were designed according
to the groups of variables and the related assumptions. These
assumptions correspond to the different alternatives that may be
considered for improving each of the components of the fixed cost. The
list of variables and assumptions was made as comprehensive as possible,
and by no means was it expected to be fully completed by any one of the
information sources. The list of information sources consisted of
directly-contacted and indirectly-contacted members of the nuclear
industry. The first category is composed of 14 companies. Their
specialities are as follows:
Equipment vendors 3
Architect/Engineer-constructor 2
Research group 1
Utilities 8
With members of this group we had personal contacts involving one or more
meetings, as well as other forms of communication. The group of
variables for which information was requested of the A/E firms and the
utilities was large. Hence it had to be broken down into four subgroups
when contacts with a second category of information sources were made.
This category includes 24 utilities and one architect/engineering firm.
About one-third of the 38 sources have provided us with complete positive
responses. All information sources were given anonymity. All
information obtained from any of them will be referenced as "our survey
sources."
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2.1 Data from the Survey of U.S. Nuclear Industry
The results of the survey data are presented in Table 2.1. The
first column on the left has the serial numbers with which the variables
are located on the list of variables. The second column gives a brief
description of the variable. The next two columns give the mean value
and the standard deviation of the data, using the same units. The fifth
column gives the number of points (information sources) from which
pertinent data were obtained. The last column describes the assumptions
associated with the adjacent value assigned to the variable. All data
reflect 1977 conditions unless otherwise stated. SINGLE UNIT means that
the plant has one unit, designed, licensed, and constructed without
taking advantages of standardization. DUPLICATION means that more than
one identical units are considered, with one or more utilities building
and licensing them, or more than one unit in operation under the same
management at the same site. STANDARD DESIGN is when a combination of
Reference Systems for the Nuclear Steam Supply System and Balance of
Plant is exploited (see Section 7.2). REPLICATION is similar to
DUPLICATION except the licensing effort of the latter unit is separate
from that of the referenced unit. CWIP is when the Construction Work in
Progress is added to the current rate base, and hence the allowance for
funds using during construction is billed directly to current consumers.
NO A/E means that the utility does its own architect/engineering and
construction activity with no outside support in these areas.
PRESELECTED SITE reflects the condition when the necessary activities for
site selection are completed prior to NSSS purchase. Other remarks are
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self-explained. Information that reflects the possible implementation of
other assumptions (or conditions) as well as the majority of the future
projections could not be obtained. Some of the collected data reflected
a misunderstanding of the relevant questions or use of alternative
definitions that resulted in inconsistencies. These data were not
included in the statistics. Some sources gave information on some
variables under some assumption such that when compared with other data
from a different set of sources concerning the same variable, results
were distorted. This can be noticed in a few cases in the table. When
major distortions or inconsistencies were observed, the method of
calculating the mean and the standard deviation is altered. This is
found wherever the number of points is expressed as n + m. m is the
number of points used to generate the first value reported for the
variable, while n is the number of points that are shared consistently by
the two sets of assumptions. As an example, consider variable 22. The
figure 141.2 + 28.2 is based on m = 5 data points. The next value 126.1
+ 25.2 is based on 2 + 5 data points. m = 5 are the same data points
used for the first value. When the second value was calculated there
were more than two data points under the duplicate assumptions. Only 2
points are consistent with the set of 5 points used to calculate the
single unit value. When these 2 points are compared with their
counterparts in the 5-point set, the value 141.2 + 28.2 was scaled down
to 126.1 + 25.2. Comparison is carried out between sets of data that are
obtained from the same set of information sources.
The data presented in Table 2.1 form the basis for the analyses
presented in the remainder of this report. Examples are the set of input
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data for CONCEPT code calculation of the capital cost base case estimate
in Chapter III, variations of capital cost base elements in Chapter V,
and O&M cost related data in Chapter IX. In Section 6.1, Table 2.1 data
helped to assess the effects of escalation, and to assess standardization
in Section 7.2. The assistance of the survey data in Chapter IV was
limited, since only a small set of future-related data extending to the
late 1980s was obtained. Our survey sources indicate that uncertainties
for future projections are too high to generate dependable data.
Therefore, the use of these data for future projections must be
considered as highly uncertain beyond 1990, and the work discussed here
is limited to a time span up to 1990.
Table 2.1 Summary of the Survey Data
# Variable Name
1 Cost of equip.
required
2 Escalation rate
of 1
12 Cost of computer
equip.
13 Cost of all
reactor plant
equip.
15 Cost of condensers
16 Cost of feedwater
heaters
14 Cost of turbine
generator
18 Cost of all
turbine plant
equip.
19 Cost of diesel
generators
Mean Value
$158/kWe
$149/kWe
$142/kWe
6.47%
$2.25/kWe
$2.45/kWe
$2.0/kWe
$3.6/kWe
$83.9/kWe
$74.2/kWe
$5.3/kWe
$2.35/kWe
$39.8/kWe
$31.0/kWe
$41.9/kWe
$88.0/kWe
$87.1/kWe
$3.07/kWe
$2.52/kWe
S.D.
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14
24.2
1.48
.64
.35
.42
19.7
18.1
.21
7.8
.8
8.2
10.4
10.3
.55
.86
# pts
4
4
2
6
4
2
2
1
6
7
1
2
7
2
1+7
3
1+3
4
2
Remarks
Single unit
Duplicate unit
Standard design
Single unit
Duplicate
Standard design
1987 single
Single unit
Duplicate units
Single unit
Single unit
Single unit
Duplicate/Replica
Single unit (1987)
Single unit
Duplicate
Single unit
Duplicate
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Table 2.1 (continued) Summary of the Survey Data
# Variable Name b
20 NSSS equip.
delivery time
21 T-G equip.
delivery time
22 Total lead time
23 Time from NSSS
commitment to
CP
24 Construction
time
24B Pre-NSSS con-
struction time
25 Pre-commercial
testing time
26 Site preparation
time
27A NRC licensing
time - PSAR
27B NRC licensing
time - PSAR
(not on critical
path)
28 EPA licensing
time
30 State licensing
time
31 Local licensing
time
32 Labor requirements
5 Single unit
33 Average cost of
of labor
34 Material
requirements
Mean Value
60 months
55.3 months
60 months
48.8 months
47.3 months
41.8 months
141.2 months
126.1 months
128.4 months
125.5 months
113.4 months
134.8 months
50.6 months
43.1 months
41.8 months
39.9 months
48.3 months
22.0 months
67.8 months
64 months
33 months
27.4 months
6 months
16 months
31.5 months
21.4 months
24.7 months
36.7 months
26.3 months
22.7 months
41.3 months
33.0 months
22.5 months
S.D.
8.5
12.7
4.0
13.7
16.2
11.7
28.2
25.2
25.6
25.1
22.6
26.9
17.5
15.0
14.4
13.9
16.8
7.7
3
3.5
7
5.8
10.5
7.7
5.2
6.1
9.0
11.9
2.2
6.1
10.4
18.6
# pts
4
3
3
4
3
2+4
5
2+5
1+5
2+5
1+5
1+5
5
3+5
1+5
2+5
1+5
1+5
5
3
5
1+5
Remarks
Single unit
Duplicate
Standard design
Single unit
Duplicate
Standard design
Single unit
Duplicate
Replicate
Standard design
Pre-selected site
CWIP + no A/E
Single unit
Duplicate
Replicate
Standard design
No A/E
Pre-selected site
Single unit
Standard design
Single + duplicate
Standard design
Most significant
value
5 Single unit
4
2+4
2+4
1+4
3
3
Single unit
Replicate
Standard design
2 duplicate units
Single unit
Standard design
3 Insensitive to
standardization
4 standardization
4 standardization
10.6 mh/kWe 2.0
8.56 mh/kWe
11.2 mh/kWe
$15.3/kWe
$60.7/kWe
.85
1.8
2.2
5
3
5
Duplicate
Standard design
CONCEPT-5 estimate
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Table 2.1 (continued) Summary of the Survey Data
# Variable Name
35 Material req./
structures
36 Material req./
thermo-hydro
37 Material req./
electrical
38 Spare parts
allowance
39 Contingency;
normal + abnormal
40 Engineering
services
41 Cost of con-
struction equip.
42 Plant fore cost
($1977)
43 Escalation rate
of #33
44 Escalation rate
of #34
45 Escalation rate
of #40
46 Escalation rate
of #41
47 Escalation rate
of #42
52 AFDC
53 AFDC effective
rate
54 Insurance during
construction
55 State taxes during
#23
63 Federal taxes
64 Other taxes in
commercial
Mean Value
$38.1/kWe
$24.8/kWe
$15.2/kWe
$13.3/kWe
$15.2/kWe
$2.2/kWe
$65.9/kWe
$62.8/kWe
$83.7/kWe
$82.8/kWe
$73.6/kWe
$17.1/kWe
$16.8/kWe
$588/kWe
$545/kWe
$535/kWe
7.48%
6.56%
6.35%
6.17%
6.69%
$356/kWe
8.88%
$1.103/kWeyr
S.D.
5.1
0.8
2.0
0.4
2.0
0.7
15.6
18.3
21.4
33.1
11.8
1.9
5.1
97.2
78
88.4
0.62
1.51
0.77
1.72
0.68
106
0.66
.023
# pts
3
3
3
3
3
4
Remarks
Single unit
Standard design
Duplicate unit
Standard design
Duplicate unit
6 Single unit
6 Duplicate
6 Single unit
7 Duplicate
3 Standard design
2 Single unit
4 Duplicate
5 Single unit
6 Duplicate
1+6 Standard design
7 Annually
7 Annually
4 Annually
7 Annually
5 Annually
5 This is a dependent
variable
5 Annual rate
3
zero
$13.5/kWeyr
$12.2/kWeyr
$32/kWeyr
$12.1/kWeyr
$10.9/kWeyr
operation 28.7/kWeyr
65 Operating fees zero
66 Nuclear iability $1.22/kWeyr
insurance $1.12/kWeyr
1 Single unit
1 2 units
1 Single unit
1 Single unit
1 2 units
1 Single unit
0.12
0.11
(1988)
(1988)
2 Single unit
1+2 2 units
---
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Table 2.1 (continued) Summary of the Survey Data
# Variable Name
67 Staff number
(operation)
68 Staff average
wages
Mean Value
112 men
S.D.
149 men
160 men
112 men
$24,889/yr
$44,895/yr
$47,278/yr
69 Cost of O&M 2.15 mill
requirements kWehr
70 Escalation rate 8.67%/yr
of #69
71 Fore cost changes 7.67%/yr
due to req. changes
72 Fore cost changes 4%/yr
due to req. changes
73 Fore cost changes 3%/yr
due to req. changes
74 Fore cost changes 2%/yr
due to req. changes
80 Plant thermal 33%
efficiency
81 Reactor thermal None
output limit
87 Cost of site $20/kWe
preparation req.
91 Cost of manu- $565/kWe
factured plant
92 Escalation rate 6.5%
of #91
93 Site licensing 18 months
time
94 Manufacturing 42 months
time
95 Work on-site 36 months
before FNP arrival
96 Work on-site 6 months
97 after FNP arrival
98 Cost of FNP $5x106
99 transportation
s/
5273
9511
10016
1.05
3.60
7.02
4.24
2.83
1.41
1
# pts Remarks
1 1060 MWe-single
unit
1 1060 MWe-2 units
1 1150 MWe-single
1 1200 MWe-single
unit (1988)
3 in 1977
1+3 in 1982
1+3 in 1988
4 at a capacity
factor = .65
3
3 for 1977-81
2 for 1982-86
2 for 1987-91
2 for 1992-96
3 with no future
changes
(technologically)
1 Increasing 4%/yr
1 1150 MWe, FNP
1
1 (variables 93-95
are overlapping)
1
1
1
1
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C H A P T E R III
CAPITAL COST ESTIMATE
This chapter covers the area of capital cost estimate. It starts
with establishing some basic definitions to be used for the remainder of
the report, then reviews the capital cost estimates and calculations, and
concludes with establishing the base case.
3.1 Basic Definitions
In order to provide a consistent set of terms, the following
definitions are made and clarified by Figure 3.1.
1) The Fore Cost. This is the cost of all equipment, materials,
and services that will be consumed until the completion
of the project, evaluated in terms of the prevailing prices at
the beginning of the project. Hence the fore cost is given in
dollars valued at about the time the decision to purchase is
being made.
2) The Tail Cost. This is the cost of equipment, materials, and
services that will be consumed during the completion of the
project in terms of prices that are actually (or expected to
be) paid at the time of their purchase, according to the
then-market conditions, throughout the construction period.
Note that the fore cost and the tail cost account for the same
items of equipment, labor, materials, and services.
3) The Escalation Cost. This is the difference between the tail
30
CF: Fore cost
CT: Tail cost
Cc: Commercial cost
AFDC: Allowance for funds used during construction
CEDC: Cost of escalation during construction
L: Total project lead time
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cost and the fore cost. It may be referred to by CEDC for
the cost of escalation during construction.
4) Allowance for Funds used During Construction, AFDC. This is
the cost of investment during the construction period. It is
the sum of the interest on the borrowed fraction of capital,
and the opportunity cost on the equity part.
5) The Commercial Cost. It is the tail cost added to the
associated AFDC. It thus represents the total project cost for
the utility, including their opportunity cost of investment.
Alternatively, this is the book value of the plant at the start
of commercial operation. The rate base of electricity is made
considering the commercial cost.
The contribution of the capital cost to the busbar cost is given by
the value of the commercial cost, CC, as the plant goes into commercial
operation. This set of definitions describes "levels" and components of
capital cost. These "levels" are the fore cost, CF, the tail cost,
CT, and the commercial cost, CC. They have the following
relationship:
CC(t) = CF(t - L) +CEDC(L) + AFDC(L) (3.1)
= CT(t) + AFDC(L) (3.2)
where
L = project lead time, years
t = calendar time, years
CEDC = cost of escalation during construction, and
AFDC = allowance for funds used during construction.
It is interesting to clarify the preceding definitions by a
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numerical example. In Section 3.3 the fore cost is calculated for a
special case as $592/kWe for 1977. Eleven years later, the CEDC was
$312/kWe, making the tail cost $903/kWe. The AFDC during the same period
was $438/kWe, and the commercial cost was $1342/kWe.
The same computational procedure was repeated, assuming historically
averaged values of 7% AFDC annual rate, 9 years for project lead time,
and 3 years for construction permit lead time. The same reactor size was
used and the date of commercial operation was January 1, 1977. The
resulting commercial cost value is $599/kWe, which is only 1% higher than
the first value. These two values are in good agreement when the
uncertainties in determining the computational parameters are
considered. The obvious conclusion is that the fore cost of a given
plant at any point in time is the same as the commercial cost of a
similar plant that has just been completed under similar project
conditions. Based on historical economic data since 1953, a recent study
concludes that the fore cost is + 6% of commercial cost of the same
date. On the average, CF is only 1% higher than the CC (J1).
3.2 Use of CONCEPT Code, Phase 5
The CONCEPT code is a package of three computer programs that were
developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the Computing Technology
Center (E2). It consists of a main program, CONCEPT, that accepts as
input for each run, information about size, location, and type of plant,
as well as the dates associated with NSSS commitment, issue of
construction permit, and commercial operation. This code has been used
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as a source of information and a means of comparison wherever possible in
this study.
To carry out the necessary calculations, CONCEPT utilizes the output
of the two other programs. CONTAC generates data files for the various
types of plants from the relevant cost models. The words "type of plant"
refer to whether it is, say, coal-fired with scrubbers, whether it is a
first or second unit, and the kind of cooling system employed. The
expression "cost model" means the item-by-item detailed description of
plant equipment, necessary material and labor to build the plant and
install equipment in place, and the associated costs. The CONLAM program
reads historical data for labor and material costs for each of 23
locations in the U.S. and Canada, and generates data files to be used by
CONCEPT.
Any changes in the cost models for any of the various types of
plants result in another run of CONTAC program to produce a new data file
for CONCEPT. The same is true with respect to labor and/or material
related changes and the CONLAM program. Minor changes, however, can be
temporarily implemented during the use of CONCEPT without altering the
relevant data files. To appreciate this arrangement, we notice that a
CONLAM run on the MIT computer system costs about $45 and a CONTAC run
costs about $95. These preliminary runs result in about $2.50 for each
CONCEPT run during normal usage. On the other hand, using raw data for
the CONCEPT program may result in a cost of $8.00 per run.
The package is continuously undergoing development and updating. At
MIT we first obtained the CONCEPT Phase 4, Code package (CONSYS4). This
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is the most informative and flexible version of the code. It has
equipment price data for June 30, 1975, and labor and material data
relating to the beginning of 1977. The drawback of this package is that
it still uses cost models created in 1972 (W1). This causes the code
estimates to be lower than actual ones made by utilities and vendors.
The Phase 4 code was used in the early stages of the study and its
output was normalized against updated data. Later, an early edition of
CONCEPT code, Phase 5 was obtained (H2.) It has computational features
similar to those of Phase 4. More detailed output can be generated. It
still follows the accounting system presented in the USAEC Code of
Accounts (N1) in an expanded form as compared to Phase 4. The main
advantage in this phase of CONCEPT code is the newly updated cost models
which are based on the latest United Engineers and Constructors Study
(N2) and were modified as late as June 1977. The labor and materials
data were modified by the same date. Unlike CONCEPT-4, CONCEPT-5 has
only the LWR and coal-fired power plants options. These two types of
large power plant technologies are the ones mostly expected to be
utilized in the foreseeable future. Because work on CONCEPT-5 has not
been completed by the time we obtained the said edition, the only option
of cooling system available was that of mechanical draft cooling towers.
This has restricted our flexibility in this relatively minor area (see
Section 3.3).
Few changes were needed in the program sources in order to make them
operable on the MIT computer facility. The changes included modifying
the subroutine IDAY encountered in CONCEPT-4 and CONTAC-4, and
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programming changes in CONLAM-4 to make it read input data from the
magnetic tape prepared at ORNL. In the CONCEPT-5 package, only the first
change had to be implemented.
3.2.1 Accuracy of CONCEPT Code, Phase 5
There have been two instances where actual data have been obtained
(from our survey sources) as a complete set usable for CONCEPT-5 input.
These data were accompanied by actual cost estimates of the relevant
power plants. The following presents the important points of comparison
between CONCEPT-5 calculations and actual detailed estimates made by
utilities.
Case 1: one unit plant
Commercial Cost (1985)
$/kWe %
Actual Estimate 1525 100.00
CONCEPT-5 Calculation 1187 77.85
Case 2: 2 unit plant total estimates
Labor Require- Tail Cost
ments (1985)
Manyears % $/kWe %
Actual Estimates 11, 500 1T 1650 100
CONCEPT-5 Calculation 10,448 90.85 1537 93.15
In both cases the Code has underestimated the actual figures. The first
case project started relatively early and licensing delays and
abnormalities may have distorted what the code considers as average
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conditions. CONCEPT estimates are within 9% of the utility estimates in
Case 2, a reasonably good agreement in this case.
3.3 The Capital Cost Base Case
A base case data set had to be established as a prerequisite to
further analyses. In addition, the base case was needed for the MIT
Regional Electricity Supply Model (REM), which is used by the Economics
Group to do overall cost-benefit evaluations of alternative LWR
improvement strategies. As an input to REM, fore cost data are required
for typical generating plants. Allowance has been made for the base case
for the coal-fired plants (with fewer details) in addition to that of the
LWR power plants.
3.3.1 Capital Cost of LWRs
Any power plant construction project is characterized by equipment,
labor, material, and time requirements. The base case parameters are
those that determine the base case capital cost value. With the
assistance of the data presented in Chapter II, these parameters have
been determined, then used as the standard input into CONCEPT code, Phase
5. The base case parameters are as follows:
a) Plant Power Capacity
The most popular size of generating units among the sources we
contacted is 1150 MWe. There were 59 generating units that have been
applied for to the NRC (AEC) between Jan. 1, 1974 and the end of 1975
(N3). The mean size of these reactors is 1181 MWe, with a standard
deviation of 120 MWe. When two 900 MWe units and two 906 MWe units are
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taken out, a sample of 55 reactors remains. The lowest reactor size in
this sample is 930 MWe. The average size of the 55 reactors is 1201 MWe
with 96 MWe as a standard deviation. Note that in this sample, except
for four reactors that are of 930 MWe, all other sizes start from 1120
MWe. This sample reflects the notion of the industry about the optimum
future reactor generating capacities. Hence, for convenience and
consistency, the plant size was taken as 1200 MWe.
b) Reactor type
Only 14 of these reactors were of the BWR type. Forty-one reactors
are of the PWR type. Four others were undecided (and were canceled 4
years later). This makes the PWR/BWR ratio 3 to 1. Investigation of
additional information (N2) shows that the two types of power plants come
close within 2% of fore cost. The base case reactor type was arbitrarily
chosen to be a PWR. Table 3.1 shows results of CONCEPT-5 calculations.
Table 3.1 Cost Comparison of Reactor Types (CONCEPT-5 Output)
LABOR REQ'MT FORE COST TAIL COST COMMERCIAL
REACTOR TYPE (1977) (1988) COST (1988)
manhours/kWe % $/kWe % $/kWe % $/kWe %
PWR (base 9.282 100.00 592 100.00 903 100 1342 100.00
case)
BWR 9.497 102.32 591 99.83 903 100 1340 99.85
c) Number of units per plant
Although many sites have, or are planned to have, more than one unit
per plant, one unit per plant was chosen. This is because there are many
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cases where the reactor is truly a first unit, and many others where the
advantage of being a second duplicate unit could not be taken.
d) Cooling system
The type of cooling system for the plants described in a) above,
was distributed as follows:
Once-through cooling 11 units
Natural draft towers 21 units
Mechanical draft towers 23 units.
The third type of cooling system was chosen because of the
restrictions of the available version of CONCEPT-5. CONCEPT-4
calculations for the three cooling systems are made with the same base
case input data. The results are shown in Table 3.2. The cost
comparison between the three types of cooling systems shows that the
choice of mechanical draft cooling towers is an acceptable assumption.
Table 3.2 Cost Comparison of the Cooling Systems (CONCEPT-4 Output)
LABOR REQ'MT FORE COST TAIL COST COMMERCIAL
TYPE OF (1977) (1988) COST (1988)
COOLING
SYSTEM manhours/kWe % $/kWe % $/kWe % $/kWe %
Mechanical
Draft 7.745 100.0 401 100.00 636 100 946 100.0
Natural
Draft 7.983 103.1 407 101.5 644 101.3 958 101.3
Once-
through 8.142 105.1 407 101.5 649 102.0 967 102.2
e) Location
Northeast region, designated as BOSTON, MASS., is agreed on by the
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project working groups. This location has the following features:
1) It is a real location.
2) It is very close to the conditions in terms of final cost
data of the hypothetical site, Middletown, USA used in CONCEPT
code-related studies as the reference site.
3) Although the Northeast region is the worst region from
fixed cost considerations as shown by the EPRI study (El), nuclear energy
stands as the major electricity source beside oil in this region. The
EPRI study shows that this region has the highest capital cost--about 10%
larger than the average over all U.S. regions (see Table 8.1 in Chapter
VII).
f) Date of NSSS Commitment
January 1, 1977 is taken as the reference date for fore cost data.
g) Date of Construction Permit
Table 2.1 shows a construction permit lead time (variable 23) of
50.6 + 17.5 months for single unit plants. It shows lower values for
other special cases. Forty-eight months is taken as the convenient
value. Hence, the CP date is January 1, 1981.
h) Date of Commercial Operation
Table 2.1 shows the total project lead time (variable 22) as 141.2 +
28.2 months, or a mean value of 11.75 years for single unit plants. It
shows much shorter times for other alternatives. Eleven years is chosen
and the commercial operating date is January 1, 1988.
i) AFDC Effective Annual Rate
The value of 8.48 + 1.05% is shown in Table 2.1 (variable 53) for
the AFDC. As a convenient conservative value, recommended by some
industry sources, 9.0% was chosen.
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The last three parameters, g, h, and i, do not affect the fore cost
value. Other important parameters, such as the costs of equipment and
materials, and labor requirements, were left to be calculated by the
code. The values for these parameters, as calculated by the code, were
different from those shown in Table 2.1 in an inconsistent manner.
Consequently, the code-computed values for these parameters were left as
a part of the base case value, and Table 2.1 data are reserved as a guide
for the sensitivity studies. The results of CONCEPT-5 calculations are
summarized in Table 3.3. Note the remarkably close agreement between the
CONCEPT-5 value for the 1977 fore cost and that reported in Table 2.1
(variable 42).
Table 3.3 LWR Base Case Capital Cost
Fore Cost (1977)
Total
direct equipment cost
direct labor cost
direct material cost
indirect costs
contingency allowance (at 10%)
Labor requirements
Tail Cost (1988)
rate of escalation during construction
overall
equipment
labor
material
cost of escalation during construction
total tail cost
AFDC (1977-1988)
AFDC effective annual rate, given
AFDC
Commercial Cost (1988)
$592/kWe
$196/kWe
$117/kWe
$61/kWe
$164/kWe
$53/kWe
9.282 manhours/kWe
6.760 %/yr
5.911 %/yr
8.385 %/yr
6.898 %/yr
$312/kWe
$903/kWe
9%
$438/kWe
$1342/kWe
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The 1977 fore cost figure was passed to the Economics Group for use as
input to the REM code.
3.3.2 Capital Cost of Coal-fired Plants
Upon request from the Economics Group, the 1977 fore cost value for
a typical coal-fired plant was estimated. The values of the base case
parameters that affect the fore cost are the same as those for the LWR
plants, except for the following:
a) Plant Power Capacity
As recommended by some industry sources, the optimum size for
coal-fired plants is around 800 MWe. This is determined by the
construction and the operation and maintenance economics. These in turn
are consequences of the nature of the fuel as well as the
state-of-the-art. CONCEPT-5 references a plant of 794 MWe capacity, and
this value was taken for this parameter.
b) Equipment
The plant is a coal-fired unit with a flue-gas desulfurization
system (scrubbers). This is expected to be the prevailing design for
future plants due to environmental restraints.
The result of the base case calculation is:
Total Fore Cost (1977) $515/kWe.
3.3.3 Assessment of the Base Case Data
Section 3.2.1 shows that CONCEPT-5 calculations deviate within about
9% of utility estimates for an ongoing nuclear power plant project
suffering the unfavorable conditions that prevail in today's industry.
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Section 3.2.1 results also tend to confirm Table 2.1, as it will be seen
in several cases. In other cases Table 2.1 data have some defects that
will be discussed later. The 9% deviation is not so large that
improvement on Table 3.3 becomes necessary. The $1.61 billion figure for
the 1988 commercial cost is in close agreement with other estimates. In
fact both fore cost and commercial cost figures seem higher than the
national averages presented in the next chapter. Finally, the main role
of the base case is to examine the impact of varying the relevant
parameters on capital cost (see Chapters V and VI).
43
CHAPTER IV
PRESENT TREND OF CAPITAL COST
The present day status of LWR capital cost is described by the base
case data set. The 1977 fore cost is $592/kWe. This has increased from
$211/kWe in about 4-1/2 years (W1). Table 2.1 shows that the same value
(variable 42) should be $588 + 97.2/kWe. The mean value is statistically
undistinguishable from the base case value. The 16.5% standard deviation
may be explained by regional variations, as discussed later in Section
8.2.
Eq. 3.1 expresses the commercial cost as the sum of the fore cost,
the CEDC and AFDC. Since the main determinant of the CEDC and AFDC is
the fore cost itself, this makes the commercial cost strongly dependent
on the behavior of the fore cost. The average annual rate of increase of
the fore cost over the last 4-1/2 year period, from $211/kWe to $592/kWe,
is 25.8%.
The other factor that influences the commercial cost is the project
lead time. This has changed dramatically over the past decade. Figure
4.1 shows the average actual construction time of LWRs for the period
1969-1977, and the estimated construction time for years beyond 1977.
Parallel to the fore cost changes, the construction time (about 60 to 75%
of project lead time) was 66 months for plants completed in 1972 and
between 90 to 105 months for plants completed in the 1976-78 period. It
is observed that for plants completed in the 1970s, the construction
44
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time increased about 4 months/year (M1). The overall increase in the
five-year (1972-77) period is about 50% for the construction time.
The CP lead time (time to obtain the Construction Permit) exhibits
similar behavior, as seen in Figure 4.2. For the 1966-71 period the CP
lead time increased at a rate of 5 months/year (M1). Figure 4.2 shows
that 3.5 out of the 5 months/year increase is in the period of
Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) review. This makes the project
lead times for plants to be completed in the 1970s increase at a rate of
9 to 10 months/year. Even though attempts to improve the licensing
procedures are being made so this trend is not expected to hold for the
Eighties, it is not inconceivable that further increases will occur due
to unforeseen factors.
The consequences on commercial cost are pronounced. Early in the
last chapter we saw the relationship between the fore cost and the
commercial cost. While the 1977 commercial cost (the 1977 fore cost for
plants considered in 1977) is estimated at $592/MWe, the commercial cost
for the same plants in 1988 is $1342/kWe (see Table 3.3). This
corresponds to a 127% increase in 11 years, or an annual average of
7.74%. Figure 4.3 supports this estimate. The data in this figure start
with $534/kWe for 1977 and end with estimated commercial cost of
$1062/kWe for 1987. On the other hand, it shows about $450/kWe for large
units in 1977. This is about 24% lower than the base case value, which
is for a plant in the same category. Note that only two LWR units
contribute to this low figure. This large discrepancy is due to the fact
that the base case calculation was done for the Northeast region, which
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is of a very high cost, while the two units that contribute to the lower
figure were built in regions on the opposite end of the cost spectrum.
Also, the two units are additions to multi-unit stations. The trend line
for all units in Figure 4.3 shows an average annual cost increase of
about $56.6/kWe.
Another study (W2) also has comparable results (see Figure 4.4). It
starts with about $153/kWe for all U.S. plants completed in 1970, to
$240/kWe in 1972, $518/kWe in 1977, $839/kWe in 1982 and ends with an
estimate of $1050/kWe in 1987. Its trend has an average annual increase
of $54.5/kWe, which is about 10.5% of the 1977 value. Note also the
uncertainty of estimates beyond 1977 in Figure 4.4, which is represented
by the shaded band whose half-width is about $64/kWe. In terms of 1977
commercial cost value ($518/kWe), this uncertainty is about 12.4% of the
total value. This uncertainty is less than that of Table 2.1. Again
regional differences are responsible for the low value reported here
($518/kWe) for 1977 relative to that of the base case.
The MIT's Center for Policy Alternatives conducted a study on LWR
capital cost in 1974 (B1). Its early date and, thus, its limited input
base, made its findings less dependable. The main contribution of this
study is the statistical technique later exploited in a Rand Study (as it
will be referred to in this report), which considers capital cost
analysis of LWR plants (M1). The Rand Study is more up-to-date, in the
sense it used the widest possible data base available in the winter of
1978. The most interesting finding of the Rand Study is that capital
cost is increasing by $140/kWe/year for LWR plants whose Construction
Permits were issued in the early 1970s. Figure 4.1 shows that, for the
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1976-90 period, commercial operation date lags the CP date by about 8
years. By considering the Rand Study projections for commercial cost
versus the CP date, the following results are obtained:
Year of Comm. Op. Comm. Cost, $/kWe
1983 1335
1988 2019
1993 2718
1998 3417
This 1988 commercial cost value is 50% higher than that of the base
case. The Rand Study concludes that these figures "might well be
realized." Based on our previously discussed findings, we assume in this
report that the Rand projections are overestimates and unlikely to be
realized.
A possible flaw in the Rand Study may be in the statistical
technique that was developed in the 1974 MIT study, whose shortcomings
were pointed out later by Lotze and Riordan (L1). The Lotze/Riordan
study shows that LWR and coal-fired plants exhibit similar capital cost
behavior. If this is true, along with the Rand Study projections, then
by the 1990s both coal and LWRs exhibit economies similar to those of the
not-yet-developed technologies.
The main conclusion that can be drawn here is that, based on Figures
4.3.and 4.4, the commercial cost increases linearly at about $55.5/kWe,
at a rate about 10% of the 1977 value. This linear increase has resulted
in a higher rate of change in the past and will result in a lower rate of
change in the future. It is consistent with the 25.8% annual increase
for the 1972-77 period.
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Thus far our attention has been concentrated on the commercial cost,
which may have the alternative definition of being the total capital cost
at the date of starting commercial operation. This definition makes the
value for commercial cost constant for a given plant. The capital cost,
however, is not constant for the same plant. In other words, although
commercial cost changes with time if several plants are considered,
capital cost changes with time even if one plant is considered. Since
the commercial cost value cannot be decreased once the plant is
completed, it thus stands as the minimum value for the capital cost of
that plant. After the plant comes on line backfitting expenses are
accumulated on top of commercial cost and thus capital cost of individual
plants rises. Such capital cost increase is added to the rate base, and
therefore is annually reported to the Federal Power Commission. A study*
that concentrated on 10 single-unit plants for the 1971-76 period
investigated this increase (Al). It found that the average accumulated
capital cost in 1976 was $155 million per plant. The average annual
increase per plant is $2.40 million for 1971-76 period. This increase is
about 1.5% of the 1976 average value. It should be noted here that the
$155 million is on a per-plant basis. The average unit capacity in this
sample is 595 MWe. This makes the average cumulative capital cost in
1976 to be $250/kWe. This is less than half the 1977 commercial cost
value. The reason for this too-low value is that it represents
commercial costs of plants completed between 1968 and 1972, whose annual
*It will be referred to as the S&W (for Stone & Webster Engineering
Corp.) Study,, in Chapter III.
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capital cost increments are in the vicinity of a few percentage points.
Another reason is that more than half of these plants were built as
turnkey projects; therefore their reported costs were unrealistically low
(P1). Although these 10 plants represent about 20% of the reactors
operating in 1976, these figures suggest that the capital cost increase
of operating units is much less than the commercial cost rise of plants
simultaneously under construction, although the latter category includes
much the same backfitting that has been implemented in the operating
plants. The main reason lies in the difference between the financial and
work circumstances of both categories of plants. Backfitting "projects"
for operating plants have much shorter project lead times and therefore
less CEDC and AFDC. Sometimes backfitting expenses are added to the
annual O&M costs, which may have distorted the outcome of the above
study, as we shall see in Chapter IX.
As a final comment, the commercial cost increase is much more
important than the capital cost increases of individual plants.
Therefore, discussion is confined to the analysis of commercial cost,
which is the dominant portion of capital cost throughout the individual
plant life and also the important parameter in comparing the LWR power
plants with other competing technologies. Henceforth, commercial cost
will have the same meaning as plant capital cost or total investment.
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CHAPTER V
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE CAPITAL COST ELEMENTS
In this chapter, attention is paid to the constituents of capital
cost and how they affect its final amount in each project. These
constituents, or elements, of capital cost are classified as the five
areas of equipment, labor, material, indirect expenses, and schedule.
Items such as labor, material, or specified equipment have direct effects
that can be felt through the quantities to be purchased and their
relevant prices. Stretching the construction schedule or introducing a
new specification of a piece of equipment has its indirect effects
through increased quantity of labor and/or material consumed, as well as
direct effects. The following sections address each element in
appropriate detail and investigate the capital cost sensitivity as the
possible ranges of change for each element are explored.
As a preview to the following subsection, a set of data that will be
useful in the up-coming analyses is presented in Table 5.1. This set of
data is the result of calculations based on information in Table 3.3.
Table 5.1 describes the contributions of the four physical elements of
capital cost, i.e., direct equipment, direct labor, direct material, and
indirect costs, to the fore cost, tail cost, and commercial cost. The
fifth capital cost element, time, is felt through the changing levels of
cost, i.e. from fore cost to commercial cost. Indirect costs (discussed
in Section 5.4) incorporate labor, equipment, and perhaps materials.
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Table 5.1: Contributions of the Physical Elements of Capital Cost
Contributions to Fore Cost (1977)
direct equipment cost $216/kWe 36.5
direct labor cost $129/kWe 21.8
direct material cost $67/kWe 11.3
indirect costs $180/kWe 30.4
Total Fore Cost $592/kWe 100.0
Contributions to Tail Cost (1988)
rate of escalation during
construction, overall 6.760%/yr
effective escalation period 6.45 yrs
direct equipment cost $310/kWe 34.3
(at 5.911%)
direct labor cost
(at 8.385%) $217/kWe 24.0
direct material cost
(at 6.898%) $102/kWe 11.3
indirect costs
(at 6.760%) $274/kWe 30.4
Total Tail Cost $903/kWe 100.0
Contributions to Commercial Cost (1988)
AFDC effective rate, given 9.0%/yr
effective compounding period 4.59 yrs
direct equipment cost $461/kWe 34.3
direct labor cost $322/kWe 24.0
direct material cost $152/kWe 11.3
indirect costs $407/kWe 30.4
Total Commercial Cost $1342/kWe 100.0
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This is why the word "direct" has preceded each of the first three
elements. The word "direct" will be dropped after this clarification.
Since expenditures related to each of the four capital cost physical
elements follow a rather complicated function of time, the cash-flow
function, a simple way to describe their contributions is to use the
following expression:
c ~ T1
CTi = CFi( + si) for tail cost contributions, and
CCi = CTi(109)T2 for commercial cost contributions.
In these expressions s is the escalation rate, i designates the capital
cost element, and T1 and T2 are the effective compounding periods for
escalation and AFDC, respectively. Their values are specified such that
Tables 5.1 and 3.3 remain consistent.
5.1 Equipment Contributions
Plant equipment can be classified as follows:
1) Functional Equipment. This class consists of those items that
are necessary to carry out the function of the plant, as
specified by its purpose, size, and performance level. The
reactor, coolant pumps, turbine, and feedwater heaters are
examples of this class.
2) Supporting Equipment. This is a wide class and includes
systems and components that accomplish a wide range of
assignments. It includes the control equipment, for instance,
which sets the functional equipment into a configuration
suitable to fulfill its requirements. It also includes
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auxiliary systems, such as those involved in coolant chemical
treatment, and the part of reliability-related components that
are there for the purpose of increased plant availability.
3) Protective Equipment. This class of equipment is required to
protect the public, the environment, and other parts of the
plant from any harm that could result from operation of some
system in the plant, or its malfunctioning. Examples are
radiation shielding structures and the containment
negative-pressure sustaining system, as well as the off-gas
system for BWRs. In addition, systems or components designed
as engineered safeguards, and all other reliability-related
components that are there for the purpose of enhancing plant
safety, are in this class.
This classification will assist us to examine in the following discussion
the role of the various pieces of equipment and their relative impacts on
capital costs.
Since a sizable fraction of capital cost is fixed and independent of
plant performance level, the aim is to maximize the plant output to the
point where the law of diminishing returns dominates, i.e., to the point
when marginal spending is not justified by the marginal increase in plant
output. This marginal spending is related primarily to expenditure on
additional optimizing equipment, such as larger turbines, or more
feedwater heaters to increase the efficiency of the steam cycle. This
suggests that the functional equipment class is not so flexible and its
contribution to rising capital costs is merely because of its direct
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costs. The direct costs of equipment reflect costs of raw materials,
design, and manufacturing, and also costs associated with transportation
and installation.
The supporting equipment class offers more flexibility. Limits on
flexibility are set according to direct cost and degree of utilization of
the first class. The minimum occurs when the plant is barely operable
and the cost of components lying in this class is lowest. On the other
hand, the maximum occurs when more redundant components are supplied and
larger capacities of auxiliary systems are installed, so failure of any
component, for instance, has very little effect on the whole plant. As a
practical example of the minimum limit, consider the case when there is
only one control system with enough instrumentation to operate the
reactor very cautiously. This situation results in a plan of operation
such that the reactor stays at low neutron flux and local power, well
away from expected safety limits. Power shaping and maximum utilization
of fuel cannot be accomplished. Operators would be ready to shut the
reactor down at the first sign of a problem. This may cause a number of
unnecessary outages and would drive the cost of power generation upward.
From a short-run point of view, the flexibility of the protective
equipment class is relatively infinite. Some of this equipment is
required by the plant owner to protect his employees and his investment.
The balance is also required by the regulating agencies to provide
adequate protection for employees, the public, and the environment.
Radioactive, chemical, mechanical, and electrical hazards are
considered. Through this class the environmental and safety regulations
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affect the level of equipment contribution to capital cost. Reduction in
equipment requirements (and related structures) can be accomplished by
lowering regulatory limits to less costly ones or by taking advantage of
overlapping, i.e., by using of multi-purpose configurations. The latter
suggests that additional effort on plant design otpimization is required.
5.1.1 Capital Cost Sensitivity to Equipment Cost
Based on the base case data set of Table 3.3, the contribution of
direct equipment is 36.5% to the fore cost (see Table 5.1). This weight
is slightly reduced to 34.3% when measured against the tail cost or the
commercial cost. The clear effect to this reduction is the relatively
lower escalation rate of equipment. We should recall here that the tail
cost data in Table 5.1 were obtained by assuming appropriate compounding
parameters, i.e., effective compounding periods. These parameters were
chosen such that the total values representing the sums of the component
values match their corresponding values in Table 3.3. A provision for
error should be recognized.
Table 2.1 presents the cost of equipment as $158 + 27/kWe, variable
1. This figure does not include a contingency allowance. The
corresponding fore cost figure is $588 + 97.2/kWe, which contains the
contingency allowance of $65.9/kWe (variable 39) or 11.2%. Considering
the mean values, the cost of equipment with 11.2% contingency makes 29.9%
of the fore cost. Considering the standard deviations, the uncertainty
in these data can make the equipment fraction of the fore cost as low as
21.3% or as high as 41.9%. The value obtained for the base case for this
fraction is well within this uncertainty range.
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Changes in equipment costs can be done through changing the unit
price or changing the quantity required. The first produces a linear
effect on the capital cost levels with a slope equal to 36.5% of the fore
cost and 34.3% of the commercial cost. When the quantity required is
altered, capital cost changes in a non-linear manner. This is because
the addition of equipment, for instance, is accompanied by increased
labor and material requirements, extra indirect expenses, and perhaps
schedule delay. The effect of such equipment requirement change on
changing other element requirements depends on the type of equipment and
its location in the plant. Such problems could not be easily
investigated, although the overall effects will be discussed in Section
6.2.
5.2 Labor Contributions
Let us start by examining the following expression:
CL = E Cih i (5.1)
where
hi = number of manhours of labor type i,
Ci = wage of labor type i, $/manhour,
N = total number of types of labor.
Hence, CL is the total cost of labor. As shown, CL depends on the
three factors N, Ci, hi. The growth of N has a minor effect, since
the newly created types of jobs, such as inspectors with different
specialties or marine biologists, usually do not involve a large number
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of people. Indirectly, however, they increase the inertia of the working
team and affect its overall performance.
Since it has a multiplying effect, the wage ($/manhour) is the most
important factor. Because of the prevailing economic conditions of
inflation and collective bargaining, wages are on a continuous rise. It
may slow down, but there is no reason to expect that wage cost will
stabilize or decline. The busbar cost should directly reflect this cost
and it is not possible to let the investor carry the burden. As the
busbar cost increases, energy of all forms becomes more expensive and
this reflects more wage increases. This leads to the obvious conclusion
that the discussion of labor cost is within the domain of economics.
The last factor, hi, has both a variable and a fixed component.
The fixed component is the number of manhours of labor type i,
necessarily required in the course of building the power plant. This
number is hard to define. It can be estimated by sophisticated
analysis. It is mentioned here but will not be discussed further. The
variable component is the number of manhours in excess of the fixed
component. It is separated from the total, because the objective is to
eliminate the variable component. This latter component depends on the
work atmosphere, the job conditions, and the quality of the labor force.
Work atmosphere refers to the variable geographic and climatic
conditions, as well as to labor politics. This factor is fixed from our
point of view. As the design changes, new equipment is introduced or a
different construction management scheme is actuated, and the worker
encounters transient conditions that reduce his performance. Besides
61
this, one can safely make the following observation: industry growth in
the past has been larger than the growth of the adequately qualified work
force. Accepting this fact leads to the expectation that, as time goes
by, less skilled and experienced, and hence less productive labor force
members are fed into the market, receiving almost the then-prevailing
wages. This of course makes the labor problem worse.
The distinction between the two components of hi has been made
merely for discussion purposes. The coming analysis considers the total
labor requirements as one variable without referring to any fixed or
variable component.
5.2.1 Capital Cost Sensitivity to Labor Cost
As has been mentioned, the labor cost depends on the quantity
consumed, or labor requirements, usually expressed in manhours/kWe, and
the unit cost, or wage, usually expressed in average $/manhour. The
latter is influenced by escalation. Table 3.3 shows that the annual
escalation rate for labor is 8.385%. When this is compared by the
overall project escalation rate of 6.76% (Table 3.3), one can readily
conclude that based on this effect alone the labor cost is moving toward
becoming a dominant, non-stabilizing factor. This factor is further
discussed in the next chapter when the cause of escalation is
investigated.
The base case, Table 3.3, has a value of 9.282 manhours/kWe as labor
requirements. The reference number in the UE&C Study (N2) is 9.5
manhours/kWe. Their earlier figure in 1972 was 6 manhours/kWe. This
shows about a 10% annual increase in labor requirements over the 1972-77
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period. Table 2.1, variable 32, has the value of 10.6 + 2.0 manhours/kWe
as the 1977 labor requirement. Table 5.1 shows the impact of labor on
capital cost. It shows that labor is responsible for 21.8% of the fore
cost and 24.0% of the commercial cost. This shows the effect of the
relatively high escalation rate of labor. It is expected, therefore,
that the sensitivity of capital cost to labor is controlled by these
percentages. In other words, a change of 1% in labor cost will change
CC by about .24%. We should, however, allow for expected errors due to
the fact thai: these percentages are based on rough calculations.
Considering the sensitivity of capital cost to the cost of labor, the
relationship is highly linear. This is because if the changing factor is
wages, it has the same effect on capital cost as that of price changes in
individual equipment items. If the quantity of labor is the changing
factor, whether the overall number of manhours or that of some labor
crafts, a similar effect is produced. This is explained by the fact that
in both cases the product Cihi in Eq. 5.1 changes, and therefore CL
assumes a new value whose effect on the commercial cost comes through the
24% labor contribution.
The variations in the labor quantity occur by changing the
productivity coefficient of labor due either to changes in laborer skill
or changing the way labor is utilized. Such independent variations of
labor quantity have no effect on other capital elements except some
material waste, minor equipment replacement, or a slight change in
indirect cost expenses. This is why it was stated earlier that the
capital cost/labor cost relationship is "highly" linear, rather than
"strictly" linear.
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To check this analysis, the following cases are investigated using
CONCEPT-5:
E.1: 10.6 manhours/kWe
E.2: 7.531 manhours/kWe
E.3: 8.406 manhours/kWe
E.4: 10.157 manhours/kWe
E.5: 11.033 manhours/kWe
E.6: 12.784 manhours/kWe
The first case is that of Table 2.1 data mean value. The standard
deviation in these data is 2.0 manhours/kWe or 18.9% of the mean value.
If this standard deviation were to affect equivalently the base case
value, then the latter appears as 9.28 + 1.75 manhours/kWe. The last
five cases are related to the base case value as follows:
E.2: 9.28 - S.D.
E.3: 9.28 - 1/2 S.D.
E.4: 9.28 + 1/2 S.D.
E.4: 9.28 + S.D.
E.6: 9.28 + 2 S.D.
The results of these calculations are presented in Table 5.2. Figure 5.1
summarizes these results. The linearity holds with slope of .28 which is
not far from the fraction of the capital cost that corresponds to the
contribution of labor cost. It should be noted here that the curve is
eyeball-fitted, which is sufficient for our purpose. It should be
noticed from Figure 5.1 that as the cost of labor increases, commercial
cost increases at a rate larger than that of the fore cost. This is
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Table 5.2 Capital Cost Sensitivity to Labor Requirements
Case CF CF/CFo CT CT/CTo A A/A0 CC CC/CCO
($/kWe) (%) ($/kWe) (%) ($/kWe) (%)
Base
Case 592 100 903 100 438 100 1342 100
E-1 616 104.05 943 104.43 458 104.57 1401 104.40
E-2 561 94.75 851 94.24 413 94.29 1264 94.19
E-3 577 97.47 878 97.23 427 97.49 1304 97.17
E-4 608 102.70 930 102.99 451 102.97 1381 102.91
E-5 623 105.24 956 105.87 463 105.71 1419 105.74
E-6 653 110.30 1008 111.63 488 111.42 1497 111.55
Notes: = Fore cost
for funds used during construction, AFDC.
LT Tail cost
A Allowance
CC = Commercial cost
The subscript "o" refers to the base case value.
($/kWe) (%)
F
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because labor has the largest escalation rate, relative to the other
physical elements.
5.3 Contribution of Plant Construction Materials
The analysis of the previous subsection can be applied here as
well. If hi is replaced by qi, the quantity of material i, then
Equation 5.1 yields CM, the total cost of material. The number of
types of materials, N, is not as flexible. Changes in design and
regulations tend to create preference for a certain material relative to
another. Examples of this include the changes in material used for
fitting wire penetrations in the containment structure, and in wire
insulating materials. These changes usually result in small increases of
the number N.
The price component of material cost, Ci, depends on market
conditions. Unless the nuclear-construction industry is a major consumer
of any particular material, effects on its price resulting from any
LWR-related strategy will be small. Transportation and other on-site
costs are the flexible components of Ci. When transients hit the
market, as well as work on licensing problems, the quantity purchased may
be so small that transportation costs per unit of material increase
greatly, or so large that storage costs per unit undergo similar change.
Aside from all this is the quantity of material. The quantity
necessary is less disputable. On the other hand, the amount of waste
makes the difference. All other factors such as equipment, labor, and
time contribute to this waste. As undesired trends occur in these
factors, more than proportional amounts of material are associated with
these trends.
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Material waste occurs because of "friction losses". As the number
of steps for material handling increases, waste increases. "Creep"
effect is noticed with chemicals that dissociate with time. When the job
had to be re-done due to worker error, concrete is broken and pipes are
unwelded. In each of such cases, material is thrown away for small,
zero, or negative value.
The base case material fore cost is $61/kWe (Table 3.3), which is
approximately the same value shown in Table 2.1, variable 34. This
agreement is due to the plain fact that the source of information in both
cases is identical. There are other values collected in the industry
survey, but their reporting serves no purpose except confusion. The
reason is that they show inconsistency with other figures; inconsistency
rising from the way different sources define materials. An attempt has
been made in this report to make consistent definitions.
Table 5.1 shows the contribution of material as 11.3% of the fore
cost and commercial cost. The reason that the material contribution to
the two cost levels does not change is that the material escalation rate
is very close to the overall escalation rate.
Obviously there is a linear relationship between capital cost and
material cost if the unit cost of material is changed. The same is true
when changes in quantity of material occur independently from other
elements or are accompanied by proportional changes in the other
elements. On the other hand, if changes in plant design require
different structural requirements, the variation in material requirements
is then accompanied by labor requirement variations; therefore the
capital cost/material cost relationship becomes nonlinear. Quantifying
such non-linearity is beyond the scope of this study.
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5.4 Contribution of Indirect Costs
This element of capital cost is composed of several accounts, which
trace expenditures related to the management, set-up, planning, design
and administration of the project. Table 5.3 describes the various
accounts and their contributions to fore cost. The data there is taken
from the base case calculation results.
Unlike equipment whose requirements are independently determined,
and labor and material which have relatively weak interdependence among
themselves and equipment, this element is strongly dependent on those
three elements as well as on the fifth; time. Although changing the unit
cost of any of the four elements may not change the indirect costs,
changing the requirements of those elements, i.e., the number of units,
has its effect on indirect costs. This fact is observed when the
sensitivity of capital cost to labor requirement variations was made
through changing the number of manhours/kWe, rather than the hourly
wages. This had its effect on the indirect cost-account of construction
sources. The fact that other accounts were not affected has to do with
the way their relevant cost is modeled in CONCEPT-5.
More than 80% of the indirect costs is distributed among seven
accounts. These are 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 2.1, 3.2, 4.2, and 4.5, as numbered
in Table 5.3. Accounts 1.1 and 1.2 are affected by the construction
industry standards, and hence the owner has little influence on them.
Account 3.2 is affected by the nuclear industry standards. The cost of
this account is expected to rise with regulations. Account 4.5 is a
strong function of lead time among other factors. Account 2.1 is
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Table 5.3: Indirect Cost Accounts and Their Contribution to Fore Cost
Value* % fore cost
Account Description ($/KWe)
1. Construction Services
1.1 Temporary Construction facilities 22.4 3.78
1.2 Construction tools and equipment 20.3 3.43
1.3 Payroll insurance and taxes 18.7 3.16
1.4 Permits, insurance and local taxes 4.0 0.67
Total 65. l1.04
2. Home Office Engineering and Services
2.1 Home office services 43.6 7.37
2.2 Home office quality assurance 2.1 0.35
2.3 Home office construction management 1.2 0.20
Total 46.9 7.92
3. Field Office Engineering and Services
3.1 Field office expenses 2.9 0.49
3.2 Field job supervision 17.7 2.99
3.3 Field quality assurance and quality
control 4.3 0.73
3.4 Plant startup and testing 2.6 0.45
Total 27.5 4.66
4. Owner's cost
4.1 Engineering and quality assurance 5.8 0.98
4.2 Taxes and insurance 13.5 2.28
4.3 Spare parts 5.8 0.98
4.4 Staff training 3.8 0.65
4.5 Owner's general and administrative
overhead 11.6 1.95
Total 40.5 6.84
Total, indirect cost 180 30.4
*These values include 10% contingency, which may not be realized in
each individual account.
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the most expensive account and is expected to rise as design becomes more
complicated, especially for custom-built plants. Except accounts 1.1,
1.2, and 4.5, all others are usually determined as percentages of direct
costs. Hence, the sensitivity of the capital cost to their variation is
not an interesting problem. Instead, it is obvious that changing the
value of any of the direct cost accounts has a linear effect on the
capital cost. The linearity constant is whatever fraction that account
represents in the capital cost.
The failure to measure any interdependence among the majority of
indirect cost accounts and changing requirements of the first three cost
elements is due to the lack of the appropriate tool. CONCEPT code does
not have any feedback-type of procedures that can control such
interdependence.
It is interesting to compare some of the information of Table 5.3
with what is available in Table 2.1. The only common points in the two
tables are the following:
Table 2.1 Table 5.3
Variable $/kWe Account $/kWe
Construction tools and
equipment 41 17.1 + 1.9 1.2 20.3
Engineering services 40 83.7 + 21.4 2.1 43.6
2 +3 74.4
Spare parts 38 2.2 + 0.7 4.3 5.8
. .
m
71
The first account shows close agreement, although Table 2.1 does not
specify construction tools as part of that account. However, they can be
assumed. The third account has small magnitude and is less important to
discuss except to say that the small magnitude may have its effect on the
disagreement. The engineering services category is the most important
cost contributor. Table 2.1 shows (variable 40) its cost as $83.7 +
21.4/kWe out of $588/kWe fore cost, or 14.2%. Table 5.3 attributes 12.6%
of the fore cost to engineering and services both at home and in the
field offices, or $74.4/kWe. Given the size of uncertainties associated
with Table 2.1 data, these two numbers are in good agreement. This
variable is supposed to represent payments to outside
architect/engineeers and other engineering professionals, or cost of
engineering staff and activities if the utility does all or part of the
related work. This is independent from engineering and quality assurance
in the category of the owner's cost. The latter represents the cost of
technical staff and activities as part of the utility management and
liaison with the project. Most of this cost can be saved if the utility
has its own A/E and construction team.
The cost of engineering services, usually rendered by outside
agents, is evaluated as a percentage of the project cost and conducted
under cost-plus type of contracts. This is the general practice of the
industry. Therefore, this cost is largely dependent on other direct
costs and its improvement is expected to be postponed to improvements in
direct costs.
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5.5 Time Contribution
Here time represents the length of the project, not the calendar
date. The quantity of time needed to complete the plant since the date
of commitment to major equipment is called the "project lead time," or
sometimes, schedule.
Certain costs depend largely on time. They increase proportionally
with time, or in a compounding, exponential manner. Items involved in
such costs are:
1) AFDC,
2) Insurance,
3) Services such as guards, site utilities during construction,
and owner general and administrative overheads,
4) Storage of all or some of certain materials and equipment,
5) Worker compensation for idle time, and
6) Overtime work wages to accelerate certain tasks.
The current trend has been an increase in licensing lead time,
construction duration, or more generally, the length of overall project
schedule. The contribution of this element can be explained in a fashion
similar to that of the first three. Namely, we have:
N
CT= Cih i (5.2)
i=1
where
Ct is the cost of time, N is the number of time intervals, hi,
and Ci is the effective costs of unit time. The index i characterizes
the types of time intervals, i.e., there are different time intervals
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during the project lead time, each of which is associated with a
different level of integrated expenditure. If the cost of money does not
change throughout the project lead time, then Ci is equal to C which is
equivalent to the AFDC annual effective rate. This says that as more of
the expensive time intervals hi are consumed, the AFDC increases. The
cost of escalation during construction is an additional time burden to
the AFDC, whose price is s, the overall escalation rate.
Because of the interaction between the AFDC and escalation as the
calendar time goes by, discussion of the time element takes two
directions. The most common case is when the start of the project is
fixed and the project lead time varies with delays and schedule
overruns. The other "ideal" case is if the date of commercial operation
could be fixed and the project lead time becomes a matter of technical
choice. The contribution of project lead time along with its 'price,' in
terms of the AFDC rate, is examined separately for the two cases. The
variation in escalation rates is discussed in the next chapter.
The base case time parameters are as follows:
a) construction permit lead time 4 years
b) construction lead time 7 years
c) AFDC annual effective rate 9%
Table 3.3 shows that the corresponding AFDC is $438/kWe. Table 2.1
shows an AFDC value of $356 + 106/kWe with (8.88 + 0.66)% as the
effective AF[)C annual rate (variables 52 and 53). It should be mentioned
here that only five sources give values for both the AFDC and its rate,
and the calculations recognize only their contributions.
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To examine the sensitivity of capital cost to this time element the
following cases were considered to cover both the quantity of time as
well as the cost of time. In the description of the cases there are
three figures separated by slashes. The first figure indicates the date
of NSSS purchase; the second indicates the date of construction permit
issue; and the third is the date of commercial operation. The cases are
as follows:
A.1: 1977/80/87
A.2: 1977/82/89
A.3: 1977/86.5/92.5
A.6: 1977/78/83
A.7: 1977/81/87
A.8: 1976/81/88
A.9: 1978/82/88
A.10: 1979/82/88
A.11: 1981/83/88
B.l: 7% annual effective AFDC rate
B.2: 10% annual effective AFDC rate
The first five cases are used to assess the condition of schedule
fluctuations after the committed NSSS purchase date. This largely
affects both the tail cost and the AFDC. Table 5.4 presents the results
of escalation. Since two variables are changing in each case--the CP
issue date and the date of commercial operation--it may be necessary to
consider that the results are in three dimensions. Changing one variable
75
at a time is not realistic when broad ranges of variations are
considered. Figure 5.2 is a plot of the AFDC and the tail cost versus
the total lead time for the cases A.1, A.2, A.3, and A.6. The commercial
cost is also shown there. The latter shows a trend toward linearity with
a slope of about 3/4.
The construction lead time constitutes the last five to eight years
of the project lead time. Most of the expenditure takes place during the
construction lead time. The length of this period determines the AFDC.
The CP lead time makes the balance of the project lead time. When the
NSSS purchase date is fixed, the CP lead time determines the CEDC, or the
tail cost. The duration of these two sub-lead-times is largely
independent of each other, although one may expect some savings in the
construction lead time when the CP lead time increases. This saving is
in the order of a few months, and it is due to more complete design work
as the CP lead time becomes longer. This is the cause of failure to
produce any correlation between the AFDC or tail cost and total lead time.
Another interesting observation can be made in Table 5.4. Cases A.1
and A.7 have the same project lead time. They differ in the date of the
CP issue, where it is delayed by a year in the case of A.7. This
one-year delay resulted in a 3.5% increase in tail cost, about an 11%
decrease in AFDC, and a 1% decrease in the commercial cost.
More interesting observations arise when cases A.8 through A.11 are
examined. These four cases address the condition of the date of
commercial operation being fixed and the length of the project schedule
being varied. In other words, the uncertainty in future demand of
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Table 5.4 Sensitivity of Capital Cost to Delays and Speedups
Description CT CT/CTo A A/A0 CC CC/CCo
(%) ($/kWe) (%) ($/kWe) (%)
Base
Case 1977/81/83 903 100 438 100 1342 100
A-1 1977/80/87 844 93.47 413 94.29 1257 93.67
A-2 1977/82/89 868 107.20 528 120.55 1495 111.40
A-3 1977/86.5/92.5 1242 137.54 568 129.68 1810 134.87
A-6 1977/78/83 713 78.96 225 51.37 938 69.90
A-7 1977/81/87 876 97.01 364 83.11 1243 92.62
Notes: CF
CT
A
CC
= Fore cost
Tail cost
- Allowance for funds used during construction, AFDC.
= Commercial cost
The subscript "o" refers to the base case value.
Case
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electricity diminished and hence a fixed commercial date is established.
Also, this scenario assumes that the power plant construction projects
become a routine manner and hence the project lead time is a known
parameter.
These four cases, in addition to the base case, examine five values
for this parameter. Table 5.5 presents the results. These results are
sketched in Figure 5.3. Although the data points are scattered, linear
approximations show the following:
a) Because of escalation, decrease in lead time increases the
fore cost.
b) Tail cost increases at a rate less than that of the fore
cost. This is because the difference, the CEDC, decreases
as the schedule is shortened and most of escalation goes
into the fore cost.
c) The shorter construction lead time makes the AFDC decrease
at a rate larger than that of the tail cost increase. The
relative net change results in a slight decrease in the
commercial cost.
The rate of change of the commercial cost is 0.08 versus lead time,
i.e., when the lead time changes by 100%, the CC changes by 8% in the
same direction. The AFDC behavior clearly makes the difference, and
obviously this behavior depends strongly on the AFDC rate. To examine
the influence of the AFDC rate over capital cost, cases B.1 and B.2 where
calculated. The results are shown in Table 5.6. With the assistance of
Figure 5.4., the linearity of the results is clearly observed. The slope
of the AFDC line is 1.16. The slope of the CC line is 0.385. The
ratio of the two slopes is 0.33, which is nearly the AFDC contribution to
CC at the base case condition.
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Table 5.5: Sensitivity of Capital Cost to Project Lead Time
Case* CF CF/CFo
($/kWe) (%)
CT CT/CTo
($/kWe) (%)
A A/Ao CC CC/ CCo
($/kWe) (%) ($/kWe) (%)
Base
Case 592 100 903 100 438 100 1342 100
A-8 555 93.75 896 99.22 451 102.97 1347 100.37
A-9 632 106.76 935 103.54 392 89.50 1327 98.88
A-10 673 113.68 940 104.10 383 87.44 1323 98.58
A-11 698 117.91 985 109.08 318 72.60 1303 97.09
Notes: CF = Fore cost
CT = Tail cost
A = Allowance for funds used
CC = Commercial cost
during construction, AFDC.
The subscript "o" refers to the base case value.
*Case Description
Case
Base Case
A-8
A-9
A-10
Description
1977/81/88
1976/81/88
1978/82/88
1979/82/88
A-11 1981/83/88
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Going back to Figure 5.3, it is expected that if the same cases A.8
through A.11 were examined under different AFDC rates, the following is
observed.
a) No change in CF and CT curves, of course.
b) An AFDC rate lower than 9%, contracts the range of AFDC
variation and hence the C change may reverse direction.
c) A higher AFDC rate shows more benefit under those conditions.
To verify this, cases A.12 through A.19 were considered. Their results
are in Tables 5.7 and 5.8 and Figure 5.5. The above expectations are
confirmed. The overall effect on commercial cost is minor in any case,
given the wide range of project lead time variations.
It is interesting at this point to consider the findings of the Rand
Study regarding the cost sensitivity to project lead time. The study
(M1) divides the lead time into three sections, the CP lead time, the
construction time, and the pre-commercial testing time. It divides the
project lead time among these sections as 16, 74, and 10%, respectively.
The pre-commercial testing time averages about 7.5 months of duration.
The cost input data of the Rand Study are in terms of constant dollars.
Because of the cash-flow (in constant dollars) characteristics, the
relationship between cost and each of the individual project lead time
sections is considered separately. The short period and the type of
relevant activities make the pre-commercial testing time effect on
capital cost insignificant. As for the CP lead time and the construction
time, the Rand Study found no significant correlation between their
respective lengths and capital cost. This agrees with our finding in the
case when the date of commercial operation date is fixed. As for the
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Table 5.6: Capital Cost Sensitivity to AFDC Effective Annual Rate
CT CT/CTo
! I,II,.,, '~ f~'_
A A/Ao
/ { I1.1,,~ fg{. 
Cat CC/Co
Case Description ' " -= t kP ' W-: I t" ":c tho)
base case 903 100 438 100 1342 100
(9%)
B.1 7% AFDC rate 903 100 327 74.66 1230 91.65
B.2 10% AFDC rate 903 100 498 113.70 1401 104.40
Notes: CF =
CT
A =
CC =
Fore cost
Tail cost
Allowance for funds used
Commercial cost
during construction, AFDC.
The subscript "o" refers to the base case value.
It / I ., I / \
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Table 5.7: Sensitivity of Capital Cost to Project Lead Time
(8% AFDC Rate)
Case* CF CF/CFo
($/kWe) (%)
CT CT/CTo A A/Ao CC CC/CCO
($/kWe) (%) ($/kWe) (%) ($/kWe) (%)
Base
Case 592 100 903 100 438 100 1342 100
A-12 555 93.75 896 99.22 393 89.73 1288 95.08
A-13 632 106.76 935 103.54 341 77.85 1275 95.01
A-14 673 113.78 940 104.10 335 76.48 1275 95.01
A-15 768 129.73 985 109.08 279 63.70 1264 94.19
Notes: CF
CT
= Fore cost
= Tail cost
A = Allowance for f
CC = Commercial cost
unds used during construction, AFDC.
The subscript "o" refers to the base case value.
*Case Description
Case
Base Case
A-12
A-13
A-14
Description
1977/81/88
1976/81/88
1978/82/88
1979/82/88
1981/83/88A-15
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Table 5.8: Sensitivity of Capital Cost to Project Lead Time
(10% AFDC rate)
Case* CF CF/CFo CT CT/CTo A A/Ao Cc CC/CCo
($/kWe) (%) ($/kWe) (%) ($/kWe) (%) ($/kWe) (%)
Base
Case 592 100 903 100 438 100 1342 100
A-16 555 93.75 896 99.22 513 117.12 1408 104.92
A-17 632 106.76 935 103.54 443 98.86 1378 102.68
A-18 673 113.78 940 104.10 433 98.86 1373 102.31
A-19 768 129.73 985 109.08 358 81.74 1343 100.07
CF =
CT
A
CC
Fore cost
Tail cost
Allowance for funds
= Commercial cost
used during construction, AFDC.
The subscript "o" refers to the base case value.
*Case Description
Case
Base Case
A-16
A-17
A-18
Description
1977/81/88
1976/81/88
1978/82/88
1979/82/88
A-19 1981/83/88
Notes:
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other case where the NSSS commitment date (or the CP issue date, as Rand
Study does) is fixed, our findings agree that the fore cost value is not
affected with project lead time variation. Because of escalation and
AFDC, the commercial cost changes with project lead time if the
commercial operation date is not fixed. Introducing escalation and AFDC
violates the assumption of the Rand Study of constant-dollar capital cost
data and therefore, for the case of schedule overruns, the two findings
are not comparable.
As a final comment, saying that the fore cost is always insensitive
to project lead time is the same as saying that the commercial cost is
insensitive to project lead time when the commercial operation date is
fixed. This is due to the relationship between the two levels of capital
cost, as they were defined earlier.
5.6 Summary
We go back to Equation 3.1, which says:
CC = CF + CEDC + AFDC.
The fore cost, CF, is composed of the first four elements of
capital cost that were previously discussed and occasionally referred to
as "physical elements". The cost of escalation during construction, CEDC
(with schedule overruns), and the allowance for funds used during
construction, AFDC, are mainly dependent on the fifth element, time. The
CEDC and AFDC are not independent of CF, and therefore the contribution
of each of the physical elements has its effect on the CEDC and the
AFDC. Table 5.1 recognizes this fact and explains the contribution of
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the physical elements through all levels of capital cost by sharing the
CEDC and the AFDC appropriately. Table 5.9 considers the matter from a
different angle, where the contribution of the fifth element can be
recognized.
It has been shown that the fore cost depends on the date of project
start. Fore cost of a later date is higher than that of a previous date
by an amount equal to the cost of escalation during the intermediate
period. The tail cost, however, depends to a large extent on the date of
project completion. The CEDC fraction of tail cost depends on
the length of project lead time. If the lead time is stretched forward
the CEDC increases; since then, most of the construction activities takes
place during a period of high cost. If the lead time is stretched
backward, then reversed conditions occur, leading to reversed results.
This shows an advantage to the tail cost if the schedule is stretched
backward. The increase in the AFDC associated with the longer schedule
eliminates this advantage when the commercial cost is considered.
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Table 5.9: Contribution of the Elements of Capital Cost.
$/kWe %
Fore Cost:
Equipment
Labor
Material
Indirect
216
129
67
180
16.1
9.6
5.0
13.4
Total
CEDC
AFDC
311
438
23.2
32.6
Commercial Cost 1342 100.0
90
CHAPTER VI
CAUSES OF INCREASED CAPITAL COST
In the preceding chapter we have noticed the rising trend of capital
cost. The several causes of such a trend can be located in one of two
categories: increased unit-cost and increased requirements. The first
category is related to prices and wages. The other category has to do
with increased quantity of required units. Causes in both categories
will be examined in how they affect each of the five elements of capital
cost and to the extent they affect the overall capital cost at the
various levels.
6.1 Increased Unit-Cost
With time all prices tend to increase in terms of current dollars and
hence the purchasing power of money decreases resulting in increasing
costs when the magnitude of the amount of money paid is considered. This
is inflation and is a pure economic problem beyond the scope of this
study. Because of a decrease in available resources, of technical
improvements resulting from operating experience, and of other rising
production difficulties, all related to a particular commodity, the cost
of that commodity increases in real terms in what is known as
escalation. This makes the rate of the commodity cost increase, i.e.,
its escalation rate, which is higher than the general inflation rate.
It is usually hard to distinguish whether the cost increases are due to
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inflation or escalation. By comparing the escalation rate of the
commodity with the inflation rate over a specified period, the effect of
cost can be detected. Figure 6.1 shows historic values for the general
inflation rate. Figure 6.1 is based on data obtained from reference
(U1). In addition to the increased cost of money, escalation is the main
cause under this category.
Escalation is measured in terms of annual escalation rates. The base
case estimate for the escalation rate during the period 1977 through 1987
is 6.76% per year. In Table 2.1 the 1977 estimate is (6.69 + 0.68)% per
year (variable 47).
To investigate the capital cost sensitivity to escalation rates, the
following cases were examined:
F.2 overall escalation rate of 7.5%
F.3 overall escalation rate of 10.%
F.4 overall escalation rate of 5.6%
F.5 overall escalation rate of 4.0%
The results are compiled in Table 6.1 and plotted on Figure 6.2. The
CC, CT, and AFDC appear to behave closely in a liner fashion. This
rate of change is about 5.8% of their value for each change of escalation
rate of 1%. The range of this sensitivity is, as shown, 4% to 10% for
the escalation rates. The 4% may be unrealistically low with respect to
the current conditions since it is much below the current inflation rate
of at least 5.5% (Figure 6.1). The 10% is taken as an upper bound that
is seldom exceeded when escalation rates are averaged over periods of
time of several years.
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Table 6.1 Escalation Effects on Capital Cost
Overall
Escal. Rates
(%)
CT CT/CTo
($/kWe)
A A/Ao CC CC/CCo
(%) ($/kWe) (%) ($/kWe) (%)
Base
Case 6.76 903 100 438 100
F-2 7.5 943 104.76 456 104.11 1398 104.17
F-3 10.0 1097 121.48 521 118.95 1618 120.57
F-4 5.6 839 92.91 411 93.84 1250 93.14
F-5 4.0 760 84.16 377 86.07 1414 84.72
Notes: CF
CT
A
CC
= Fore cost
= Tail cost
= Allowance for funds used during construction, AFDC.
= Commercial cost
The subscript "o" refers to the base case value.
Case
1342 100
94
60 80 100. 120 140
/0 of base case value
I I I
5.6 6.76 7.5
Escalation rate, %
I0I 0
Fig. 6.2 Effect
capita
of escalation
I cost
120
116
-1 12
108
104
100
96
w
00
a,
0
0
U
toa,00
0-
00
92
88
84
I
4
rate on
IIII
95
In addition, the following cases were considered:
F.1: 6.7% overall escalation rate.
F.6: escalation rates: 6.5%; equipment, 7.5%; labor, 6.6%;
material.
F.7: 10% increase of the base case escalation rates.
F.8: 10% decrease of the base case escalation rates.
Cases F.1 and F.6 are values derived from Table 2.1. Cases F.7 and F.8
are additional sensitivity tests. This time the changes are made on the
individual escalation rates rather than on the overall one, as is done in
cases F.2 to F.5. The results of these runs are presented in Table 6.2.
Since the values derived from Table 2.1 for the overall escalation
rate is close to that of the base case, it is not surprising that the F.1
results are close to those of base case as it is shown. Although the
values of F.6 are different from the base case values, the increase in
the equipment escalation rate makes the overall escalation rate equal to
6.80%, or only a factor of .5% higher. This makes the final capital cost
figures for this case identical with those of the base case. The overall
escalation rate for case F.7 is 7.43%, that of F.8 is 6.059%, or about a
factor of (10.14 + .32)% away from the base case value. The results of
the F.7 and F.8 cases fit closely to the CC curve previously shown in
Figure 5.4. The variation of either the overall rates or the individual
rates by the same percentage give the same effect on the capital cost.
Once more, this reflects the linear assumptions that are built in CONCEPT
code, which are plausible so long as the only changes are in the unit
costs.
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Table 6.2 Escalation Effects on Capital Cost
CT CT/CTo A A/Ao CC CC/Cco
($/kWe) (%) ($/kWe) (%) ($/kWe)
Base
Case 903 100 438 100 1342 100
F-i 898 99.45 437 99.77 1335 99.48
F-6 903 104.21 455 103.88 1396 104.02
F-8 941 95.79 423 96.58 1288 95.98
(%)
Notes: CF
CT
A
CC
= Fore cost
Tail cost
Allowance for funds used during construction, AFDC.
- Commercial cost
The subscript "o" refers to the base case value.
*Case Description
Escalation Rates
6.76% overall, 5.91% equipment
8.38% labor, 6.9% material
6.7% overall
6.5% equipment, 7.5% labor
6.6% material
10% increase of base case values
10% decrease of base case values
Case*
Case
Base case
F-1
F-6
F-7
F-8
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6.1.1 Escalation of Physical Capital Cost Elements
The base case escalation rates of capital cost elements are
presented in Table 5.1. In Table 2.1 variable 2 gives an escalation rate
for equipment of 6.47 + 1.48% per year. Variable 43 has a labor
escalation rate of 7.48 + 0.62%. The material escalation rate, variable
44, is 6.56 + 1.51%. There is no close agreement between the base case
values and Table 2.1 values only in the case of labor.
Comparable variations of escalation rates of the individual capital
cost physical elements are expected to affect the tail and commercial
costs in manners proportional to their contributions to these costs.
Several CONCEPT code runs confirmed this expectation, and reflect the
linear assumptions built into the code. The largest variation occurs, of
course, with changing the equipment escalation rate. Changing the
equipment escalation rate by 1% causes a proportional change of
commercial cost by about 3.5%. Labor does the same, but within 1.85%,
and material within only 0.93%. Indirect cost accounts are expected to
exhibit parallel behavior.
6.1.2 Escalation of Time Cost
It has been shown in Sections 5.5 and 5.6 that a large portion of the
time contribution is concentrated in the AFDC. The value of AFDC in any
project can be expressed as:
AFDC(t) = C (t){ i(m) (1 + j) dm- 1
where
t = calendar time,
m = time during construction, bounded by L,
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L = project lead time,
i(m) = expenditure density, (differential cash flow function) which
is characteristic of each project, and
j = AFDC effective rate.
(For more discussion of related mathematics, see the Appendix.)
It is clear from this expression that at any time, for nuclear power
plants, the AFDC depends on CT, L and j. As has been discussed before,
in the case of schedule delays CT becomes a function of L and hence the
AFDC becomes escalation dependent. This case will be studied later as
part of increased time requirement. Rather, here, we are interested in
the value of L as a parameter by itself, regardless of the reasons for
its value such as project delays that are nowadays prevailing in the
industry due to other factors.
Several values have been reported for j under the 1977 conditions
ranging from 7% to 9.8%. Table 2.1, variable 53, shows a value of (8.88
+ .66)% per year. There is one case where escalation is reported over a
period of 11 years as an increase of 7.5% of the 1977 value. This makes
the base case value, 9%, increase to 9.675% per year, which is lower than
10%, as assumed in the case B.2 (see Table 5.6). The overall affect on
the commercial cost is about a 3% increase. This makes time escalation
effects comparable with those of equipment escalation.
6.1.3 Escalation and Plant Capital Cost
We have seen how escalation can affect capital cost. As will be
discussed shortly, the increased requirements, due to large demand for
new power plant construction and old power plant back-fitting versus the
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relatively inelastic supply have caused instantaneous resource
depletion. The relevant scarcity of equipment, labor, material, and
services have driven prices at a rate larger than that of general
inflation. It has been mentioned on several occasions, however, that the
overall escalation rate of nuclear power plants is lower than that of
many industries. In particular, the cost of housing construction has
been escalating over the last few years at a rate higher than that of
nuclear plants (Table 6.3). This table is based on information obtained
from reference (N16).
Table 6.3 Annual Escalation Rates for some Commodities and Services,
Typically Consumed in the U.S. (Averaged over 1960-78 period)
Item Escalation Rate, %
housing construction 8.54
imported silk blouses 5.91
bread 3.32
education in private colleges 6.00
dental services 4.86
The 6.7% escalation rate as opposed to the 5.5% to 11.0% range of the
rate of general inflation (Figure 6.1) is not so large. The conclusion
here is that the nuclear station construction escalation deviates
insignificantly from the general inflation. Consequently, its impact on
capital cost should not be a major technical consideration.
This conclusion is based on the fact that the factors associated with
unit-cost increase are instantaneous, and rather than driving prices
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sharply upward, their major contribution is in the form of delay type of
problems, which tend to lower productivity and stretch project
schedules. These last matters will be discussed under the category of
increased requirements. No single commodity has been cited such that the
nuclear power plant construction industry is the main consumer of such
commodity and hence, more LWR power plant construction threatens the
availability of the same commodity.
Before closing this matter it should be added that estimated future
fluctuations of escalation rates are within the ranges used for
sensitivity analyses in the previous subsections. Typical data for
future variation in escalation rates for labor and materials are shown in
Figure 6.3. These data are based on information received from one of the
industry sources contacted in the course of our survey. Uncertainty in
labor data is represented by the shaded area shown in the upper part of
the figure. It is interesting to compare this figure with Figure 6.1.
6.2 Increased Requirements
In Chapter IV we saw that in the 1972-77 period, LWR capital cost
estimates changed from $211/kWe to $592/kWe. If this increase is
attributed to escalation, then the annual escalation rate during the
relevant 4-1,/2 year period is 25.8%. Actually no particular component,
material, service, or craft labor wage has undergone such a rate of
escalation. During this period the average inflation rate is about 7.4%
annually (Figure 6.1). The difference between the average rate of LWR
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cost increase and the average inflation rate is about 17.1%. This
difference was caused by changing the nuclear power plant design and
construction requirements. Part of the questionnaire was prepared to
detect any anticipated future projections by the nuclear industry in this
area. Unfortunately no appropriate response was received. The exception
has to do with the seemingly ever-evolving regulations. Many believe
that the changing regulations are the major contributor to such fore cost
increases. A very limited number of sources have addressed variables 71
to 74. As shown in Table 2.1, the effect of more restrictive and costly
evolving regulations is still expected, though diminishing over the next
20-year period.
The plan that will be pursued in this section is to rely on past
experience for estimates in this category. As we will see, in addition
to increasing the financial burden, most of the causes tend to increase
schedule overruns and affect capital cost through the fifth element, time.
The nuclear power plant construction requirements have increased
through the years, because of the following factors:
1) larger physical size
2) availability considerations
3) safety considerations
4) environmental considerations
5) lower productivity
6) public intervention
7) financial requirements
Each of the following subsections addresses one of these factors.
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6.2.1 Size-related Requirements
The generating capacity of nuclear units has increased from few
hundred megawatts of electricy in the early 1960s to more than 1000 MWe
by mid-1970s. Increasing the electric power output can be done by either
improving the efficiency of the energy conversion system or by increasing
the thermal output of the nuclear steam supply system. Recall the
classification of equipment in Section 5.1. The first option involves
changing the functional equipment requirements. This is done by
improving the performance and perhaps the number of items in the
feedwater heater category. The scope of this option is not too large.
Technology in this area is similar to that of non-nuclear plants and it
already had undergone large improvements. Because of thermodynamic
limitations, only small improvement can be achieved, and soon the law of
diminishing returns dominates. A parallel idea is to improve the
availability of the power plant; this will be discussed later.
The second option--to increase the electric output--is to have a
larger NSSS. Substantial improvement can be gained in this way. Over
the years since Dreseden I, reactor sizes have increased by more than six
times. The following are the major incentives to go to larger sizes:
a) Characteristics of the electric demand,
b) Project procurement is nearly independent of size, and
c) Lower specific capital cost, $/kWe.
The last is the most important of these three incentives. It has
been shown that for plants going into commercial operation between 1977
and 1987, the specific capital cost in $/kWe for plants of sizes larger
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than 1000 MWe averages 19% less than that of plants in the 800-900 MWe
category (D1). There are other factors that are in favor of the larger
plants, such as utility experience and location. These factors, however,
could have not made all that difference. The effect of size on LWR
capital cost over 1977-1987 period can be seen by the gap between the
dashed and the solid lines, shown in Figure 4.3.
On the other hand, the magnitude of capital investment has increased
sharply. Over the range of 450 MWe to 1150 MWe of generating capacity,
the Rand Study found that specific capital cost decreases by $22/kWe for
each additional 100 MWe of capacity, in terms of 1976 dollars. It cites
an example of enlarging a plant from 850 MWe to 1050 MWe yields specific
capital cost savings of only 7%. The 23.5% increase in plant capacity
is, therefore, accompanied by 15% increase in total investment.
In addition, the Rand Study cites an increase of total project lead
time with size, at a rate of a little more than 4 months/100 MWe of
additional plant capacity.
The movement toward larger sizes has contributed to the heavier
financial burden on utilities, whose effects are discussed in Section
6.2.7.
6.2.2. Availability Considerations
In order to increase plant availability, and hence to enhance plant
operation at higher capacity factors, improvements are made in the class
of supporting equipment and in the class of functional equipment. These
improvements involve additional back-up systems and redundant components,
and better design and material quality for basic (functional) equipment.
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Several ideas, such as ways to shorten refueling outages, are
considered. A set of possible improvements to capacity factor that have
significant capital cost impact is presented in Table 6.4 (B2). When the
cost of these items was implemented in CONCEPT code, the base case
capital cost values are increased by the following fractions:
Fore Cost (1977) 1.18%
Commercial Cost (1988) 1.19%
Table 6.4. Capacity Factor Improvement Items (B2)
Capacity Factor
Increase
Item range average
Condensate polishers 0.5 - 3.5% 1.2%
Titanium tubing/condenser 1.2 - 3.9% 1.4%
Reactor coolant pumps with
improved seals
Proven diagnostic instruments
Improved circulation steam
generator
Overall capacity factor
improvement with all these items
1.4%
2.0%
0.5%
4.5%
This is an example of how availability considerations could affect
capital cost. It is interesting to mention here that the balance between
these capacity factors and capital cost changes results in a busbar cost
decrease of about 4.3%.
The results of the above example suggest that attention is better
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concentrated on other areas than those availability improvements that
include a large change in capital cost..
6.2.3 Safety Considerations
As the nuclear power technology has grown over the years, a large
number of safety issues have evolved. This has had the affect of
increased requirements via two channels. The first channel is by making
design criteria more stringent and therefore demanding improved system
components whose cost has risen sharply, at a rate much higher than any
conceivable escalation rate. The second channel is increasing plant
requirements by additional systems or components. The aim of these
additions is to decrease the risk of any potential hazard. The main
areas of concern are:
a) emergency core cooling
b) radioactive and other plant emissions
c) plant security
d) fire protection
e) siesmic considerations
Cost escalation, increased plant size, and other requirements make it
hard to determine precisely the effects of safety considerations on
capital cost. Plant design changes for safety-related considerations are
consequences of safety-related regulations. Figure 6.4 shows the
relative impact of these regulations on NSSS design as accumulated
between 1967 and 1974.
Relevant data to assess quantitatively the impact of safety
regulations on capital cost is scarce. For this and the next section we
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rely heavily on the Wash-1345 report (W3). The time-scope of this report
is limited to capital cost changes between 1971 and 1973. Table 6.5
summarizes these changes and the associated cost increases. The total
increase resulting from these changes is $21.6 million, or about 10% of
the 1971 fore cost. As Figure 6.4 shows, the impact of regulations still
continues after 1973. If the rate of increase of capital cost due to
safety regulations is constant, the above $21.6 million explains only 10
out of the 17.1% average annual increase, cited at the beginning of this
section. Practical evidence shows that the safety considerations may
contribute by larger fractions.
6.2.4 Environmental Considerations
The main areas of concern in this case are:
a) cooling system requirements, and
b) adequacy of the Environmental Statement.
For all three types of cooling systems, the cost has been increased
sharply. The fore cost of the water circulating system with intake and
discharge structures for a once-through cooling system in 1972 was
$7,344,000 (W1). The fore cost of a mechanical draft cooling system in
1977 is $21,588,164 (N2). It was shown in Table 3.2 that the
once-through system contribution to capital cost is 2.2.% above that of
the mechanical draft cooling towers for the same plant. This shows that
the increase of this system cost is by factor of 3 over five years.
More complex designs have evolved, in the form of man-made lakes,
spray systems, deeply-buried tunnels, and far off-shore intake/discharge
outlets as well as moisture reduction arrangements of cooling towers.
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Table 6.5 Safety-Related Changes Causing LWR Plant
Cost Increases Between 1971 and 1973 (W3)
(1973 experience, 1971 dollars)
Chanqe
Containment
Recirculating system
Purge system
Isolation system
Recombiner
Liner
Nuclear fuel handling
Control building isolation (IEEE)
Removable insulation
(in-service inspection)
Control rod drive mechanism (seismic)
Safeguards cooling system (seismic)
Instrumentation, monitoring and
I&C piping (IEEE)
Auxiliary generators, motor-
generator sets, and inverters (IEEE)
Cable trays and conduit (IEEE)
Control wiring and cable
Labor Equipment and Materials
109,000
33,000
500,000
150,000
1,000,000
614,000
250,000
24,000
399,000
258,000
148,0000
4,775,000
1,917,000
308,000
43,000
2,700,000
550,000
1,000,000
73,000
109,000
669,000
1,143,000
470,000
815,000
514,000
940,000
2,120,000
Total cost increase 10,177,000 11,454,000
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Table 6.6 shows a list of environmental-related items whose costs have
changed between 1971 and 1973. Their impact on 1971 fore cost is an
additional $12.1 million or a 5.7% increase over the two year period.
The other area of concern is the preparation of the Environmental
Statement. Based on the Seabrook experiences, the overlap between
regulatory agencies and the adequacy of the current version to stand
intervenor criticism is questionable. If this item becomes a major issue
increased time requirements are expected in the form of licensing delays.
Environmental regulations also have indirect impact on LWR cost.
This happened when equipment vendors, as part of the casting industry,
were required to comply with the newly imposed environmental regulations
in early 1970s (W2). Among other factors, this led the vendors to limit
their production capacities, and their failure to fulfill their delivery
schedules. The consequence was massive delays in plants that were then
in the middle of construction. Such undesirable episodes may not be
repeated for plants to be constructed after the early 1970s.
6.2.5 Lower Productivity
In addition to their direct effects on the elements of capital cost,
the first four factors that contribute to increased requirements have
indirect effects in the form of low productivity. The increased
requirements of equipment and structures have brought with them more than
proportional labor and material wastes. More time becomes necessary to
implement the new complicated design in the form of schedule expansion
and waste. Although this area cannot be investigated in a
straightforward manner, a work sampling of a nuclear station shows that
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Table 6.6 Environmental Changes Causing LWR Plant Cost Increases
Between 1971 and 1973 (W3)
(1973 experience, 1971 dollars)
Equipment and
Change Labor Materials
Turbine room
Water-intake structure
250,000
2,631,000
150,000
1,266,000
0.5 fps
15OF T
Near-zero release radioactivity 1,080,000 2,411,000
Radwaste update
New equipment
Piping
Circulating water system
Condenser
Noise abatement
Condensate and feedwater pumps
Diesel-generator building
5,318,000
961,000
178,000
100,000
118,000
1,367,000
1,447,000
100,000
45,000
Total 6,786,000
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only 31% of the working day is spent on production work (P2). This
figure gives an idea about the contribution of the labor force.
Management has also its contribution to this low figure. Figure 6.5
shows the contribution of various causes to the non-productive faction of
the work time. By reviewing Figure 6.5 one can observe that the
contribution of several items may be alleviated by more effective
construction management. In addition, sizable quantities of manhours and
material are wasted because of unsatisfactory performance of labor, low
quality control cited by inspectors, or back-fitting during
construction. All the above increases labor, material, and time
requirements. In addition, there is a psychological factor associated
with lowering the field labor performance. Because of changes in design
during construction (mainly due to regulatory changes), rendered jobs are
repeated, perhaps several times. This creates uncertainty in the sense
that workers are not sure whether the job will receive final acceptance.
This makes workers less careful; they expect the job to be redone
anyway! This in turn leads to unsatisfactory inspection results, and so
the problem of lower performance is augmented.
The most controversial and important item that can be included as a
lower productivity cause is the longer and longer licensing times.
Figure 4.2 summarizes the events of a ten-year period ending in 1975.
Seventy-two months between docketing and construction permit issuance is
not unrealistic. Although there are others, the major factor to such
long licensing time is the review by the NRC staff. It was confirmed by
a regulatory source that positive decisions regarding some licensing
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activities are sometimes delayed because the concerned regulatory staff
member anticipates some upcoming regulatory change with which,
unknowingly, the applicant is not complying. Rather than giving the
application a positive decision under the then prevailing regulations,
the staff member waits for the related issue to be resolved internally
within the regulatory body. Clearly such a practice impedes the
reviewing process. A detailed review for this matter is presented in
reference (Sl).
6.2.6 Public Intervention
As part of the licensing process, public hearings are held before any
major nuclear power plant license is issued. They were principally
developed as a public relations or public education program (W4). The
atmosphere of the process was envisioned as a town meeting where issues
relating to the impact of plant construction and operation would be
clarified. The hearing rules were drafted too loosely, without
anticipating what has become real life. No one expected the
sophisticated intervention that new nuclear plants have encountered in
the recent period. A twelve-month time span is a typical length of the
current public hearings. There are cases when such hearing took as long
as 30 months. More about this cause and related-regulatory issue can be
found in reference (Sl).
6.2.7 Financial Requirements
Although this may seem a consequence of the first six causes, it is
included here because it bears the symptoms of a primary cause. Needless
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to say, the first six causes resulted in the proliferation of total
investment required for power plant construction. That increased the
demand on financial resources by utilities. As early as 1965, the cost
of obtaining the capital for power plant construction started to increase
steadily and massively (P1). The problem was augmented for LWR plants by
their long project lead time. Utilities started to consider the less
capital-intensive options of fossil plants. By 1973, however, the fuel
costs for fossil plants as well as their capital costs increased, and LWR
plants became more attractive. In the following two-year period, the
decline in electricity demand (due to higher prices and conservation)
increased the fraction of reserve capacity for most of the utilities and
led them into a more awkward financial situation. Consequently, in the
same two years, about 125,000 MWe nuclear generating capacity was
canceled. In 1977 Nuclear News reported that about 10 LWRs were delayed
for two years due to financial problems. Two other units were cancelled
in the same year after the utility was committed to about 20% of the fore
cost. More delays or cancellations have been reported in 1978. In all
these cases financial unavailability was cited as one (if not the only)
cause of delay or cancellation. In some other cases, the conservative
decisions made earlier against the uncertainty of future load when
evaluated later under improved information showed an overestimation of
future load. Since the nuclear plant capacity cannot be partitioned,
utilities found themselves in no-hurry conditions. In addition to
others, these two factors have resulted in schedule delays and work
interruptions that only make matters worse. In order to investigate
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the related effects on capital cost, the following case is examined:
G.I: construction permit issue date 1981.00
work halt 1984.50
work resume 1986.50
commercial operation date 1990.00
Table 6.7 presents the results of the related calculations; 260 million
dollars, or nearly a 20% increase to the total cost, is the consequence.
Although 20% may not look too serious, $260 million is another matter,
which is almost all in the form of additional AFDC. It should be noted
here that the slightly lower value for the tail cost has resulted from
the calculational procedure with a modified cash flow data table. As
explained before, the CEDC should be larger for this case than the one
for the base case. Therefore the final figure for C should be
somewhat higher than $1602/kWe. The two main causes of work
interruption--financial shortage and future load drop--would have minor
effects on utility decisions regarding construction continuity if the
plant capacity were low.
Aside from the above, other factors that are encountered less
frequently or have small effects make their contribution to increased
requirements. In February 1977 the Federal Power Commission issued an
amendment to the Uniform System of Accounts for Public Utilities (F1).
In one case, this action had the effect of increasing the AFDC value by
25%, or about 8% of the total project cost. Because the AFDC is affected
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Table 6.7 Effect of a 2-Year Work Interruption on Capital Cost
CT CT/CTo A A/A0 CC CC/CCo
(%) ($/kWe) (%)
Base
Case 903 100 438 100 1342 100
G-1 898 99.45 704 160.73 1602 119.37
($/kWe) (%)
Notes: CF
CT
A
CC
= Fore cost
Tail cost
Allowance for funds
= Commercial cost
used during construction, AFDC.
The subscript "o" refers to the base case value.
Case
($/kWe)
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by the length of the lead time, the only effect of this action is to
magnify the contribution of the time elements and the importance of the
causes that lead to increased time requirements.
6.2.8 Summary of Increased Requirements
At the beginning of this section it was estimated that LWR capital
cost has increased at an average annual rate of 17.1% during the 1972-77
period due to increased requirements. We have seen that during 1971-73,
the average annual rates of capital cost increase due to safety and
environmental considerations are 10% and 5.7%, respectively. If these
rates hold until 1977, as Figure 6.4 suggests at least in the area of
safety, then only about 1% out of the 17.1% average annual rate of
increase due to increased requirements remains to be explained by other
causes in this category. In fact, Section 6.2.2 shows that by 1977,
possible availability improvements may raise the capital cost by about
1%. This does not imply that the effects of the other causes are
negligible. Rather, it is unfortunate that their contributions could not
be separated from those of availability, safety, and environmental
increased requirements.
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CHAPTER VII
POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES FOR CAPITAL COST IMPROVEMENT
Thus far, we have examined the behavior of capital cost and its
components, the elements that contribute to capital cost, and the causes
that affect the contribution of these elements and consequently influence
the capital cost. At this point, it is time to consider the alternative
schemes, if any, that may be pursued to improve the capital cost of LWR
power plants.
Three sets of alternatives are identified. Each set contains a
number of possible strategies that are, to a degree, mutually
independent, and at the same time, have common goals in the target range
of capital cost improvement. Combinations of these alternatives are
expected to enhance the overall results, as will be shown later. These
three sets are: 1) Optimization of Current Practices; 2)
Standardization; and 3) Improved Utility Structure and Finance. One
common feature among the elements of the first set (improved design,
project management and licensing) is that the relevant decisions are
normally made outside the electric utilities, namely by equipment
vendors, architect/engineers, constructors, and regulatory bodies. While
these institutions and utilities contribute to decisions relevant to
standardization, the third set of improvement alternatives depends mainly
on the interactions between utility companies and the public. This is
discussed in the next chapter.
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The following sections describe and evaluate each of these
strategies according to their impact on capital cost. Improved licensing
procedures that are part of the first set are discussed in a separate
section following Standardization.
7.1 Optimization of Current Practices:
This set of strategies does not require any drastic changes of the
way LWR power plants are designed, licensed, and constructed. They
instead involve improving current practices to minimize unnecessary
excessive expenditures, and to shorten related schedules. The obvious
consequence is cost reduction. Three phases of power plant project have
been mentioned above, namely, design, licensing, and construction. The
licensing problem is addressed in the work of the Regulatory Group of
this MIT LWR Study. More on improving licensing will be discussed in
Section 7.3 after Standardarization. This section is, therefore,
dedicated to the phases of design and construction.
7.1.1 Design Optimization:
This option involves review and evaluation of plant layout, its
requirements and the ways those requirements are fulfilled. All
activities, of course, should remain enclosed by an envelope whose
boundaries are marked by plant-functional objectives and design criteria
that are determined by regulatory bodies. The aim of these activities is
to look, microscopically, at all plant components; how they are
manufactured, transported to the site, installed and connected to each
other, where this is applicable. This covers manufactured equipment, as
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well as structures, prefabricated or otherwise. The expected areas of
improvement are as follows:
A) Labor and Material: The plant layout is reviewed and optimized,
keeping in mind during the process the way those office drawings are
carried out in the field. The objective is to reduce the labor and
material consumption required by the given design. In the case of
structures, multi-purpose arrangements are exploited whenever possible.
A shielding wall can be positioned to fulfill its function and serve as a
support for other components. Shorter pipes save pipe material, welding
material and labor, pipe hangers, and even space.
It has already been demonstrated that the best way to achieve these
improvements is to start with detailed models that are used both in the
early plant design stages and during construction stages. In the later
stages, time, labor, and materials can be saved in the field since the
detailed model allows better visualization of design requirements than
the usual engineering drawings. The cost of such models is often
considered prohibitive, especially for single-unit, custom-built plants.
Stated differently, the amount of savings in labor and materials costs
does not offset the additional cost of engineering services. This
problem is resolved by utilizing the design in several units, as will be
seen in Section 7.2.2, or by concentrating the activities on drawing
tables without any models.
B) Equipment: Alternative methods in manufacturing equipment as
well as manufactured material such as electric wires, insulation, etc.,
may reduce their cost. This may be done by rearranging shops such that
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costs of set-up each time new equipment specifications arrive, are
minimized. In designing equipment, attention should be paid to
manufacturability, i.e., satisfactory economic and practical
manufacturing processes. Other manufacturing plans and practices could
be investigated. Reactor pressure vessels, for instance, are made by
rings in Japan and Belgium as opposed to the way they are made in the
U.S., by plates. The foreign method surely reduces the welding effort
that is necessary to integrate the pressure vessel. We do not have
specific information on the cost effectiveness of such manufacturing
variations.
C) Functional Optimization: The stress here is to maximize the
plant productivity. The idea is to design the plant with a combination
of equipment that both increases efficiency and availability. The former
requires more equipment that is directed toward decreasing the heat
degradation on one side, and increasing the average temperature at which
heat is added on the other side of the thermodynamic cycle. This
increases the portion of available heat and hence increases plant
efficiency. More equipment, however, means either a higher failure rate
or less availability. Consideration is being given to the following
idea. Higher plant availability and safety are obtained through improved
quality of equipment rather than by increasing its quantity in the form
of redundant components and back-up systems. If this philosophy gains
acceptance, relatively simpler design is expected. Although the reduced
quantity of equipment may cost more due to individual component
improvement, savings in labor and material requirements are expected.
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One move in the direction of plant design optimization is the newly
proposed design referred to as CNSS. These letters stand for
Consolidated Nuclear Steam System. The Babcock & Wilcox Company has
announced its desire to commercialize this arrangement of PWRs (N5). In
addition to its small capacity of 400 MWe, which may turn out to be
convenient for several reasons, the main feature is geometry. The
reactor vessel, 15 meters tall and 5 meters in diameter, contains, in
addition to the core, ten replaceable steam generators with control rods
and reactor coolant pumps attached to the top of the vessel. Of the
conventional PWR NSSS components, only the pressurizer is located outside
the vessel.
Reduction of lead time to about 6 1/2 years from the current 11 to
12 years is expected. Sharp reduction in material and field labor is
thus anticipated. More features of the CNSS are discussed in Section
7.2.4.4.
Another example is the use of remote multiplexing in plant control
systems. This concept largely reduces the amount of wire material and
associated labor requirements. Other advantages are ease of modification
and future expansion, increased reliability, less vulnerability to fire
hazards and simplified interfacing with plant instrumentation (E5). In
reference (E5) it is estimated that remote multiplexing in non-safety
plant control systems may reduce commercial cost by close to 0.5%.
7.1.2 Improved Project Management
There are several fine examples of utilities with nuclear plants
that have already demonstrated the benefits of improved project
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management. Some areas where improvements have been found to be
beneficial are discussed below.
Project management refers to the management of all activities
related to completing the power plant and bringing it into commercial
operation. The dominating portion of these activities is in the
construction of the physical plant. In this report we shall, thus,
concentrate on construction management.
Estimates made in 1972 (W1) attribute 29.9% of fore cost to labor
with about 6.0 manhours/kWe (N2). As shown in Table 5.1, 1977 estimates
have changed to 22% of the fore cost and 9.3 manhours/kWe. The magnitude
of the 1977 labor cost is more than twice that of 1972. The cost of
material has undergone nearly the same change in magnitude (N2). To
balance against this trend, improved project management is considered.
Improved constructon management could have the following results:
1) Shorter construction period,
2) Less cost per unit time of construction, and
3) Lower number of manhours/kWe.
These are accomplished by:
1) Decreasing waiting and traveling time of workers (Figure 2.5.5),
2) Lowering the friction among working units through programming
an overall plan of tasks, both spatially and temporally,
3) Maximizing the use of material and construction equipment,
4) Decreasing waiting time for equipment and material, i.e.,
minimizing storage costs,
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5) Controlling material consumption to such a degree that
quantities purchased of material at each time maximize large
quantity purchase benefits and on-site availability,
6) Minimizing losses of construction equipment by improved service
and maintenance scheduling,
7) Minimizing job duplication or unnecessarily repeated tasks, and
8) Taking into account best estimates of weather effects.
This list is meant to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. Other
means such as modularization can be added.
It is obvious that the benefits of improved construction management
cannot be gained easily. Appropriate studies by operations analysts and
the experience of construction teams participating in the nuclear
industry should be exploited. The level of improvement depends on the
effort put into these studies.
One expects that the task of improving project management is greatly
simplified if the activities to be managed have a definite layout.
Unfortunately, this is not true in the case of building nuclear power
plants, since each one may have unique site characteristics and system
components that require modification to any originally executed and
experienced management scheme. This leads us to consider the impact of
other capital cost improvement strategies, such as standardization, which
will be discussed in the next section.
At this point we note that through better productivity of labor, and
by eliminating certain jobs and reducing time spent on other jobs through
improved construction management, standardization results in lower number
of manhours/kWe.
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7.1.3 Concluding Remarks:
The study of capital cost assessment related to design optimization
and improved project management requires detailed review of plant design,
exploration of vendor capacity, and detailed understanding of project
management structure and construction schedules and environment. We have
directed some specific questions regarding both areas to a number of the
industry members who declined to furnish any relevant response. The
lengthy work and proprietary nature of the matter did not allow such
cooperation. Such attempts had to be given up in an early stage of the
program.
On the other hand, we should believe that, in a market economy like
that of the U.S., the concerned parties in the industry, namely equipment
vendors and A/E and constructor firms, have both the motive and the
capability to take care of these two strategies. The CNSS concept of
primary system design mentioned earlier is a good support for this
argument. Hence, the practicalities of the problem prevented possible
further activities along this direction of research.
7.2 Standardization:
Advantages of standardization relative to capital cost are
enormous. This naturally accepted idea has been around for about a
decade. Activities in this field have been triggered by the USAEC (NRC)
statement on Standardization in April 1972. In March 1973 a more
definitive policy on standardization was released by the U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission. This policy considered the three options of Reference
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Systems, Duplication and Manufactured (Floating) plants. The Replication
option was added in July 1974 (01).
Standardization results in simplifying the preparation of licensing
material and procedures. It improves the performance of the licensing
teams. It also yields considerable potential for reduction in equipment
cost, better labor performance on site through handling of standard
equipment, less waste of material used in construction, improved project
management and hence, reduction in overall lead time.
There are arguments (N5) that discuss the so-called drawbacks of
standardization. For example, it is said that site approval is now on
the critical path, in most cases, for obtaining the construction permit.
In addition, permit requirements and public hearings before local, county
and state zoning and environmental and power commission boards are
escalating. The point here is that these effects tend to shrink the
benefits of standardization.
It is not suggested that one should "standardize" sites, or the
social-political and legal processes in order to halt this kind of
escalation. Standardization involves the design of the plant and the
planning of its construction. Without this standardization, the site and
construction permit problems make the overall situation worse; sooner or
later, the combination may become intolerable.
Another argument is that nuclear plant design is immature, and a
greater effort in research and development is being made to reach better
safety and performance levels. This argument is hard to by-pass and it
needs special consideration. As one NSSS vendor (M2) put it, the U.S.
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nuclear power industry has passed through four periods since the first
commercial plant went on line in 1957. These periods are:
1) Early commercial - When six demonstration plants were built by
the various vendors, including a non-current NSSS vendor, they
utilized both PWR and BWR technologies. Several design and
construction organizational arrangements, including some
utility participation, were experienced. This period covers
the first decade of the nuclear industry life. Plant
capacities were from 50 to 265 MWe.
2) Turnkey - The major activities associated with this stage took
place in the late 1960s. Twelve plants are in this category.
Their sizes range from 430 to 800 MWe. The main feature of
this period was that the NSSS vendors took full responsibility
for the project, with construction activities subcontracted to
one or more firms.
3) Transitional - Most of the related activities occurred in the
early Seventies. Plant capacities went above the 1000 MWe
size. The major feature was that utilities took responsibility
for the projects.
4) Standardization - This period will be discussed in this section.
At this fourth stage, NSSS vendors indicate that they reached
maturity with their Reference Systems designs, from which they
expect no major future alterations.
An assessment, including an historic consideration of each of the
standardization options in the form of their applicability and impact on
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capital cost, will be presented in the next four subsections.
Conclusions about this information are summarized in Section 7.2.5.
7.2.1 Flotation
The basic idea of this scheme is to assemble the power plant over a
barge in a specially designed and equipped manufacturing facility. This
work is expected to take about 3 1/2 years. Then the barge is towed to a
site where arrangements have been made to tie it in place and protect it
from surrounding weather and environmental conditions. Since most of the
high energy-demand regions are connected to large bodies of water such as
an ocean, river, or lake, this idea would have wide applicability.
This concept provides seismic insulation for the plant from ground
motion and avoids ordinary site problems. Thus, it increases the number
of potential sites. This was one of the great advantages of this option,
as cited in the late 1960s (B3). Assembly-line techniques are expected
to be used once the concept gains enough acceptance. Such techniques
contribute greatly to lower capital costs.
On the other hand, the difficulties associated with building the
barge itself and designing it to withstand the ocean environment and
shield it against strong waves, ship collisions and waterborne fires may
reduce the extent of the benefits.
The idea was originated toward the end of the last decade. Several
industrial firms specializing in nuclear plant equipment manufacturing,
engineering/construction, and shipbuilding considered the idea in tandem
with several utilities. When compared with other standardization
options, the idea is considered the ultimate standardization of nuclear
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power plants. Because of the nature of the concept, special
organizational arrangements had to be made. This led to the formation of
the sole company of this kind, Offshore Power Systems. Eventually
Westinghouse Electric Corporation became the only participant in this
subsidiary. The concept is called the Floating Nuclear Plant, or FNP.
Whenever specific information is necessary, it will be based on OPS/FNP
characteristics, since it has been the only appreciable experience in
this field.
Table 7.1 presents the major parameters of the FNP. The 1977 fore
cost is about $696/kWe. Figure 7.1 shows about 7.4 years as a project
lead time. Under normal escalation and AFDC cost conditions, as well as
no schedule deays, the commercial cost is expected in the range of $1085
to $1204 per kWe. The exact value depends on cash flow characteristics.
This corresponds to 81 to 90% of the base case value. In addition, the
capital cost uncertainty is expected to be lower than that for land-based
nuclear plants (Figure 7.2). This is due to the several factors
presented in Table 7.2. Other financing advantages are as follows:
a) The plant is mobile and hence can be treated as liquid asset in
case a utility wants to sell it, especially before it is moored.
b) A firm price with a predefined payment schedule and an
escalation basis lowers the cost and makes it more predictable.
c) There is a lower AFDC due to shorter schedule since the plant
is prelicensed and pretested and since plant manufacture and
site construction proceed in parallel.
The annual escalation rate during construction is expected to be 6.5%.
Because the activity distribution related to FNP is different from that
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Table 7.1: Floating Nuclear Plant
SIZE DATA:
Plant displacement, tons
Platform length, ft
Platform width, ft
Platform height, ft
Platform overall height, ft
Draft, ft
160,000
400
378
44
208
34
Delivery route: minimum width, ft
minimum depth, ft
POWER DATA:
Reactor type
Containment
Cooling system
four-loop PWR
ice-condenser system
any convenient type
Net generating capacity, MWe
NSSS rating, MWt
Transmission voltage, kV
1150
3425
345
COST DATA:
Cost of manufactured FNP, $/kWe
Cost of FNP transportation, x $106
Cost of site preparation, 2 units, x $106
565
5
300
OPS manufacturing facility, x $106
400
35
250
ci Cc
,u Q
0 0
0 _-o C 4 ..
a, E mn
- E '
a o c o
o U ' ,o 0o o
Y L O L
b N ~..
C VI L- 04-
c '-
... 0 ,
C C C C
O cmO 0 0
0 Z, 0 a ( .
D - . 0 0
C.2 C a 0 0
. L .-L
0C 'U 
0 N
3 .
0 4-
C 0
o L
U)
132
0O-
,c
a
0
oE
E
0
0
...
..
0
Vt
133
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::~~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~:::::::iii:it:::::::::: ::  :f :: :: i: : : :
ii:iiii ...:.....:::::i: i:I~i/iiiiii:i:!iiiiiiiii.c:i !ii:!~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ r :!::::i::~::::i:::i:i:i:!:!:!:i:i:i::i::!:;:i::i:i:!i o a. i : : iCo 
:i??????~'~~i;:''~ii??i!:ii:? o ::::::::::::::::i~·I:::i::::0 : f i : f . .........
............ .....·· · O w .
'..;::r··..;:: ~ iiii::~i~~~·iiimo~ii''''''''''
0
0~~~~~0~
0 = 0 E
4-c 0.L CO
z
;:·:·::::::: c :::::i:Li:i::!:  a,
o ~  ~ ~~, ov-::: ._.:::'::: 
0 ~ ~ 00 0 00 :0:::::':ii:::: cu ::i : : U. 
I I I I I I I I I 
a,
u
.20. a
-*- 0 E-0
N -
4-
O 1)
U) .
z
V) %
a o ,,--
I r
a Z
tflh,C-I
r-- a 4-I0
U0 0nC
uCz
-Ju 4- = a.LLZ
u E
c 
%-0
0 
0 ,
c
0 7U)
0
a 0C)CU)L
04+- w.
u ,Q 0C
- U
ca_ -a)
00
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 O O - (0 W A r.3 IN
Isoz3 palod o luaJsad
0 0
......... - ...- ...... ......... . r- ..... ------ .... j
134
Table 7.2: FNP Firm Price Savings
Samples of Frequent Power Plant Cost Responsibility
Construction Cost Overruns Land-Plant FNP
· Architect-engineering Manhour Overruns Owner OPS
· Construction Drawings:
Late Owner OPS
Design changes during construction Owner OPS
· Construction Labor:
Productivity lower than original A&E estimate Owner OPS
Retraining unstable work force Owner OPS
Overtime Owner OPS
Labor disputes Owner OPS
Components, Equipment & Materials:
Increases in quantitites required Owner OPS
Schedules delayed due to late or incorrect
deliveries Owner OPS
Quality Assurance:
Delays due to NRC audits Owner OPS
Cost of maintaining documentation
center and staff Owner OPS
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of the land-based plants, their escalation rates are different. It is
anticipated that the FNP escalation rate will be lower.
The OFFSHORE part of the OPS name may be unfortunate. Offshore
siting may involve a FNP moored offshore or a land-based plant built on a
man-made island, as was proposed in Western Europe. FLOATING is the
appropriate adjective. FNPs have considerable flexibility of siting.
They can be located several miles off shore, where cooling is the
once-through open cycle, surrounded by expensive breakwaters. They also
can be located in artifical basins dredged inland, where closed cycle
cooling is possible and structural requirements are reduced. The latter
can be done where deep water approaches close to shore and bottom
material can be economically excavated. This includes both estuarine and
riverine sites. It is required that the sea floor be three to four feet
below the bottom of the FNP barge, where the plant is moored.
As shown in Table 7.1, it is expected that the OPS manufacturing
facility near Jacksonville, Florida will cost about $250 million by the
time it is ready for the first FNP assembly. It is expected that eight
FNPs will pay off for this investment. For that reason, OPS has applied
for a license to manufacture eight FNPs. Only four FNPs have been
ordered, and their latest delay moved their commercial operation date 8
1/2 years on the average from their original schedules, to 1988 for the
first, and 1995 for the last FNP to be put on line (N7). Although
many utilities have considered this alternative, none is committed to any
of the other four. There was at least one case where a utility changed
its mind and went for HTGRs instead. Another considered FNPs but settled
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for land-based nuclear plants of smaller sizes. Other utilities' main
concern was the drop in future load projections. This was the same
reason reported as a cause of delay of the four units on order.
The Jacksonville, Florida facility is accessible to plant sites on
the east coast and Gulf of Mexico. The Panama Canal is too narrow for
the barges to pass through. This excludes the west coast. Obstacles on
the Mississippi River prevent the barges from going up beyond New
Orleans. Thus the Mississippi Valley and for similar reasons the Great
Lakes region are excluded. The expected demand in regions that are
inaccessible from Florida is not large enough to have similar facilities
sited elsewhere. No one expects OPS-like assembly lines to be
constructed between the bridges on the Mississippi River or on each of
the Great Lakes to serve their respective areas. From demand and
topographical considerations, the Pacific Coast has a better chance. The
technical flexibility of this option diminishes on the west coast because
the ocean floor drops sharply near the shore, which increases the site
structural requirements and affects the stability of the plant. On the
Atlantic and the Gulf coasts, which are accessible and may create enough
demand to recover the manufacturing facility cost, licensing problems are
expected to undermine the advantages of the FNP concept. Lately, in the
course of reviewing the OPS application for license-to-manufacture, the
NRC has issued the final report of the Liquid Pathway Study (NUREG-0440),
which concludes that "consequences could be 6 to 30 times more severe
with FNP than with a land-based nuclear plant, because in the former
case, radioactivity would be more likely to enter the hydrosphere and
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would reach water surface sooner" (N7). The problem was augmented by the
fact that, unlike the case of land-based plants, the NRC staff may
consider Class-Nine accidents for FNP license-to-manufacture, as ruled by
the Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board (N8).
It was suggested by members of this study that the FNPs may be
funded by the federal government and stockpiled as an insurance policy
for expected future energy shortages. This idea was presented by OPS
earlier to the Federal Energy Administration around the mid-1970s, but no
action has been taken.
The success of this option is yet to be tested when site licensing
is encountered. This experience is at least a decade from completion.
One of our survey sources indicated that the on-site related cost could
drive the total FNP cost to 10% higher than the land-based plant. It is
fair to say that, aside from any anticipating licensing problems, the
flotation alternative is technically and cost-wise feasible. It is also
more attractive as far as schedule improvement is considered.
It should be noted here that the previous capital cost numbers are
based on comparing an FNP to a land-based plant, both committed in 1977.
The shorter lead time of the FNP fives it a clear advantage. For
comparison between two plants that are expected to be on line at a future
date, the picture may be reversed, since the bulk of FNP activities will
move to a higher escalation period relative to that of the land-based
plant. The lower escalation rate and the more predictable schedule for
the FNP are the areas where contribution to cost reduction is expected.
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7.2.2 Duplication
This option has been exercised by Commonwealth Edison in its
Braidwood and Byron Stations, and by Duke Power Co. Several other
utilities who are building two-unit plants pursued this option. It has
been exercised largely in fossil plants. The main contribution of
duplication, where several sites and several utilities are involved, is
the SNUPPS project.
The idea is to have more than one power generating unit licensed
simultaneously by one or more utilities for construction on several
identical sites over a relatively short period of time. Capital cost
improvement is expected via the following four channels:
a) Shorter licensing lead time: It is expected that this option
will reduce the amount of effort needed by the NRC staff to review
all submitted applications for construction permits, as well as for
other licenses. Utilities in general will benefit indirectly, and
duplicating utilities should save some time especially on the later
units.
b) Purchase of large quantities: As a market practice, purchase of
large quantities of material and equipment of similar specifications
results in a lower unit cost.
c) Low engineering cost: Duplicate plants involve identical design
and similar home-office engineering activities. This has a large
impact on capital cost through lower indirect cost.
d) Improved labor utilization: By slipping the schedule of later
units appropriately, labor can be moved across the project without
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additional cost of turnover. As workers repeat their assignments
after the first unit, their efficiency is upgraded.
In order to verify the applicability of these points, actual cases are
examined. These can be classified in three groups: 1) standardized
plants, 2) multi-unit duplicates, and 3) SNUPPS. In the first group
other standardization options are exploited in addition to duplication
and will be discussed later. The other two groups will be discussed here.
i) Multi-unit duplicates: Seventeen nuclear power units are
involved in this category. They are described in Table 7.3. As early as
1966 and 1967 Oconee units 1, 2, and 3 were filed under a single PSAR.
McGuire, Byron, and Braidwood stations followed later. Duplication in
the nine units involved in these stations was considered before the 1972
AEC statement on standardization. There is a large number of multi-unit
nuclear stations that have two or more units with identical licensing
schedules. Examples of these are Palo Verde, Sequoyah, Seabrook, and
LaSalle County stations. Although they are expected to be duplicate
units, there is no evidence that they were licensed under this option.
After 1972, Cherokee, Perkins, and Haven stations were reported as
duplication events. To examine the impact of duplication, Figure 7.3
shows the behavior of lead time for duplicate packages. The lower part
presents the PSAR review time, i.e., the time between docketing and CP
issue date. The upper part shows the total licensing lead time, which
starts from the date of NSSS commitment and ends by CP issue date. In
addition, the upper part includes three other data points that represent
non-standardized plants. The first point represents the ten cases that
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were committed in 1968 (see Table 7.4). They all received construction
permits in about (35 + 16) months later. The other points represent the
nine cases of 1971 commitments. The lower point, (33 + 6.5) months, is
when construction is started. For three cases this was after the Limited
Work Approval issue. The upper point, (44 + 21) months is based on CP
issue dates for plants involved. Of these, there are four units which
are sited as second or third units on sites previously licensed for
earlier units.
Table 7.3 Multi-unit Duplicates - Schedule
Nuclear Unit
Oconee 1
2
3
McGuire 1
2
Byron 1
2
Braidwood 1
2
Cherokee 1
2
3
Perkins 1
2
3
Haven 1
2
Date of
Commitment
7/8/66
II
5/1/67
11/17/69
II
4/9/71
II
9/28/72
II
3/26/74
II
II
II
II
II
6/24/74
II
Date of
Commercial Operation
)ate Appl'd Date of Actual or
to NRC CP Issue Original Expected
12/1/66 11/6/67 5/71 7/16/73
I" " 5/72 9/9/74
5/3/67 " 6/73 12/16/74
9/18/71 2/28/73 3/76 7/79
1" " 3/77 3/81
2/23/73 12/31/75 10/78 3/81
10/79 10/82
10/79 10/81
10/80 10/82
3/29/74 12/30/77 9/82 1/85
9/83 7/87
2/84 1/89
1/81 1/88
1/82 7/91
1/83 1/93
5/29/74 2/81 6/87
" 6/82 6/89
-
I
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Table 7.4 Proqress of Non-standardized
Year of
Announcement
1968
1971=
1973
1974
No. of
Stations/
Packages
10
9
8*
3
No. of CP Lead Time
Units (months)
Mean S.D.
14 35.1 15.9
16 44 21
16* 45.5+ 20.5+
6 45#
Project Lead Time
(months)
Mean S.D.
115.3 28.5
135.2 17.2
146.7** 29.2**
131.3 13.0
(1) The PSAR review time is as follows, months
1971 34.6 + 18.8
1973 35.5 + 19.1+
1974 42#
* include 2 cancelled stations with 4 units
** exclude 2 cancelled stations with 4 units
+ based on 2 non-cancelled cases; others are still with no CP
based on one case; the other two have no CP yet
= four packages are on previously used sites
Figure 7.4 completes the lead time picture by showing an overall
schedule duration for the first units to come on line for each
duplication package. The lower band is for originally estimated
schedules at the start of the project. The upper band is for actual, or
currently estimated, schedules. Non-standardized plant data are
represented by three points, for 1968, 1971, and 1973 commitment years.
Except for the last point which is relatively highly uncertain at the
time of writing this report, the other two points are above the band.
This shows the contribution of this form of duplication to lead time
improvement.
Units (1)

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By looking back at Table 7.3, the following remarks are made
considering the nature of this duplication option. Oconee 3 was
committed ten months later and docketed five months later, after the
first 2 units. All received the CP on one date. There is a large number
of packages that are similar to that of McGuire 1 & 2 units, in the
matter of licensing schedule. Braidwood Station was announced about a
year and a half later than Byron station. Both were docketed and
received the CP as one package. The stations are on separate sites,
which led to independent construction schedules that are nearly
simultaneous. This makes Braidwood 1 as a first-unit as Byron 1. The
separate sites do not cause considerable problems since they are within
the same environmental envelope. This makes all four units virtually
identical except for rejected heat removal systems. The difference is
removed in the case of Cherokee/Perkins stations since they both employ
mechanical draft cooling towers. Here the site separation caused CP
issue
delays for Perkins relative to Cherokee station. The Haven station is
encountering a great amount of uncertainty due to siting problems. Its
set-up is similar to that of McGuire, but it had to be resited after a
period of three years since the Koshkonang site was considered
initially. The original duplicate design is still committed to, although
the site-related problems are overwhelming.
ii SNUPPS option: The Standardized Nuclear Unit Power Plant
System, SNUPPS, has been the first and, so far, the last-of-a-kind
duplication concept. Table 7.5 shows the plants involved and their
respective schedules. Multi-ownership, and multi-sites, as shown, are
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involved, in addition to different rejected heat removal systems.
The idea is to design a standard plant, known as the Power Block,
that covers the major portion of the power station leaving out those
items that are site-dependent, such as the cooling system, or the
administrative building. The Power Block is designed to withstand all
the conditions that are encountered in the so-called site envelope. The
site envelope is a conceptual site characterized by the extreme
conditions that are anticipated in all actual sites. These conditions
reflect Kansas severe tornadoes, Wisconsin cold temperatures, and
upper-state New York snow loads as examples. A group known as SNUPPS
staff is formed as a management organization for the project. An A/E
firm is chosen to design the Power Block, and a NSSS design is also
selected.
One major area of improvement was the engineering activities related
to the Power Block. For the first time, detailed modeling was used for
the Power block design, displaying all related systems. Several models
were built for use in the different project stages. These models help as
a primary design tool in the layout of process piping, in isometric
drawing preparation, and to avoid field design of small components
usually done during construction. They also help in developing
construction plans (M2, N9). The increased cost of engineering design is
spread among the five units. This has made the engineering cost per kWe
50% lower than that of the comparable custom-built plants. The same
engineering services that cost about $50 million per plant were obtained
for $100 million for the five SNUPPS units, or $20 million
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Table 7.5 SNUPPS Plants
Nuclear Unit
Owner & Location
Carlaway 1
2
(Union Electric,
Fulton, Mo.)
Date of
Commitment
Date Appl'd
to NRC
4/30/74
1l
7/16/73
II
Sterling 1 4/30/74
(Rochester
Gas & Electric
Co., Oswego,
N.Y.)
Tyron 1 3/21/73
(Northern States
Power Co. & 3
other utilities,
Durand, Wisc.)
Wolf Creek 1 2/20/73
(Kansas City Power
& Light, and
Kansas Gas &
Electric Co.,
Burlington, Ks)
II
II
4/1/74
Date of
CP Issue
Date of
Commercial Operation
Actual or
Original Expected
4/16/76 10/81
" 4/83
9/1/77 10/82
12/23/77 /82
5/17/77 4/81
10/82
4/87
4/84
4/84
4/83
_ . . . ._ .
. . .
''Ts ' -^ w A BEn S
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per unit (S2). This pooling of resources by the concerned utilities in
financing the cost of engineering services has allowed for the expensive
detailed modeling to be realized, as well as subsequent benefits.
Another advantage is in the area of project schedules. Of the
eleven nuclear stations announced in 1973, only six have received
construction permits so far. Four of these six belong to the SNUPPS
project, which averaged 45.5 months of CP lead time. The fifth station
has three units and its CP lead time was 31 months. The sixth CP was
granted to two units to be added to a station with two nuclear units that
are already in operation. These two units were canceled 28 months later
for non-direct licensing reasons. Another station is delayed
indefinitely due to a drop in the expected future load growth. One unit
received a Limited Work Authorization after 28 months but still is
without a CP. The remainder uncancelled, non-SNUPPS, first on-line units
will have (149 + 31) months for currently estimated project lead time.
This is compared to the four SNUPPS first-on-line units which show the
advantage by lead times of (121 + 9) months, that are about 20% lower
than the other units. The CP lead time was (45.5 + 11) months. In 1974
three stations were announced. Only one of them received the CP 45
months later. This is a third unit, however, which will be added to an
already licensed site. The second unit in this site is identical to this
third unit. The other two stations, first-on-line units, are expected to
have an average project lead time of 132 months, but this is highly
uncertain so long as the CPs are not issued.
The shortest lead time is 111 months for the Callaway 1 unit. This
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is much shorter than the 141 month industry average in 1977 (Table 2.1).
This short schedule was originally intended to be even one year shorter,
but was delayed for non-licensing reasons. The cost savings of SNUPPS
seemed not to be sufficient, for the Callaway station unit 1 was delayed
one year while unit 2 was delayed four years due to financial problems.
The overall project cost increase due to the delay will be $800 million
(N10). The commercial cost changes, consequently, from about $1100/kWe
to about $1400/kWe for the two units. This is almost a 30% increase.
Each of the other three SNUPPS units has been delayed for about two years.
It should be noted here that the SNUPPS units are expected to be
built by different construction teams, that, except in one case, they are
single-unit stations, and any given plant has unnecessary requirements
included in the design because of the 'site-envelope' characteristics.
These factors do not help the capital cost, if they do not increase it.
The other SNUPPS units are expected to cost more than the original
Callaway station cost of $1100/kWe.
It is interesting to compare the SNUPPS Project with another
duplication project, the Cherokee/Perkins Package. The schedule of this
package is described in Table 7.3. It has six units with a capacity 33%
larger than that of SNUPPS. The schedule is shifted a little later than
SNUPPS schedule. Each three units are on a separate site. The sites are
similar in climate. The design of the units is identical through the
rejected heat removal system, however, they utilize a standardized NSSS
design. It took 45 months for Cherokee Station to obtain a CP, while
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intervenor action still delays that of Perkins. The commercial costs at
the completion of each station will be $926/kWe for Cherokee, and
$1126/kWe for Perkins (H1). Considering the current Callaway station
cost estimate, these figures are much lower than those of SNUPPS,
noticing that Cherokee/Perkins schedules are longer. It should be noted
that expensive duplication features such as detailed modeling are used in
Cherokee/Perkins also. Factors other than licensing have made the
difference. These factors will be discussed in Section 7.4.
7.2.3 Replication
This concept is similar to the preceding one in that the new plant
is as identical to the early plant as possible. It works as follows. A
new, separate application for CP is made for the plant under
consideration. In this application and related PSAR, reference is made
to an already licensed plant. This reduces the review process to merely
considering site-related matters and compatibility of the replicated
design to the new site. Therefore, the CP lead time is expected to be
shorter. In addition, engineering and construction services, if they are
rendered by the same teams that handled the reference plant, are expected
to cost less. The construction lead time is improved due to the earlier
experience.
Table 7.6 summarizes the status of replication. No CP has been
granted, although five and four years have passed since the announcements
of James Port and NEP Stations, respectively. Table 7.7 presents the
values for lead times. Catawba Station differs from McGuire Station in
that the cooling system took 37 months for PSAR review, while McGuire
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Table 7.6: Replicate Plants Status
Nuclear Unit
Reference Plaint
Date of
Commitment
Date Appl
to NRC
'd Date of
CP Issue
Date of
Commercial Operation
Actual or
Original Expected
Catawba 1
2
(McGuire)
James Port 1
2
(Millstone 3)
Marble Hill
(Byron)
7/26/72
II
6/27/73
II
11/13/73
5/74
'I
1
2
NEP 1
2
(Seabrook)
Table 7.7:
7/24/72
II
6/12/74
7/1/75
Im
8/7/75 3/79
" 3/80
6/81
6/83
4/5/78
9/9/76
II
6/82
6/84
/82
/83
Replication Progress, Months
PSAR
Review TimeUnit
CP Lead
Time
Project Schedule Estimate
Original Current
Catawba 1 37 37 92 126
James Port 1 96 132
Marble Hill 1 33 53 103 103
NEP 1 97 145
7/81
1/83
6/84
6/84
6/82
6/84
/86
/88
__
- -
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took only 17 months. Comparing this to the 1973 commitments of (44 + 21)
months (Table 7.4), it shows a slight improvement, although it was
committed a year earlier. It took Marble Hill Station 53 months to
obtain the CP, which is higher than the 1973 average. With respect to
project lead times, the original estimates average about eight years,
which shows the high expectations of the utilities involved. Catawba
schedule shows improvement when compared to 1971 and 1973
non-standardized plant data. The Marble Hill current estimate of project
lead time of 103 months leaves 50 months only for construction lead time,
which seems unrealistic. A new estimate with at least a one-year delay
is no surprise at this point, although limited work was authorized more
than three years ago. James Port 1 and NEP 1 average about 139 months,
which is close to the 1973 averages and not better than the 1974s. In
both cases and that of the 1974 average, it is too early to consider the
relevant figures reliable.
The relative improvement cited in the case of Catawba can be
attributed to factors other than replication. These factors will be
discussed in Section 7.4. The other three cases have not shown any
significant improvement. One cannot disregard the fact that their
performance may be worse if they are custom-built. This leaves us with
the conclusion that there is no clear advantage in Replication.
7.2.4 Reference Systems
This is the fourth option--standardization. This concept is simply
licensing a standard design for a portion of the nuclear power plant,
which a number of plants would presumably utilize as an integral part of
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the overall design. It is expected that once a design was reviewed and
licensed, it would be referenced in subsequent applications without
undergoing a similar review, so long as its license is valid.
Backfitting has been implemented in these reference systems, as well as
in the non-reference designs and already-built power plants. This
procedure should shorten the CP lead time by the amount needed to review
the design of the relevant portion of the power plant each time a new
application is submitted.
Because of the nature of the nuclear industry structure, the nuclear
power plant has been divided into two parts. These are the Nuclear Steam
Supply System (NSSS) or the Nuclear Island, and whatever is left, i.e.,
the Balance of the Plant (BOP). Each of these has been standardized as a
Reference System by concerned participants in the nuclear industry.
Licensing applications were filed with the NRC. Most of them received
Preliminary Design Approvals (PDA). And some of them have been
implemented in actual CP applications. The impact of each of these two
Reference Systems will be discussed separately in the remainder of this
section. In addition, two important arrangements of reference design,
the Nuclear Island and the Consolidated Nuclear Steam System, will be
assessed.
7.2.4.1 NSSS Reference Design
Standardization of design is limited to the Nuclear Steam Supply
System. It only considers the reactor, its primary cooling system, and
steam generators. It goes as far as the containment enclosure. The
contributors in this area are, of course, the NSSS vendors.
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This option is implemented by producing a document corresponding to
the portion of a conventional PSAR that covers the NSSS-related design
characteristics. This document is docketed, reviewed, and licensed as
usual. The license is called Preliminary Design Approval (PDA).
Subsequent applications by interested utilities need only reference this
document. This reduces the material volume of the application and,
consequently, saves the preparation and review efforts.
Several NSSS reference designs have evolved. The status of these
systems is summarized in Table 7.8. (Note that these are PWRs only; BWR
standardization goes beyond the NSSS; see Section 7.2.4.3.)
Unfortunately, by the time these reference designs were approved, the
demand on new nuclear units has diminished. Only one project was
reported, as shown in Table 7.9. As of April 1978, 34% of construction
Table 7.8 NSSS Reference Design Status
File PDA
Vendor Reference Date Date MWt Application
Babcock & Wilcox B-SAR-241 3/74 3818
B-SAR-205 3/76 3800
Combustion
Engineering CESSAR 12/31/75 3800
Westinghouse RESAR-3 /75 3425 Updated as
RESAR-3S
RESAR-41 2/74 12/31/75 South Texas
Project
RESAR-3S 12/76 3425
RESAR-414
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Table 7.9 NSSS Reference Design Implementation Progress
Nuclear Unit Date Of Date Appl'd Date of Date of Commercial
(Reference NSSS) Commitment to NRC CP Issue Operation
Original Actual or
Expected
South Texas 1 6/6/73 5/19/74 12/22/75 10/80 10/80
2 " " " 3/82 3/82
(RESAR-41)
is reported complete (N11). The CP lead time is 30 months, while the
PSAR review time is only 19 months. The construction lead time is
expected to be 59 months. The overall project lead time is, hence, 89
months. Comparing this information with data in Table 7.4 for
non-standardized plants shows huge improvement.
This conclusion could be strongly verified and made more reliable if
more cases were available. Historically, RESAR-3 design was applied in
McGuire Station. This was before any PDA was issued. The CESSAR is
based on Combustion Engineering System-80 design of NSSS. The same
design is utilized in Cherokee and Perkins Stations. The relevant
application, however, did not reference the CESSAR, which gained a PDA at
a later date. All these stations have been discussed before. Had the
RESAR-3 and the CESSAR been licensed at the appropriate time, would there
be any further improvement in these projects in addition to the
duplication benefits cited before? The answer is not clear. The McGuire
PSAR review time is only 17 months, but the CP lead time is 40 months.
It might have lessened the PSAR preparation time. For the other two
stations, non-NSSS related matters dominated, and this option is
ineffective.
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7.2.4.2 BOP Reference Design
This concept is similar to the previous one, except that attention
is paid, this time, to plant parts other than the NSSS, i.e. the Balance
of the Plant.
The various reference designs are listed in Table 7.10. Figure 7.5
shows a typical reference design. In this figure it should be noted that
the "Center area bounded by crane wall will accommodate the NSSS of an
LWR" (02). The LWR is a PWR. This is true of all published BOP
reference designs to date, as listed in Table 7.10.
The BOPSSAR, for example, has cost $3 million, with over 3.5 years
of design work (N12). Because they have to interface with established
NSSS designs, the BOP reference systems have to be completed at later
dates. Because of unfavorable market conditions, they have had little
chance to be implemented. The only action taken in this regard was the
announcement of New York State Gas & Electric in July 1977. This
announcement consists of two 1250 MWe PWRs referencing the SWESSAR
interfacing with the CESSAR. The two units are expected to be in
commercial operation by 1988 and 1990 with a total capital cost estimate
of $3 billion (N3), or $1200/kWe. Compared with the base case commercial
cost of $1342/kWe, this shows a 10% improvement, although the project
lead times do not show such improvement. About eight months later the
announcement was amended to commercial operation dates of 1991 and 1993,
and commercial cost of $3.306 billion estimate (N7), or $1322/kWe. Yet,
no firm commitments were made with the relevant vendor and the A/E firm.
The cause of delay lay woth uncertainty in licensing.
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Table 7.10 BOP Reference
BOP NSSS
Reference Interface
Design Status
File PDA
Date Date MWe Application
Ebasco
Fluor Pioneer
Gibbs & Hill
Gilbert/
Commonwealth
Stone &
Webster
BOPSSAR
GIBBSSAR
GAISSAR
SWESSAR-P1
RESAR-414
RESAR-41
RESAR-414
11/75
8/76
8/77
RESAR-414
RESAR-41
RESAR-3S
CESSAR
RESAR-414
B-SAR-205
6/74 5/76 1250
10/75 8/76 1150
8/76 1300
4/1/77 1200
1300
An Architect/Engineer firm (K1) expects the following benefits of
BOP reference design:
· 5 to 10% construction man-hour savings
· 1 year shorter schedule with approved site
* 86% plant availability or better.
The last point may be appreciated if the increase of availability is only
5%, the resulting savings are $200 million over a 40-year plant life, or
about 1 mill/kWehr. Also a 10% reduction in labor lowers the commercial
cost by 3.5%, while one year of the lead time results in savings twice as
high. The combined effect of a 10% reduction in man-hours and 1 year
shorter schedule is about a 10% savings in commercial cost.
The main contribution of this concept to the industry is in changing
the A/E role. It used to be a service-supplier and now it enters the
A/E
-
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market with a product, namely the approved BOP design. This is one step
in the institutional changes that will be discussed briefly later, and in
detail in the LWR Institutional Group report.
7.2.4.3 The Island Concept
The first two sections were concerned with PWR power plants. The
BWR plant design pursued a different strategy with regard to the scope of
standardization input by the reactor vendor. Rather than being bounded
by the crane wall, reference design was extended to the "nuclear
island." This may be attributed to the technology and special safety
features of BWRs as opposed to the PWRs. The relevant documents are
GESSAR-238 and GESSAR-251. Each covers the standard design of the
nuclear island, which consists of the NSSS and all nuclear and
safety-related systems in the containment building, auxiliary building,
fuel handling building, control room, rad-waste building, the off-gas
structures and one diesel generator building. Figure 7.5 illustrates the
scope of the nuclear island possible for a PWR. The BWR nuclear island
is not very different. This effort has paid off in terms of less Nuclear
Island/BOP interfaces. It covers 85% of non-site-related material of
PSAR. It is expected to save the utility about 40 man-years, or $2
million in the PSAR preparation and review (S3).
To complement the Nuclear Island, another reference design is
necessary to complete the BWR plant standardization. This is the Turbine
Island design, so far one such design has emerged, and is designated as
BRAUN SAR for 1280 MWe and interfaces with GESSAR-238. Table 7.11
summarizes the status of the Island concept. Incidentally, the numbers
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Table 7.11 Island Concept Status
Reference File PDA
Designer System Island Interface Date Date Power Application
General GESSAR-238 Nuclear 5/73 12/75 3579 Hartsville
Electric (MWt) 1-4, Phipps
Bend 1-2,
Black Fox
1-2
General GESSAR-251 Nuclear 3/75 3800
Electric (MWt)
C.F. BRAUN SAR Turbine GESSAR-238 5/76 1220
Braun (MWe)
following the GESSAR acronym refer to the inner diameter, in inches, of
the reactor vessel, and hence they are proportional to power. For
reasons similar to those encountered with the first two reference design
concepts, only GESSAR-238 has been implemented. Table 7.12 presents the
progress of this implementation. After 34 months of docketing, the Black
Fox Station has not obtained even the Limited Work Authorization. Table
7.13 summarizes the progress of the first units. These data are to be
compared with that of Table 7.4 for non-standardized units. With respect
to the PSAR review time and CP lead time, Hartsville shows a little
improvement, while Phipps Bend shows greater improvement. The large
improvements are noticed in the current project lead time estimates.
Almost one year, on the average, has been saved in each case.
It has been noticed during PSAR reviews by the NRC that only two or
three clarifying questions on areas described by the GESSAR-238 were
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Table 7.12 Island Concept Implementation Progress
Date of Commercial
Nuclear Unit Date Of
Commitment
Date Appl'd
to NRC
Date of Operation
CP Issue Original Actual or
Expected
Hartsville 1
2
3
4
Black Fox 1
2
Phipps Bend 1
2
Table 7.13
8/1/74
II
10/1/75
II
1/15/78 4/82
" 4/83
8/84
3/85
First Unit Progress with Nuclear Islands
(months)
PSAR
Review TimeUnit
CP Lead
Time
Project Schedule Estimate
Original Current
Hartsville 1
Black Fox 1
Phipps Bend 1
asked by the NRC for Hartsville case.
Phipps Bend Station (03). Both stati
None was asked in the case of
ons are owned by the same utility,
TVA. Figure 7.6 illustrates the history of licensing activities relevant
to these stations, and Figure 7.7 shows an attempt to present the
prospects of such standardization.
7/1/74
II
II
II
12/15/72
II
II
II
1/23/73
II
1/77
II
II
II
7/79
4/80
10/79
10/80
4/82
4/83
8/8/75
II
6/83
4/84
12/83
12/84
8/84
3/85
30 49 76
27
120
41
126
132
12092
161
Docketed SER issued
7/73 11/74
PDA-I
12/75
PDA-I,Am. I
6/77
Gssar * Ad· O ' ·ACRS 
3/75 Docketed SER issued CP
11/74 4/76 5/77
Uaw* II;. - _
e [ e*-
Phipps bend
e- NRC action
Docketed
11/75
ACRS
5/76 ACRS
5/77
PDA-I, Am.I
Expires'
12/78
CPexpected
I/78
SER issued
4/77
- ACRS action
Fig. 7'.6 Nuclear island
nu r i V I 
licensing progress (S3)
162
A custom plant
Pl PSAR
611.1 *1-1-1-l-I~iI
PH CP
*l1, *l -- 1|_-
Site
*Ulll l ,,1llllf lll 1 11111itlllllA- . ml
review PH -Si LWA
/ approval
/-/1
Construction OL
FSAR /
I 'IIUIUI 10 years
Iyears
PI PH CP / Construction OL /
IAm- * 6 years
FSAR
B Referenced *.'11 lIUBl
standard plant
12 months
Key:
PI - Project initiation
PH - Public hearing
LWA - Limited work authorization
CP - Construction permit
OL - On line
Fig. 7.7. Benefit of reducing C.P. lead time (S3)
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7.2.4.4 Standardized Modular Design
This option is based on a conceptual NSSS design recently developed
by Babcock & Wilcox Company, and called the Consolidated Nuclear Steam
System, CNSS. The reactor is a PWR. The basic idea is to have a
relatively large reactor vessel that contains all the primary system
components such as the core, the steam generators, and reactor coolant
pumps. Except for the pressurizer, all primary system components are
placed in, or directly attached to, a reactor vessel of the conventional
1200 MWe PWR. Figure 7.8 illustrates the arrangement. The power is
limited by structural considerations to 1200 MWt, or 400 MWe. The size,
however, seems more favorable than the large units for a considerable
segment of the utility market if the associated cost is reasonable.
This design reduces the LOCA requirements, which includes the core
flood system (S4). Less piping and relevant structures in the primary
system are required as compared to the conventional loop-type PWR. Other
features, discussed in Section 7.1.1, show promising capital cost
benefits. The 400 MWe CNSS specific capital cost ($/kWe) is expected to
be similar to that of a current PWR in the 700-800 MWe range (B4).
This system is still in the conceptual design stage. The
participants expect that the first-of-a-kind unit will be built by the
late 1980s. The reported economic benefits are for the nth-of-a-kind
unit. This may take place in the mid-1990s, toward the end of the scope
of this study.
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Feedwater i
10 Steam gene
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lower lat
Surge nozzles
Fig. 7.8 Reactor vessel - consolidated nuclear steam system (B4)
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In addition, this design has yet to be licensed.
requirements evolution continues, drastic changes may
direction in the relevant economics.
This option could be incorporated with the NSSS
category. Because of major changes in its BOP design
overall status, it has to be discussed in this separa
above mentioned reasons, a closer look at this concep
the proposed extension of this study.
If the regulatory
occur in either
reference system
, as well as its
te section. For the
t will be made in
7.2.5 Summary
Standardization is expected to have favorable impact on other
capital cost improvement alternatives as well as on plant reliability.
Almost all participants in the Reference System option expect
considerable improvement in the reliability area. Relative to this
point, it was mentioned that plant availability is expected to be 86% or
better with one of the reference BOP designs (Section 7.2.4.2). In this
regard, standardization is expected to facilitate identification of
factors that have large potential on plant reliability.
As for the impact of standardization on project management, Figure
7.9 summarizes the highlights of the expected interaction.
The various standardization options are generally not mutually
exclusive. Flotation, sometimes described as the ultimate
standardization, has a relatively smaller range of applicability. It has
not been licensed yet, which does allow the capital cost figures to be
very reliable at this point in time. The Reference Systems option was
the one that met with the largest success. Duplication, in the SNUPPS
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scheme, has some limitations, as discussed in Section 7.2.2. Replication
is the one with the least success. Factors that are independent of
standardization have their impact on these results. We can expect a
situation where a package of DUPLICATE units are licensed according to
approved Reference Systems spanning the NSSS and BOP. This has been
examined to some extent. This package may be a REPLICA of another
station. Thus, all non-flotation options can be exploited
simultaneously. Consequently, it is not necessary to assess the impact
of each of the land-based standardization options on capital cost as if
they were mutually exclusive alternatives. Quantitatively, Flotation
capital cost is estimated at + 10% of the land-based plant capital cost.
Duplication promises 6 to 13% cost improvement; 10% savings are
anticipated with Reference Systems. Replication shows no significant
improvement.
Other standardization schemes have been considered at the beginning
of this study. These schemes concentrate on small-scale options such as
major components or portions of the Balance of Plant. As the study
progressed, consideration of these schemes was dropped, mainly for their
impracticalities.
The main impact of standardization on capital cost elements is the
reduction of time requirements. This is in turn the most important
element, as shown before. Other improvement strategies are necessary to
assist standardization and make it effective. These are discussed at
greater length in the following two sections.
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7.3 Licensing Procedures
By the beginning of the Transitional Period, the period between
turnkey projects and standardization, the nuclear industry had
accumulated a considerable amount of experience in nuclear power plant
construction and operation. More safety issues were identified, as
described in Section 6.2.3. That period coincided with relatively large
numbers of construction applications for plants that appeared to shoot
toward infinity in reactor thermal power. These are some of the causes
for the lengthy reviews that dominated since the early 1970s. This led
the various parties of the industry to feel the necessity of movement
toward improvement. In one case the AEC put a ceiling on the reactor
thermal output to enhance safety requirements, as will be discussed
later. On the side of utilities, applications of multi-unit plants were
made using single PSAR documents for all similar units on the same site.
This was an early drift toward "Duplication." By the start of the
Standardization Period, other licensing-related improvements had been
considered, namely the Early Site-Review and the issuance of Limited Work
Authorization. Discussion of these two points as well as that of a
proposed Periodic Freeze on Regulatory Changes will be covered in the
remainder of this section. The first approach has been implemented on a
limited scope; the second has had wider applications. The third approach
has merely been proposed and is worth investigation.
It is clear that these three measures deal mainly with licensing
activities relevant to the issuance of the Construction Permit and the
start of construction. The Final Safety Analysis Report review, as
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required for the Operating License, is not on the critical path for the
great majority of nuclear power plant project schedules. This is the
reason for concentrating the licensing improvement efforts on attempts to
reduce delay in the start of construction.
7.3.1 Early Site-Review
Early Site-review was proposed by the NRC around mid-1970s. A major
amendment reported in June 1976 (N14) describes the Staff Site Position,
SSP. The Nuclear Licensing Reform Bill submitted to Congress on
September 7, 1977 specifies decoupling of site reviews from safety
reviews (N12).
This approach resulted from the following consideration. The
financially significant period starts from the date of NSSS commitment.
Activities before this date, such as feasibility studies, site selection
and NSSS bid evaluations, though expensive, are relatively less costly.
Construction Permit application review requires a specified site and a
specific NSSS design. Environmental and safety-related matters are
reviewed in this process along with site "worthiness" and site/design
compatibility. Because of environmental legislation, higher demand on
appropriate sites, and other matters, site reviews have dominated the
process directly on the critical path and the PSAR review lead time has
stretched to as long as 7 years. Improvements in design, for instance
through standardization became ineffective. During this delay, payments
progress on ordered equipment, storage facilities are erected to receive
delivered equipment, overhead cost continues, and AFDC charges cannot be
avoided.
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To reduce costs, it has become necessary to decouple the site review
process from the NSSS commitment date. The procedure, then, goes as
follows. The utility selects a site and submits an application to the
NRC that includes an Environmental Impact Statement and a Site Safety
Evaluation Report. The review process ends with issuance of a Staff Site
Position. If the site is acceptable, the SSP can be referenced in a
future CP application within a period of five years (after which it
expires).
Although this procedure is expected to increase the Pre-NSSS
commitment expenditure, the associated increase in AFDC is expected to be
much lower than that caused by site-review delays according to the
conventional path.
In the case of San Joaquim project, it took four years to obtain an
early site-approval on a partial basis. As a result of public vote, this
four unit project was canceled in March 1978 (N7). It seems also that
New York State Electric & Gas is practicing this approach in its two most
recent units, announced in July 1977. Although the intention of the
utility to build a standardized plant utilizing the CESSAR and the
SWESSAR (see Sections 7.2.4.1 and 7.2.4.2) was known, no commitment with
the respective vendor or the A/E firm was made since that date. By April
1978 the project was delayed for three years due to uncertainty in
licensing (N7).
To some extent, these two examples show the limitations of this
approach. The main defect in this approach comes from state and local
intervention. Legislation requiring some form of preconstruction state
review have been enacted in at least 23 states since 1970 (G1). New York
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State requires power plant specification before its two or more year
review begins. Oregon allows early site-approval after a 2-year review,
but requires additional eight-month reviews as the power plant is
specified for the preapproved site. Because the NRC Early Site-Approval
may interfere with state and/or local government land-use planning, and
may give the concerned utilities greater influence, the matter becomes
more complex. In addition, it is expected that there will be cases of
contradictory decisions by NRC and state governments with regard to a
given site. Such problems have delayed the NRC from adopting any related
regulations (G1).
A comparison of project schedules between a custom-built plant, a
standardized plant (with Reference Design), and a standardized plant with
an Early Site-review is shown in Figure 7.10. The figure is prepared on
the basis of data selected in the survey and with assistance of reference
(W4). The Early Site-Review (ESR) conducted prior to the NSSS commitment
date has its effect on PSAR preparation, where the approved site is
referenced, as well as on the activities between docketing and issuance
of the Construction Permit.
7.3.2 Limited Work Authorization
After completion of NRC staff reviews and public hearings on
environmental and site suitability factors, an LWA may be issued. This
allows the utility to work on site preparation while safety reviews are
ongoing. An AEC amendment of February 5, 1974 states that an LWA may be
issued upon completion of an environmental impact review 8 to 14 months
before CP. This saves the utility few months worth of critical path
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activities. The LWA may be extended or renewed to permit work on
structural portions of auxiliary, fuel, and reactor buildings up to grade
level.
The first LWA was granted in April 1974. This approach was
exercised in almost all the following licensing actions. In the first
three years of implementation, 21 LWAs have been issued (G1). Table 7.14
shows the licensing progress for plants announced in 1971 where the LWA
approach was exercised, as well as for plants announced in 1973 and
1974.
Table 7.14 LWA Progress
Station
Harris 1-4
Perry 1, 2
River Bend 1, 2
Grand Gulf 1
Davis Basse 2, 3
WNP-4
Yellow Creek 1, 2
Date of
Announcement
4/71
10/71
12/71
1/72
8/73
5/74
8/74
From Announce- From Docket From LWA
m't to Docket'g to LWA (1st) to CP
5 months 28 months 48 months
17 19 31
23 24 18
8 18 6
9 19 29**
3 15* 27*
23 19 3**
Wolf Creek
Marble Hill 1, 2
Cherokee 1-3
Phipps Bend 1, 2
2/73
11/73
3/74
8/74
14
20
0
26
33
26
26
24
*Data correspond to an extension of the first LWA.
**Durations are larger than 29 and 3 months, respectively.
4
7
19
3
-
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The first LWA was granted to Grand Gulf station, whose first unit was
announced in 1972. The first seven plants are customized projects, while
the last four are standardized. It is interesting to consider the last
column of Table 7.14. The LWA for Grand Gulf and Yellow Creek came a
very short period before the CP was issued, less than 8 months. In all
the other customized plants, the LWA-to-CP period was longer than 14
months, and in one case was four years. The length of this period was
largely improved in the case of standardized plants. The obvious reason
is that the safety review in the standardized plants was shortened by
virtue of standardization. (The 19 months for Cherokee are due to the
fact that this station is the first to be licensed of a duplication
package; see Section 7.2.2.)
At the end of the seven months after the LWA for Marble Hill
station, it was reported that the percentage of construction completed
was zero (N11). Only 3% of construction was complete in the case of
WNP-4 by the time of CP issue after about 2 1/2 years with LWA. These
figures put the benefits of LWA in question. In addition, at least three
utilities had to withdraw LWA requests because of their inability to
obtain the necessary state approvals before start of construction (G1).
There is no question that the LWA has helped at least in the cases where
the CP lags by few months. Safety reviews in customized plants and state
intervention in all plants could damage this option and eliminate its
benefits.
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7.3.3 Periodic Freeze on Regulatory Changes
As discussed before in Sections 6.2.3, 6.2.4 and elsewhere, during
the past five years alone tremendous amount of regulations in the form of
amendments and regulatory orders or guides have been introduced. In
almost all cases the emerging regulatory changes have interfered with the
licensing processes, where delays due to expected need for further
clarification of issues and compliance with anticipated regulation
impedes the review process. On the other hand, this put the utilities in
a position of aiming at a moving target with no explicitly foreseeable
pattern of motion.
In addition to safety and environmental issues, design optimization
has helped to trigger such regulatory actions. The fear of ratcheting,
i.e., tightening the regulatory requirements, tends to discourage further
design optimization. Uncertainties in licensing have created an
undesirable atmosphere in the industry. It has made many utilities
reluctant to pursue the nuclear option. In many cases, projects were
delayed or canceled, or the nuclear option was precluded. This indeed
deprives the utilities in several parts of the U.S. from exploiting the
most economic electric energy source.
It is necessary for design and regulatory changes to go to stable
conditions without jeopardizing the progress in optimizing the
performance and safety of power plants. This saves the industry losses
and delays, and sets it into a more mature-like era.
On one hand, a final freeze on regulatory requirements is
contradictory to human experience with technology and will be regrettable
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as knowledge relevant to safety and design optimization expands, but on
the other hand continuous change has proven to be impractical and not
economic. Therefore, it is proposed here to control the regulatory
evolution in the form of Periodic Freezing. Since industrial experience
has grown for more than two decades, during which LWRs were sited,
designed, reviewed, constructed, backfitted, and currently operated under
the same set of regulatory criteria, it is reasonable to now initiate
periods when utilities can be assured of stable regulatory requirements.
Rather than trying to answer and argue the question of "how safe is
safe enough?", consideration is given to the modified version of the same
question as "how safe is safe enough over the next Regulatory Freezing
Period?" The answer to this question is simply that during the next
period it is "enough" to have the current safety requirements plus a
"small fraction." The advantage of this concept lies in the "small
fraction." While it allows for controlled improvement, the "small
fraction" can be determined rather easily, especially if an ample amount
of time, the Freezing Period, is allowed for the appropriate safety
assessment work.
During a given period, activities related to plant optimization and
safety and environmental protection enhancement continue. Without trying
to sell these early products by equipment vendors and to implement
emerging criteria by regulatory bodies, further optimization on both
sides, as well as communicative interactions, are exercised. Toward the
end of that period the results of these efforts are shaped up in an
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appropriate form to be used as soon as the next period begins. In
addition to reducing the uncertainty in planning on the utility side and
the hesitant behavior of the review staff, it also eliminates the
possibility of back-unfitting a back-fit for a better back-fit.
The backfitting, which mostly belongs in the capital cost category,
comes in packages rather than items, which makes it more economic. The
final package of new regulations and design criteria will have a better
chance for evaluation of its impact on safety and environmental
protection, as an overall change of power plant design in a way, say,
similar to that of Wash. 1400 study (N15). Many prefer no backfitting of
operating plants unless it is extremely necessary; this is irrelevant to
commercial cost improvement. A single backfitting package during plant
design or construction greatly reduces the current confusion and waste of
labor and materials as well as schedule overruns.
Such periodic freezes have been exercised in other industries. The
case of implementing auto emission and safety standards with the relvant
extensions of deadlines is a current example. Freezing has been
implemented to a little extent in the nuclear industry when the thermal
output of 3800 MWt is fixed as an upper limit for five years by the AEC
(to be discussed later). During the time of writing this report the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission sources let it be known that the NRC is
considering a 60-day period for discussing new rules before adopting them.
It is expected that such Periodic Freezes will be accompanied by
business cycles. Demand on nuclear plants will increase and more
applications will be submitted at the beginning of any period, while
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slowdown occurs toward the end. This soon becomes a business fact and
will have a minor effect on the industry. As for the review process, the
licensing of individual plants will speed up eliminating and thus the
possibility of clogging. If the Freeze Period is ten years, then with
standardization, Early Site-review, and LWA, a given project can be
completed and commercial operation can be realized before the beginning
of the next period.
Finally, there is the issue of who exercises the Periodic Freezes
among the several government bodies affecting the LWR power plant
projects. A very good start will be that of the NRC and the EPA.
Although some states have great influence, the federal level may set a
example for such improvement.
Although it is feasible, quantitative assessment of the impact of
Periodic Freezes on capital cost is not a simple task. Considering
assumption of historic freezes may be a rather naive approach. As for
assessment of possible future implementation of this strategy
sophisticated computer simulation of the nuclear industry is
anticipated. Such effort is beyond the time constraints of this study
and is a candidate for future work.
7.4 Improved Utility Structure and Finance
This section addresses the third set of LWR capital cost improvement
strategies. This section is divided into organizational improvements and
financial alternatives.
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The first is an area of interface with the Regulatory-Institutional
Group, one of the two other groups working on the MIT LWR Study. Its
main concern is gaining acceptance of LWR technology by allowing public
participation in the activities related to Research, Development and
Deployment of various technologies for electric generation. They propose
an institution, in the form of a national consortium, made up of all
utilities, government (DOE) and public representatives with strong
connections to the industry. More comprehensive analyses appear in those
related sections of the Final Report (M3). The effort here is reduced to
reviewing the up-to-date experience of the nuclear industry in this area
at the points of greatest impact on capital cost. Qualitative
description of the financial alternatives and results of calculations
based on a new model are presented in Section 7.4.2.
7.4.1 Organizational Improvement
In its analysis of the size effect on capital cost, the Department
of Energy, supported by relevant statistics, shows that units of sizes
over 1000 MWe have a specific capital cost ($/kWe) 19% less than that of
units in the 800-999 MWe range. This conclusion was immediately followed
by the remark that about one-third of the large units versus one of the
small are owned by three large utilities. These utilities have
accumulated so much experience in the field that their low specific
capital cost may distort the size-related statistics (D1).
The utilities in question are Commonwealth Edison, Duke Power, and
TVA. Figure 7.11 shows the specific capital cost of their units as
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compared to that of the U.S. average. Because of the argument that they
are in favorable cost regions (a situation to which they themselves
certainly contribute), Figure 7.12 and Table 7.15 were prepared as a
response to this argument.
Table 7.15 Large Utility Average Specific Cost versus
Their Regional Averages*
Regional average Utility average Cost savings
Utility $/kWe # of units $/kWe # of units % of reg. avg.
Commonwealth Edison 866 21 597 6 31%
Duke Power 750 19 670 10 10.7%
TVA 628 19 603 15 4%
*See references to Fig. 7.11
This brief remark is an appropriate introduction to the idea
presented in this section. In projects that are as sophisticated,
durable, and costly as nuclear power plant construction projects, strong
organizational structures are needed from the standpoint of efficiency.
The strength here is defined in terms of human resources with enough
organizational staff for planning, execution, and support as well as
overall project procurement. On the financial side, a large pool of
investment resources in terms of internally-generated funds and outside
supply of capital complements the picture of the strong organization.
The analysis of financial improvement schemes is left to the next
subsection. Improvement of the utility organization structure is the
subject of this section.
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The Institutional Group working on this project has considered the
formation of a national consortium that contains all activities related
to electricity generation and distribution across the country. The new
organization is expected to unify the electrical industry in a pattern
similar to that of the telephone industry. In the area of capital cost,
arising from planning and construction, a consortium idea might be found
to be effective. It is envisaged, for the purpose of the following
discussion, as a Utility System organization large enough to carry out
all activities that affect the busbar cost at the phases of planning,
construction, and operation, both technically and financially. It may be
necessary for this organization to extend its activities from generation
to transmission for better efficiency of performance, but not necessarily
to be concerned with local distribution. Nowadays there are utilities
with generating capacities as low as 20 MWe. A number of utilities are
building nuclear stations of rated power output larger than their current
capacity. Many of these are faced with the question of "Need-of-power"
during their licensing activities to which satisfactory answers are
reached after considerable delay. In addition, such small utility
organizations are not expected to produce any integrated energy planning
to utilize effectively the required resources and therefore to optimize
the cost of electricity.
There is no question that the overall situation is dangerous and it
may jeopardize not merely the nuclear industry but the welfare of
society. To avoid such undesirable consequences, the Utility System or
consortium concept is proposed as a reform measure to resolve the
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matter. The characteristics of the Utility System lie in two
categories: size and function. Each of these will be discussed
separately with respect to capital cost area development.
The Utility System can be formed as a single utility; such as Duke
Power or TVA, an alliance of a utility and an A/E firm; such as the case
of Commonwealth Edison and Sargent & Lundy Engineers, a consolidated
company formed by acquiring small utilities, or regional consortia, say,
at the generation level. This may require reform in the area of
antitrust laws, which makes an interesting point for further research.
7.4.1.1 Size Characteristics
The basic criterion here is that the Utility System generating
capacity is large enough to serve a market that is large enough to
support adequately the Utility System cumulative growth. Cumulative
growth is any capacity addition either to meet increased demand or merely
to replace retiring equipment. The adequate support is realized as
environmental, political, and technical, as well as financial. The
market should be in a region where electric power is environmentally
obtainable. The political atmosphere is dominated by the need-for-power
rather than by any extravagant considerations. The population should be
technically capable of undertaking such projects from planning to
operation. The financial potential is large enough to be utilized by any
of the financial methods to be discussed in the next section.
To match this criterion, the generating capacity of a Utility System
is such that active construction work for additional units is not
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interrupted at any time. This means that the System is continuously
replacing or increasing its capacity. A set of one or more units is
constructed one after another. For convenience a measure of generation
capacity is defined as follows:
The Utility Size Unit (USU) is the production capacity of a
utility that produces electricity at a fixed rate (MWe) from a
number of power generating units constructed one after the other in
a period equivalent to the life of any of the units. For example,
if we have the conditions that it takes 10 years to build a unit of
1000 MWe that is expected to be productive for 40 years, then 1 USU
= 4000 MWe.
The basic criterion, hence, requires that the size of the Utility
System should be at least 1 USU. In terms of MWe, it depends on the
technological parameters but it is certainly in the several thousand
megawatt range. This size will allow the system to be appropriately
functional, as will be seen shortly, and allows for financial support.
On the other hand the environmental characteristics of the service area
may prevent the existence of such large size. This may be corrected by
expanding the geographical boundary of the Utility System.
The last point leads to regional considerations. One important
characteristic of the proposed Utility Systems is the regional continuity
of the service area. While it optimizes the interaction with consumers
and reduces transmission losses, it has other benefits. Dispersed
segments of the Utility System region in the form of small islands or
peninsulas of service areas may be considered by the localities as
independent systems. This may not help the System politically, or
financially when the potential resources are not concentrated within the
System. Standardization in the form of SNUPPS concept, as a different
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point, can be greatly optimized by designing the Power Block according to
narrower site envelope requirements.
7.4.1.2 Functional Characteristics
The proposed Utility System organizes a manpower that is capable of
carrying out all activities necessary to bring and maintain generating
units on line with very minimal outside support. These activities
consist of forecasting the demand variations in its region and making the
appropriate plans to meet such demand. It also procures the capital
funds, designs the new plants, especially the BOP of nuclear units, and
fulfills the construction requirements by its own labor force. In
addition to plant testing and operator training, it carries out the
operation and maintenance duties by keeping specialized personnel as part
of its staff unless their specialty is seldom sought. Throughout this
diversified process it pays adequate attention to R&D activities in order
to optimize their planning, design and personnel performance. Keeping
smooth contact with equipment vendors is part of this optimization
process.
This organizational structure facilitates better communications
among the various teams that contribute to the whole project. It helps
accumulate experience and exchange critical information without the
barrier of industrial secrecy. It allows rotation of the staff members
among a wider variety of jobs. This increases the staff productivity via
two channels. It reduces idling time and lets the individuals look at
the different ends of the project; thus improving their experience.
Productivity is also boosted as the same teams, especially in the areas
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of design and construction, repeat almost identical assignments every
time a new unit is considered. The Utility System may develop special
relationships with equipment and material suppliers due to expected large
purchasing contracts. The resulting lower market uncertainty allows
suppliers to reduce prices, which consequently decreases the cost to the
Utility System.
Another point, worth special attention, is the current situation of
"outside contractors." These contractors provide expertise and services
that are not needed by small utilities on a continuously routine basis.
Examples of these contractors are constructors, architect/engineers,
consultants (for licensing, fuel management, etc.), and specialized
maintenance contractors. In order to save the related expenses of
keeping such specialized personnel and facilities in-house, utilities
elect to hire them when needed and to pay for their cost on a contractual
basis. The current industry structure requires the outside contractors
to have capacities that are larger than integrally needed by the utility
industry. The reason for this over-capacity is to provide availability
of services whenever they are randomly sought. Consequently, utilities
do pay for the cost of this availability to compensate for the respective
costs incurred by the outside contractors. A Utility System, consisting
of a single utility, can eliminate much of this slack in capacity by
doing without most of the outside contractors. On the other hand, if the
Utility System is a consortium of utilities and other supporting firms,
then it can accomplish the same goal through coordination and deliberate
planning.
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This results in a state of increased individual productivity,
reduced losses due to friction among independent organizations that
nowadays interact at the various phases of power generation projects, and
eliminates unnecessary payments. The overall outcome is certainly lower
cost, especially capital cost. This is the condition which the large
utilities mentioned at the beginning of this section have already
partially developed. The overall benefit to society comes in the form of
increased assurance of electric energy supply by means of more reliable
institutions.
The interdependence of size and functional characteristics is
readily obvious. To carry out all the specified functions a large staff
is needed. Organization of such a large size staff cannot be justified
unless the continuity of its services is realized over an extended
period. Construction labor force, for example, is only justified as
construction activities last much beyond the construction lead time of a
single plant. Otherwise instability of labor force availability occurs
and it may be necessary, if not appropriate, to go to subcontracting.
Activities are then carried out in cyclical patterns. The manpower
is divided into teams according to their specialty and contribution
during the cycle. Any project passes through site selection and
preparation, plant engineering design, then construction. The project
lead time may be split into two periods. In the preconstruction period
site selection, preliminary design, equipment procurement, and licensing
are done by the preconstruction team. When this assignment is completed
the preconstruction team moves into another project leaving detailed
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plant design and construction to the construction team. When this
project is complete, the construction team moves onto the other site for
which the preconstruction team has completed their assignment, and so the
cycle goes.
It should be necessary to adjust the size of the two teams to
eliminate any idling or delays. For a Utility System whose size is one
USU, i.e., building only one unit at a time, the preconstruction team
size may be reduced and compensated by the longer available time during
which the other team is busy in the construction. If the Utility System
size is more than one USU, then they may have more than one construction
team, depending on the number of different construction sites, or may
have large construction team if the units are on the same site but at
different stages. In both cases a large preconstruction team is needed
to satisfy the expected prerequisite requirements of construction team
future assignments.
The regional continuity plays its role as follows. In a region like
New England, there are several plants at the different stages of planning
and construction. If there is one Utility System that serves this
region, say, consisting of all members of the New England Power Exchange,
all these projects are handled by the same teams of planning, management,
preconstruction, and construction. The members of these teams may reside
permanently somewhere near the center of the region (in Massachusetts or
northern Connecticut) where they can move between the various projects
without the need to hire and fire of different personnel in each
project. Such an arrangement is expected to result even in lower labor
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wages due to more secure "nonseasonal" jobs "near home." To realize the
feasibility of such a Utility System one should notice the market
potential of financial resources (Boston and Hartford areas) and the
number of nuclear units to be constructed. There are 8 nuclear units
whose commercial operation dates are scheduled between 1982 and 1992.
The New England region is mentioned just as an example. It has the
features above, plus the master control center, called the New England
Power Exchange, NEPEX, which coordinates and directs all the major
electric power generation and transmission facilities in New England. It
constitutes a large portion of the regional electric reliability council
known as NPCC, for Northeast Power Coordinating Council. A strong
consortium of the local utilities in this region with supporting firms
such as Yankee Atomic and a local A/E, and utilizing the NEPEX, makes for
a highly integrated Utility System. We have already seen the success of
the large utilities of Commonwealth Edison, Duke Power and TVA, although
they do not comply perfectly with the Utility System concept.
There have been several attempts in this direction. Among them is
the formation of the Yankee Atomic Company for the purpose of offering
technical services to participating small New England utilities. Another
example is the Southern Company. Its organizational structure consists
of four operating utility companies in four states with total generating
capacity of about 20,000 MWe, and a fifth company, the Southern Company
Services, providing technical and other specialized services. One of the
subsidiary utilities does its own construction, while the service company
cooperates with independent A/E firms in plant design and related
activities.
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Although these two examples are oriented along the path of the
Utility System, they have not gone far enough. The greatest benefit of
this organizational concept is in attaining the appropriate
implementation of the nonconventional financial methods, which will be
discussed in the next section.
Finally, the Southern Company cited above, is a Public Utility
Holding Company. The ideas presented here may be considered as an
argument in favor of such organizations. In fact, as early as 1955 the
reform of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 was considered
on the grounds of technological changes in the electricity-generating
equipment. "The technology of conventional steam generation and the
technology of atomic energy will have an impact on the structure of the
electric utility industry and will tend to promote larger units."(G3)
This part of our report emphasizes the concept of adequately large
Utility Systems; whether it be a Holding Company arrangement is a matter
beyond the scope of this study.
7.4.2 Alternative Financial Methods
By the Financial Method is meant the way the capital investment
funds are raised and accounted for in the utility books for the purposes
of new unit construction or major back-fittings. In this section we
examine the following three alternatives: 1) the conventional method, 2)
the CWIP method, and 3) the Ultra-accelerated Depreciation (UAD) method.
The first method has been practiced by the utility industry. The second
method has been suggested for a considerable time; although it
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has met some success it is still being fought for in many places. To our
knowledge, this study is the first to propose the third financial
method. It introduces its detailed characteristics along with a
methodology to compare the impact of the three methods on the busbar
cost. The appendix to this report presents a mathematical model that was
developed into the computer code, ULTRA. The main objective of this code
is to compare the impact of UAD financing on the capital-related portion
of the busbar cost of electricity relative to that of conventional
financing. That part of the appendix will also be helpful in examining
other financial alternatives, as will be seen shortly.
The purpose of financial improvements is to increase the
availability of funds for power plant construction, the lack of which has
caused several project delays and cancellations, as discussed in Section
6.2.7. There have been a number of other proposals regarding such
improvement. They all fall under one of the above three methods, namely
the Conventional Method.
The following are descriptions and assessments of each of the three
methods. The order follows with the familiarity and simplicity of the
concepts.
7.4.2.1 The Conventional Method
The characteristics of this method are well-known, since it is the
only one used in all privately-funded projects. In electric power plant
construction almost all the projects have been financed according to this
method. The amounts of expected expenditures are predetermined. The
necessary funds are raised from the utility resources and sales of
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additional stock, thus providing the equity portion of the capital, while
the balance is obtained by issuing the various types of bonds as a
long-term debt. During the project lead time, return is paid to the
equity owners and interest charges are paid to bond holders as part of
the project expenditure. This part is called Allowance for Funds used
During Construction, AFDC. The sum of all expenditures, including the
compounded AFDC, is determined at the beginning of commercial operation
and then discounted at appropriate rate(s) over the expected service life
of the plant. This is done by specifying a Fixed Charge Rate, a fraction
that, when multiplied by the capital cost yields the necessary amount to
be collected as revenue to recover the capital cost. This amount allows
for returns for stock holders, interest on debt, depreciation, insurance,
taxes, as well as an allowance for debt payments. The Fixed Charge Rate
usually changes with the age of the plant, and its way of calculation is
usually regulated by state government (see Section A.2 of the Appendix).
The specific return requirement, i.e., required return related to
capital investment per unit of generating capacity, for conventional
financing is given by Eq. A.40 of the Appendix. The conventional fixed
charge rate, fk, is given by Eq. A.21. Any financial scheme that does
not appreciably change any of these two expressions is under the category
of conventional financing. Such changes involve minor rearrangements of
the terms in the expressions or even drastic variation of the values
given to the parameters from the typical ones.
Several years ago a financial model, which is part of the MIT
Regional Electricity Model (REM), was developed (K2). Eight financial
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cases were investigated in addition to a base case. Six of these cases
were conventional. They are increase and decrease of return on equity,
increase the debt fraction to 70%, increase the tax credit rate from 4%
to 7%, percentage of "construction eligible for investment tax credit"
changes from 50 to 80%, and preferred stock dividend expensed before
computing taxes. Only the case of increasing the return on equity showed
a significant increase in the availability of funds relative to the base
case. The other two cases examined by this model involve abrupt and
gradual inclusion of construction work in progress in the rate base. The
availability of funds becomes even greater.
Two other proposed schemes that are directed toward increasing
internally generated funds by increasing the depreciation allowance are
the Replacement Cost method and the LIFO (Last-In, First-Out) method. In
each of these two methods the depreciation term (1/S in the Appendix) is
separated from the rest of the fixed charge rate (Eq. A.21). While
everything else remains the same, the depreciation term is multiplied by
the net cumulative investment, I(t), which is modified as follows:
1) Replacement Cost: All the net cumulative investment (the total
amount of investment that has not been depreciated yet) of each
type of power plant is reevaluated in terms of the current cost
of building the same plant.
2) LIFO: The same reevaluation is done but in terms of the cost
of the last generation unit of each type that was added to the
system and not fully depreciated.
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The purpose of these two methods is to increase the depreciation
allowance in parallel to the increase in financial requirements due to
inflation. An example of the impact of these two methods for the case of
Commonwealth Edison Company in 1976 is given in reference (C1). In 1975
the depreciation allowance was $197 million. Using the estimated
replacement cost data, the same allowance becomes $465 million. The LIFO
method causes the original depreciation allowance to increase to $345
million. The increases in depreciation allowances are $268 million and
$148 million, respectively. These are larger than the AFDC for the same
year, which was $66.7 million. These financial schemes will be discussed
further in the following two sections.
7.4.2.2 The CWIP Method
This method is similar to the Conventional Method except in one
point. The amount of funds raised corresponds only to the direct
expenditure on the project, i.e., the tail cost. The AFDC charges are
not allowed to accumulate. Instead, the value of the Construction Work
In Progress, CWIP, is included in the utility rate base. The relevant
AFDC is charged to the customers as part of their electricity bills.
Part of this AFDC is interest to be paid immediately on the debt. The
other part is a return to equity capital which is associated with income
taxes. All this AFDC and taxes are charged to customers if 100% of the
CWIP is added to the rate base. Property taxes and insurance are paid on
the CWIP in any case. Table 3.3 shows that the AFDC amounts of
$438/kWe, or 32.6% of the LWR base case capital cost. This method
clearly reduces the burden on the utility's shoulders in order to provide
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the necessary capital investment to only the tail cost. Because the AFDC
is not allowed to accumulate, customers pay only a fraction of the
$438/kWe.
This method has been met by a full spectrum of responses in the
states' utility regulatory commissions. While some states allow 100% of
AFDC charged to customers, others do not allow it at all. There are
states which allow a fraction of the CWIP in the rate base, while some
states' responses depend on the financial health of the individual
utilities.
The main argument against this method is overcharging the customers
by forcing them to pay in advance for goods that they may not receive in
the future. This attitude toward this method has resulted from the
nature of utility rate regulation. If such regulations are not present,
the process will be merely an increase in profits to meet current
expenses. Such is the way other corporations would operate but, as we
will discuss, the monopolistic nature of utilities forces a different
view. This argument may be emphasized by the following definition:
A utility is an institution that produces electric energy in
quantities that satisfy the instantaneous demand in its region. It
constructs, operates, and expands its facilities in order to meet
that demand.
Examining this definition may lead to the conclusion that it is a
nice but useless definition. This is because it does not add new
information about utility activites. However, if we carefully consider
each part of the definition and require that the busbar rate reflect the
instantaneous expenditures of the utility, then a new view of the matter
emerges. Consider the following items with regard to the busbar rate and
ask: "Should the rate cover the following costs?"
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1) The overhead cost associated with running the whole operation;
2) The cost of operating the units that are currently contributing
to the generating capacity;
3) The cost of current construction operations for new power
plants that are expected to replace the ones in operation; and
4) Allowance for future growth to meet expanding demand.
The first two points are readily agreeable. The third point considers
the system of generating units as a continuously depreciating and
requiring continuous replacement. This is true for utilities of 1 USU or
more. Utilities with smaller capacities may be modelled in an
appropriate fashion. Since such utilities are continuously building new
units, at least to replace old ones, power plant construction becomes
part of their day-to-day operations. This fact is emphasized by
implementing the concept of Utility Systems. It has long been recognized
that public utilities have special economic status. This status is
identified as their unavoidable monopolistic position, for which the rate
regulation process was the response. It has not been recognized that
electric utilities' special economic status be identified when
consideration is made of their special product, electricity, and their
regional exclusiveness. When a corporation goes out of business the
market status is either that their product is no longer demanded, or that
other suppliers can furnish it economically. Because the need for
electricity is expected to exist and because of the regional
exclusiveness of the utility, when the utility is bankrupt its service
area is dead. Stated differently, when severe shortages of one of the
essential production factors occurs in other industries, the supply of
198
the respective commodity is tightened. This usually creates a
supply/demand equilibrium at a higher price. The immediate consequence
to tightening electricity supply is BLACKOUT. This makes the utility a
vital institution which the public should support rather than be on the
adversary side. Above all, people pay Social Security and other taxes
for an institution called "government" for services that they may not
utilize immediately or directly. As the government functions under the
supervision of the public through democratic institutions, the public
utility finances are regulated by the government that represents the
people.
This discussion may need to be repeated when the third financial
method is presented. We close with the following recommendation. The
public should be educated with the necessary detail, so they can select
the method of their preference. It should also be emphasized that power
plant construction is done to sustain the supply of a vital product whose
demand level is uncertain, as we have seen in the mid-1970s. It is not
similar to investments in new plants as other industries do to diversify
and expand their production lines.
The impact of this method was assessed in an early study (K2), as
discussed in the last section. It was shown that this method is the best
relative to any possible conventional financial scheme in increasing the
availability of financial resources to utilities. The conventional
depreciation schemes are the exception, as shown by the Commonwealth
Edison example. It was also shown that this method is accompanied by
higher prices in electricity. The last observation is also supported by
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the recent REM calculations (W5). The results reveal that because of
reduction in electricity demand due to a high initial cost of electricity
when the CWIP is added to the rate base, relatively more funds become
available in the capital market. In addition, although the capital cost
may decrease due to eliminating the delays caused by financial problems,
the price of electricity continues to be higher than it would be under
conventional financing. ULTRA code calculations, discussed in the next
section, agree with this result.
7.4.2.3 The UAD Method
Let us start this section with the following quotation:
Under conditions of "moderate" economic growth, total current-dollar
requirements for capital (to build power generation and transmission
facilities) from 1974 to 1990 inclusive will approximate $750
billion. Unless steps are taken to increase the present level of
internally generated funds, i.e., those from retained earnings,
depreciation, and tax deferrals, nearly two-thirds of these capital
requirements will have to come from external sources (E3).
We have discussed the scarcity of external financial resources and
their effects on capital cost increase through schedule delays. The
continuous growth of electric utilities makes tax deferral solution of
limited benefit in the long run. With inflation, such a solution may be
regarded as a government subsidy to privately-owned power plant
projects. Low rate of return, high dividend payout ratio, and large
capital needs result in a small possible contribution of retained
earnings (G3). In addition, an increased retained earnings margin
results in twice-as-much increase of electricity cost to consumers due to
income taxes. This leaves depreciation. Conventionally, depreciation
expenses are spread over the life of the plant. With inflation, only a
fraction of the real cost is recovered by utilities. This situation
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encourages the early recovery of large portions of capital, as discussed
in this section. Section 7.4.2.1 discusses two conventional financing
schemes with increased depreciation allowance. They have an effect on
the price of electricity similar to that of the CWIP inclusion in rate
base, as will be seen later in the next section. The Ultra-Accelerated
Depreciation method is proposed here as a step that can be taken to
"increase the present level of internally generated funds" from
depreciation with the possibility of a lower busbar cost in the future.
The basic idea of this method is to split the CWIP expenditure into
two parts. One part is included in the current rate base. This part
consists of equity capital and borrowed capital. Let the parameter d
express the fraction of debt in this part. The other part of CWIP
expenditure is expensed directly and matched by equivalent revenue. This
part is represented by the parameter B, called the UAD fraction. So, for
instance, the fraction of expenditure to be financed by equity capital is
(1 - d)(1 - B), where (1 - B) is the financed expenditure, and (1 - d) is
the equity part of the financed portion.
The UAD fraction may have values in the range of zero to unity. The
borrowed fraction d may increase from zero to rarely above 0.6, according
to the current financial practices. Any combination of values for d and
B, therefore, produces a different case of the UAD method. These are
called the UAD schemes. When B = O, we have the special case of the CWIP
method.* So the UAD method is analytically more general than
*Subtle differences exist in definitions of the CWIP Methold but for
practical purposes when B = 0, the UAD method is directly comparable to
the "conventional" CWIP Method.
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the first two methods.
Now comes the question of in what way should the revenue be
increased to match the UAD fraction of the expenditure? One way is to do
this in the form of additional retained profits. This leads to increased
allowance of income taxes and may require doubling the amount to obtain
the required expenditure, as discussed earlier. Several other forms may
be pursued. It is proposed here that the optimum way is to include the
UAD fraction of the current expenditure in the annual depreciation
allowance of the total utility investment, while allowing the rest of the
expenditure to depreciate according to the conventional practice. In
this way the revenue is increased by an amount equivalent to the UAD
fraction, and hence the extra revenue is matched by a "depreciation
expense." If B = 0.5, then by the time the power unit is brought on
line, half of its book value has been depreciated. This rate of
depreciation is higher than that of any accelerated depreciation method,
hence "Ultra-accelerated Depreciation" (UAD) Method is derived. The term
"Pre-service Depreciation" is less convenient, since it may imply that B
is strictly equal to unity.
The effect of the UAD method on the busbar cost is sharp, as shown
in Figure 7.13. The dashed curve represents the unanimous agreement
about the behavior of busbar cost, dominated by exponential growth due to
escalation. The solid curve is the expected behavior of the busbar cost
if the UAD method is implemented. It starts with a sudden jump as more
revenue is collected to match the UAD fraction of expenditure and then
follows a weaker exponential due to the decay of the capital cost
202
contribution made conventionally before the implementation of the UAD
method.
There are two characteristic variables of the dashed curve, C' and
T. The quantity C' is the magnitude of the initial jump, and if it is
too large the UAD method is highly unlikely to gain any acceptance. The
recovery period, T, is shown to be about 20 years. It may be less, more,
or even infinite. This recovery period is the measure of the UAD method
success. Both these variables depend on the various parameters of the
model, especially B. In addition, the relative growth rate of the system
and its temporal behavior have shown a large difference on the busbar
cost behavior. The behavior of escalation rates also has a comparable
impact.
Figure 7.14 presents the expected electricity cost ratio behavior
with time. It is another way of presenting the same information shown on
Figure 7.13. When the two curves in Figure 7.13 are normalized to the
solid curve, a straight line at electricity ratio of unity results for
conventional financing and the other curve in Figure 7.14 reveals the
impact of UAD financing on the cost of electricity relative to
conventional financing. The ULTRA code has been designed to evaluate the
ratio of electricity cost with UAD financing to the electricity cost with
conventional financing, i.e., to evaluate the small-dashed curve of
Figure 7.14. The first part of the Appendix discusses the mathematical
model on which the ULTRA code is based and the remainder of the Appendix
is a description of the code. The present version of the code is a
static one, in the sense that the future growth data are given as input
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rather than being estimated in relation to the electricity cost. Rather
than computing the electricity cost ratio itself, the present version of
the code stops at computing the busbar cost portion that is sensitive to
capital financing (the return requirement ratio). This latter term is
the ratio between the specific return requirement (or the specific
required return related to capital investment) with UAD financing to the
specific return requirement with conventional financing. It is thus
defined in parallel to the electricity cost ratio. The word "specific"
relates the return requirement to the generating capacity of the Utility
System.
The ULTRA code models each Utility System separately, regardless of
size or regional location. The Utility System can be a single electric
utility company or an alliance of several utilities. As described in the
Appendix, the code currently accepts data regarding the following:
1) Economic factors including growth and escalation,
2) Financial data that are basically related to the evaluation of
levelized annual fixed charge rates,
3) Technology mix of generation facilities versus time; it has
room for 8 types of power plants, and
4) Technical data related to project lead times and operation
lives of each type of power plant.
The remainder of this section discusses the results of 25 cases that
were computed by ULTRA in order to investigate the sensitivity of the
return requirement ratio to the various parameters of the model.
The base case:
The various growth and escalation rates are assumed constant versus
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time. Note that the growth data are represented by gross growth rates,
which reflect new power plant construction both for the purposes of
retired equipment replacement and for meeting the expanding demand. The
economic and financial data are presented in Table 7.16. With the
initial high increase of return requirement with UAD financing, lower
growth and escalation rates are expected. The Utility System utilizes
four technologies: LWRs, coal-fired and oil-fired steam electric plants,
and gas turbines for peaking generation. The time characteristics of
these types are shown in Table 7.17.
Table 7.16 UAD Financing Base Case Economic and Financial Data
Economic Data
Conventional growth rate, per year 10%
Conventional escalation rate, per year 7%
Growth rate with UAD financing, per year 9%
Escalation rate with UAD financing, per year 6.5%
Financial Data
UAD fraction 50%
Debt fraction of capital 55%
Rate of return on equity capital 12%
Long-term debt interest rate 7%
Property insurance and tax rate 2%
Federal and state income tax rate 50%
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Table 7.17 UAD Financing Base Case - Characteristics of Power Plant Types
Generator Type Project Lead Time Depreciation Life Operation Life
(yr) (yr) (yr)
Coal 8.0 25.0 40.0
LWR 10.0 25.0 40.0
Oil 6.0 16.0 25.0
Gas Turbine 2.5 6.0 10.0
The future time span is 60 years. The code requires historic data
of 40 years. Over the 100-year period, the generation technology mix is
given in Table 7.18. Each row in this table corresponds to a five-year
period. The first row is for years 1 to 5, the second is for years 6 to
ten, and the last row is for years 96 to 100 or, in other words, for 56
to 60 years in the future.
Table 7.18 UAD Financing Base Case - Generation Technology Mix
Period Coal LWR Oil Gas Turbine
i1 0.400 0.0 0.450 0.150
2 0.400 0.0 0.450 0.150
3 0.460 0.0 0.400 0.140
4 0.460 0.0 0.410 0.130
5 0.460 0.0 0.420 0.120
6 0.400 0.100 0.400 0.100
7 0.400 0.100 0.400 0.100
8 0.390 0.100 0.400 0.110
9 0.350 0.150 0.400 0.100
10 0.370 0.150 0.380 0.100
11 0.330 0.200 0.370 0.100
12 0.350 0.200 0.350 0.100
13 0.350 0.200 0.350 0.100
14 0.320 0.250 0.330 0.100
15 0.350 0.200 0.300 0.100
16 0.390 0.250 0.260 0.100
17 0.370 0.300 0.230 0.100
18 0.400 0.300 0.230 0.100
19 0.400 0.300 0.200 0.100
20 0.400 0.300 0.200 0.100
207
Variations from the base case data are examined in 24 other cases.
The results of ULTRA code for these variations are plotted on the
following set of figures.
The UAD Fraction: The specific return requirement ratio sensitivity
to UAD fraction values ranging from zero to unity by six cases, in
addition to the base case, is shown in Figure 7.15. Because ULTRA code
applies depreciation to the part of CWIP that is added to the rate base,
(see Section A.6), Case 2 in Figure 7.15 is an approximation to financial
method of including the CWIP in the rate base. The results clearly show
that the higher the UAD fraction the better the UAD financing. For cases
when the return requirement ratio remains above, but close to, unity,
such as in Cases 1, 4 and 5, the actual return requirement ratio may fall
below unity due to savings in plant capital cost by eliminating the
delays caused by financial difficulties. Note that the bumps in the
curves are due to step changes in the mix of plant types.
Gross Growth Rates: Figure 7.16 shows the sensitivity of the
specific return requirement ratio to four additional cases of gross
growth rates. Cases 2 and 3 are for a rapidly growing system, Case 4 is
for a system with a net growth rate of about 3.5% per year, and Case 5 is
for a decaying system.
Escalation Rates: Six additional cases are shown on Figure 7.17
with the effects of escalation rate variations on the specific return
requirement ratio. The worst cases are when the escalation rate s' is
increased due to UAD financing. This is a highly unlikely situation.
The best case is when s' drops by 10% of its low conventional financing
value of s = 2% per year. When 10% reduction is made from s = .07 (a
case not shown here) the breakeven point is 36 years with a ratio of
0.926 at 60 years.
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Figure 7.18 presents four additional cases with mixed growth and
escalation variations. All are worse than the base case. The worst case
is when the escalation and growth rates remain unchanged with UAD
financing, i.e., this financing has no effect on the economic
conditions. A high UAD fraction of 90% helps this case to some extent.
Debt Fraction of Capital: Variations of the debt fraction from 35
to 65% are examined in Figure 7.19. In these cases the same debt
fraction value is used before and after implementing UAD financing. A
minor modification in ULTRA code may allow a different value for the debt
fraction with UAD financing.
Project Lead Time: Figure 7.20 presents the results of increasing
and decreasing the project lead time by 20% for all plant types. It
shows that the return requirement ratio is more sensitive to project lead
time decreases than project lead time increases by the same value. Some
people expect that utilities with UAD financing will have less incentive
to complete the construction of new plants. This is practically untrue.
Utility managements have incentives to complete the construction projects
of such large units with desirable fuel cost advantages. Generally the
opposite behavior of project lead time (i.e., decrease) is to be
anticipated.
Best Results: The results shown in Figure 7.21 are composed from
the previous results. It shows that with a 10% decrease in the value of
escalation rate that would hold with conventional financing, and with a
low net growth rate system utilizing high UAD fraction financing,
electricity cost may decrease to less than what would be under
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conventional financing in a period between 10 to 15 years after
implementing the UAD financing. The initial rise in capital return
requirement is about 80%. When production, transmission, and
distribution costs are considered, the corresponding rise in the cost of
electricity to the ultimate consumer is about 25 to 30%. If this rise is
averaged over five-year periods instead, the initial rise of the price of
electricity is in the vicinity of 20%.
7.4.2.4 Summary of Financial Methods
It was shown in Section 7.4.2.1 that the method of including the
CWIP in the rate base is better from the availability of financial
resources sidle than other conventional financial schemes. The exceptions
are the LIFO (Last-In, First-Out) and the Estimated Replacement Cost
depreciation schemes. It was also shown that with CWIP in rate base the
price of electricity remains higher than it would be with conventional
financing. Figure 7.15 shows that the CWIP method is inferior to UAD
financing with high values of beta fraction. The lower initial rise of
the electricity price with CWIP method relative to that of UAD financing
(of high UAD fraction) is insignificant in the integral sense. Higher
initial rise with UAD financing may be considered as an advantage with
the expected consequences on growth and escalation rates behavior that
may enhance the decrease in future prices for electricity. With regard
to the CWIP method, there has been at least one case when a utility was
allowed to include the CWIP in rate base and still reported project
delays due to financial problems.
The UAD financing helps the utility to obtain funds that are
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adequate to finance current construction expenditure, since the UAD funds
and the current construction expenditure are strongly related. Other
depreciation schemes may result in either a deficit or a surplus of funds
for utilities relative to the current construction expenditure. On the
other hand, they cause an increase in the price of electricity with no
anticipated future reductions. This tends to place them in the same
situation as the CWIP method.
With respect to the LIFO and Replacement Cost Schemes the increased
cost of electricity is explained as follows. The specific return
requirement is still represented by Eq. A.40, with a minor modification.
The specific return requirement ratio, Eq. A.22, is then written as:
Rscc(t) = Rsc'(t)/Rsc(t) (7.1)
where Rsc(t) is given by Eq. A.40 and can be written as I(t)f. I(t) is
the net cumulative investment, i.e., the total investment that has not
been depreciated yet. Eq. 7.1 becomes:
Rscc(t) = I(t)f + I'(t)f2 /I(t) (7.2)
where f2 is the depreciation term in the fixed charge rate and f = f
- f2. I'(t) represents the same plant equipment that constitutes I(t)
but at a total cost much higher than the original cost because of
inflation. The value of I'(t) will be less for LIFO than for the
estimated Replacement Cost Scheme. In both cases I'(t) is greater than
I(t). This makes the return requirement ratio larger than unity for all
time t. Note that with these conventional depreciation schemes
everything remains the same except increasing the depreciation
allowance. In the UAD financing, because a portion of the plant capital
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is expensed as depreciation, no equity return, interest or income taxes
are charged against that portion. This is mainly why the price of
electricity is anticipated to decrease relative to the conventional
method.
7.5 Conclusions
Several other cost analyses and economic studies have indicated that
nuclear power, as represented by the LWR technology, remains competitive
to power generated from fossil fuels in the majority regions in the U.S.
The nearest competition from fossil fuels is coal. Although the capital
cost of LWRs can be as high as 25% above that of coal-fired units, the
high cost of coal as a fuel gives the edge to LWRs in several parts of
the country. As for the increase of LWR capital cost, the coal-fired
plant capital cost exhibits similar behavior (L1).
Although this relative picture still favors the LWR technology as an
economic power generator, the absolute picture gives a different story.
In absolute terms the LWR capital cost has increased massively and is
still rising. So far it has reached the point where predictable
variations and cost overruns exceed the acceptable level of uncertainty
associated with such an increased financial burden. The lack of wisdom
in conducting the regulatory and public participation process carries
most of the blame. They harm capital cost through its most important
element, time, as well as the other elements. The consequence has been
the augmentation of financial requirements that, through schedule
stretching, distorted the picture even further. As for future electric
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energy supply, this situation drove utilities to consider the less
economic alternatives of fossil plants whose future supply of fuel
(particularly oil and gas) is even less certain (P1).
A comprehensive improvement strategy is feasible where
standardization plays a central role, and Duplication with complete
Reference System designs provides a prime benefit. Optimization of plant
design, project management and licensing procedures, especially in
siting, enhance the scope of capital cost improvement. These
improvements consider making the project cash flow less sensitive to
site-licensing as well as reducing plant requirements of equipment,
labor, material, and time. The effectiveness of this portion of the
comprehensive strategy will be limited without major project financing
improvement, such as implementation of Ultra-Accelerated Depreciation
financing, which decreases the dependence of utilities on external
capital supply sources. Adoption of the concept of large Utility Systems
that allow the construction of large power plants and serve large markets
with adequate financial resources is a part of this strategy.
How far the elements of this strategy can be carried out is limited
by several factors, the majority of which are discussed in the next
chapter.
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C H A P T E R VIII
FACTORS LIMITING CAPITAL COST IMPROVEMENT
The previous chapters have explained the circumstances surrounding
the capital cost and its improvement. How far we can go with any
improvement scheme depends on resistance encountered along the way.
Unfortunately, certain resistance exists in certain directions and a
compromising plan is required to lighten the impact of the results of the
associated limitations.
Seven factors are major contributors to the limiting conditions.
The following discussion concentrates on each factor separately.
8.1 Size: Economies of Scale?
It is obvious that from the physical nature of power plants that the
larger the unit the more economic it is (see Sections 7.4.1 and 6.2.1).
TThe present limit imposed on this advantage is specifically defined by
the NRC licensing limit that the reactor thermal power output must not
exceed 3800 MWt. This number is a limit initially imposed by the Atomic
Energy Commission on LWRs and is based mainly on safety considerations
(U2).
The design power levels of LWR power plants have increased from
about 600 MWe in 1965 to slightly over 1300 MWe in 1973. This increase
has resulted in many design modifications that caused the then AEC staff
some difficulties in maintaining a consistent level of safety. As the
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thermal output of the reactor core increased, the criteria that control
the safety-related parameters could only be met by increasing the
requirements of the safety-related systems. As part of the AEC effort of
standardization, an upper limit was necessarily imposed on the core power
power output. The initial intention was to freeze the size expansion for
a period of at least five years, and the AEC specified the earliest date
of changing this limit as January 1, 1979. The AEC also promised to
issue a notice of its intent to consider applications at core thermal
power levels greater than this limit at least two years prior to
acceptance of such applications. No such notice was issued by the time
of writing this report, only six months before January 1, 1979.
It was noticed earlier that most of Reference Systems licensed by
reactor vendors have reactors of 3800 MWt or slightly less. Considering
the effort made in licensing these systems and the current unfavorable
market conditions, it is not surprising that little effort has been made
to change this limit. The inertia has increased with the weight of the
complementary standard design of BOP. This remark is supported by the
results of our survey (Table 2.1, variable 81). Nuclear Regulatory
Commission sources indicate that changing to a higher core thermal output
limit may be considered by the early 1980s, when experience in operating
large LWRs will have been established. From engineering considerations,
reactors can be built for larger thermal output. The limiting factor,
however, is expected in the turbine-generator. According to our survey
sources, about 1400 MWe is expected currently to be the limit for the T-G
size, due to structural and other engineering factors.
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Reactor availability and the possible decrease in specific capital
cost may not justify power plants with single large reactors and multiple
turbine-generators. The following is an attempt to clarify this
statement. A power plant in this category might have a 7000 MWt reactor
and two 1200 MWe turbine-generators. The reactor core would be of a
large size in order to be consistent with the thermal design criteria of
the current LWRs. This would make the reactor pressure vessel larger,
which might require the prestressed concrete vessel type, or maybe of
steel structure enforced by wire-wrapping. The reactor coolant systems
would have more equipment requirements. All these would require a larger
containment building as well as increased capacity of safety-related
system. The consequence of a potential accident resulting in a core
melting will be greater and hence increase the requirements of structures
and engineered safeguards. All these increase the cost of the NSSS but
perhaps to less than the cost of two 3500 MWt reactors. The station will
have two turbine-generator plants and two electrical plants. The two T-G
buildings will be at an angle of zero-180 degrees, measured at the center
of the containment building. Again the associated capital cost may be
less than that of the corresponding portions of two nuclear power plants.
The availability of this large power plant is certainly higher than
that of a single reactor T-G plant. This is because if one T-G
experiences an outage, the reactor power is only lowered to the level
accommodated by the other T-G. The availability improvement, however, is
limited by the new NSSS availability, since the reactor will experience
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both forced and planned outages, anyway. The refueling outage duration
is increased due to the handling of more fuel elements, heavier
structures, and more components lying in the way. This reduces the
availability gained by two turbine-generator plants. Many industry
members are talking nowadays of availability in the range of 85 to 90%.
So the range of improvement is small, and the final number is less than
95%. Certainly the combined availability of two 1200 MWe plants is
larger than that of this 2400 MWe large plant.
Due to the large financial commitment and the uncertain gain in cost
and availability, it seems possible that the point of diminishing returns
has been reached for the near future, so far as size-related economies of
scale go.
8.2 Regional Characteristics
Population density, climate, topography, and seismology are the
major regional characteristics. The population density affects the power
plant cost from two opposite directions. The local labor market directly
affects the construction costs. If the region population is scarce,
longer transmission lines are required. Their additional associated cost
may limit the size of the generating station. (In the previous section
discussion concentrated on the size of the generating unit, here the size
of the station, which may have more than one unit, is the issue.) This
does not help the capital cost.
The region climate may reduce the number of work-days per year,
which results in longer project lead times, as was the case of Clinton 1
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unit, which was delayed for one year (N6). The climate may also restrict
the choice of rejected heat removal systems.
The topography of the region has several effects. One of them is
the transportation accessibility, which may increase the cost of
equipment delivery. It also affects the structural requirements of the
plant foundation, given that site seismic characteristics are
acceptable. The other major effect is whether the region has abundant
water for cooling purposes or is connected to a large water body that
facilitates barge transportation. Such a water body may be obstructed by
bridges or navigational discontinuities that forbid the applicability of
the Flotation concept of power plant construction. This problem is
relieved by the fact that population centers tend to concentrate at large
water-body shores to fulfill other vital requirements.
Previously, Figure 7.12 has shown the capital cost variations for
regions with LWR power plants. Table 8.1 conveys similar information.
It shows a range of variations of about $120/MWe, which is about 15% of
the median value. The very high upper value of the cost range for the
West region reflects the seismic impact on capital cost. The most
favorable region in the U.S. is clearly the Southeast. Lower cost labor
there is cited as the major contributor. It should be expected that such
cost differentials remain desspite any improvement strategy. In Section
7.2.2 it was mentioned that the regional characteristics have contributed
to a wide site-envelope that tends to nullify the advantages of the
SNUPPS concept. These characteristics may affect the applicability of
Utility Systems.
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Table 8.1 Regional Nuclear Power Plant Capital Costs(E1)
Costs in 1976 Dollars
Expected Value Most Likely Range
Region ($/kWe) ($/kWe)
Northeast 826 757-901
Southeast 709 649-774
East Central 785 719-856
West Central 752 689-820
South Central 731 670-798
West 778 713-934*
*The high value of the range of capital costs for the West region
includes added seismic considerations in the plant design.
8.3 Constitutional Division of Authority
The effect of regulation was cited as a cause of increased capital
cost in Sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4. Some improvements are discussed in
Section 7.3. The discussions concentrated on the role of federal
agencies. In the case of Early Site-review the effect of state and local
governments intervention was shown to be a limiting factor in this
approach.
It is emphasized in this section that the existing regulatory
atmosphere suffers from the lack of coordination among the regulating
bodies at all levels of government. Constitutional considerations have
in the past prevented any imposition of coordinative programs by the
various parties. Unless a strong move in the right direction is taken,
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such lack of coordination and conflict of plans will continue as a
limiting factor on any approach to regulatory and licensing
improvements. In addition, political boundaries and variations of
regulation among neighboring states do not help the concept of large
Utility Systems.
8.4 Public Acceptance
In Section 6.2.6 we discussed the effect of public intervention on
capital cost. Later in Section 7.2.2 the consequences of delaying
Callaway Station as a part of SNUPPS projects were discussed. That delay
occurred because a voter initiative was passed that forbids the utility
to utilize the CWIP financial method (N10). Public opposition to the
same financial method has caused strong political awareness, especially
after the 1978 elections. As of the writing of this report, public
acceptance of the CWIP method is weakening. Unless public acceptance is
gained for the UAD financial method, through public education programs,
etc., this method is expected to have less chance of success than the
CWIP method.
The depreciation accounting procedures of the UAD method require
changes in current laws, and without adequate public support such a
method will not emerge. Legal matters also impede the application of the
large Utility System concept. In addition, almost all other improvements
require public acceptance, either directly or indirectly, to show the
anticipated successful results.
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8.5 O&M Considerations
From a strategic point of view, the aim should be toward a specific
design that minimizes future operating (including fueling) and
maintenance costs. If this is not possible a compromise should be made.
Attention must be paid to the fact that low capital cost may result in
high O&M costs so the overall goal of minimum busbar cost is maintained.
For example, consider the following two cases. In order to save
space or reduce the volume enclosed by various structures, and hence to
save on structures, the plant layout may be such that several parts of
equipment are installed too close to each other. In order for
maintenance personnel to reach a certain part, this design may increase
the number of radioactive parts they need to handle as compared to a
simpler, more expensive layout. Reduction in testing-related features
may prevent certain systems from being tested as frequently as necessary,
while the plant is on line. Although this may be resolved by increasing
the number of planned outages, the result would be a higher operational
cost while the capital cost associated with testing-related features is
saved.
Insofar as possible, the initial plant design should allow for the
flexibility for replacement of large equipment and possibly some
backfitting whose cost is capitalized and discounted over the remainder
of the plant service life. Failure to account for such future
possibilities may augment their cost, if not make it prohibitive.
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8.6 Growth of Power Generating Capacity
As the density of power plants increases, suitable sites become
scarcer and already-used sites become exhausted. This augments the
site-related problems and increases the costs of site selection,
preparation, and licensing.
Another consequence is the increased requirements of waste heat
removal. In order to minimize the thermal pollution effects, to allow
installation of new power generating units, and to protect the
environment, condenser cooling water diffusers, man-made lakes, spray
systems, and perhaps dry cooling towers are added to the list of capital
costs.
This point does not lead to the conclusion that energy production
growth has a limit, set up by a finite area of usable land. It merely
indicates that optimization of use of such a finite area as well as
upgrading of other sites that do not meet the relevant requirements have
undesirable effects of capital cost that distort the advantage of the
different improvement strategies.
8.7 Manufacturing of Equipment
It has been shown that time is the most critical element of capital
cost. Therefore most of the improvement strategies were directed to
reducing time requirements either by speeding up the licensing process or
by tightening the construction schedules. Such improvement can be
limited by the length of equipment delivery time. It makes no sense to
improved project schedule beyond this point.
Two factors determine equipment delivery time. One is that most of
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the equipment in question comes in the form of complex systems made up of
several components. Procurement of such components and the final
assembly of the system is a process that takes a finite length of time.
Variables 20 and 21 in Table 2.1 show that the mean delivery times for
custom units are 60 months and 49 months for the NSSS and T-G equipment,
respectively. Standardization does not lower these values very far.
Variable 24B of the same table indicates that for standardized design 27
months should elapse after start of construction before the reactor
vessel is brought into place. This suggests that trying to shorten the
period from NSSS commitment to CP issue to less than two years does not
help the project lead time.
The other factor that influences the delivery time of equipment is
the industry manufacturing capacity. It is estimated that this capacity
corresponds to about 20 plants per year. If favorable market conditions
resume such that demand requirements go a little beyond 20 plants/year,
those unfortunate late orders will suffer the bad effect of delayed
deliveries. If the market expansion becomes even larger, then there will
be a lead period for manufacturing capacity expansion. This lead period
is expected to be dominated by the vendors' hesitancy to risk more
investment and by the setup of the new facility expansion.
Even without a vast increase in demand, the manufacturing capacity
limitation may be felt in sudden reduction of its size. This happened in
the early 1970s when the emerging environmental regulations forced the
vendors to close some of their shops due to their lack of financial
resources to improve those shops in order to meet environmental
requirements.
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CHAPTER IX
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE COST ASSESSMENT
This chapter is concerned with the second component of the fixed
cost portion of the busbar cost. Unlike the capital cost component, the
O&M cost is not actually fixed with respect to the level of power
generation. Rather, some of the O&M cost components are fixed while
other components vary with no uniform relationship to quantity
generated. This point will be discussed in more detail in later sections
of this chapter.
The first area of attention in this chapter is to try to quantify
the current status of the O&M cost. Its components and their
contribution are examined before the future trend of the O&M cost is
investigated. Next, Section 9.4 is a discussion and identification of
the major causes that influence the O&M cost behavior. Finally, in
Section 9.5 an evaluation is given for the possible improvement
strategies that may be implemented to alleviate the impact of O&M cost on
the busbar cost.
9.1 Current Status of the O&M cost
Table 2.1 in Chapter II indicates that the operation and maintenance
cost is about 2.15 mills/kWehr. For plants entering commercial operation
in 1977 with a commercial cost of $534/kWe (D1), the return requirement
Qn capital investment is about 19 mills/kWehr. This makes the O&M cost
responsible for about 10.1% of the 1977 LWR average fixed cost. Relative
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to the 1977 fore cost value of $588/kWe, Table 2.1, the O&M fraction is
only 9.2% of the fixed cost.
Because the survey data upon which Table 2.1 was constructed have
been reported from different regions of the U.S. and the sources have
their own special circumstances as well, a large spread in the data has
been observed. This spread is represented by the standard deviation of
1.05 mills/kWehr, or about 50% of the mean value.
Another set of data (D2) gives an average O&M cost value of (2.15 +
1.26) mills/kWehr. This corresponds to an annual O&M specific
expenditure of $(10.82 + 5.03)/kWeyr at a capacity factor of (59.0 +
12.4)%. These results are based on information related to 43 units
operating in 1975. (More about these units will be presented in the next
section.) This means that the 2.16 mills/kWehr represents the 1975
status. Due to escalation, this figure should be increased by about 15%
to about 2.50 mills/kWehr, in order to reflect the 1977 conditions.
Given the amount of uncertainty in the data, where the standard deviation
is on the order of 50 to 60%, one cannot make any great distinction
between the Table 2.1 value of 2.15 mills/kWehr and the latter value of
2.50 mills/kWehr. The deviation between these two values is only 15%.
Our conclusion about the magnitude of the O&M cost relative to that of
the total fixed costs remains, therefore, unchanged, i.e., at about 10%.
In addition, in 1975 six LWR units went into commercial operation
(D2). The known commercial costs in that year for five of them were in
the range of ($446.6 + 47)/kWe. Assuming a capacity factor of 50% and an
annual fixed change rate of 15%, the O&M cost fraction is computed to be
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14.5%. Again the result is within the wide bounds of uncertainty
indicating a bias toward the higher fraction of the fixed cost.
For comparison with fossil-fired units, Table 9.1 shows the behavior
of O&M cost for fossil-fired units over the last decade and a half.
Table 9.1 Historical
O&M Cost*
Year (mills/kWehr)
1960 0.85
1964 0.74
1967 0.77
1970 0.83
1972 0.99
1973 1.06
1974 1.24
1975 1.60
* Reference (D2)
Behavior of Fossil Plant
Interim Annual
Escalation Rate,%
-3.4
1.3
2.5
9.2
8.1
17.0
29.0
O&M Cost
Average Unit
Size*, MWe
362
509
577
586
624
599
617
a-half. Focusing on the last few years shows that the fossil units have
much lower O&M costs compared to LWR plants, although still well in the
bounds of the standard error. One should pay attention to the validity
limitations of this comparison. The units of each type are of different
sizes and maturities and also most of the LWR units lack the advantages
of co-location. These factors are discussed further in Section 9.4.
-
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The following criticism may be directed toward the preceeding
analysis. The O&M costs are compared to commercial costs for units of
different time schedules. The 1977 (or 1975) O&M cost for all units
operating in that year are compared to commercial cost of new units that
have just gone on line in that particular year.
In response, the O&M cost is more flexible than the capital cost.
This will be clear when the O&M cost components are considered in the
next section. The O&M cost usually reflects current conditions while the
capital cost reflects historically accumulated conditions. Comparison
of, say 1975, O&M cost of plants operating that year to their capital
cost is unfair, since a large fraction of the capital cost was made early
in terms of less inflated dollars. If this happens, then the O&M cost
seems larger than it is. Correcting for inflation is an area that
requires a major effort and involves large uncertainties. On the other
hand, if the O&M cost is considered only for those plants that went
on-line in 1975, the results will be highly biased due to age effects,
and thus will be misleadingly small.
9.2 Contribution of Major O&M Elements
The Operation and Maintenance cost is the non-fuel portion of the
production cost. It thus includes the cost of plant staffing, nuclear
liability insurance, coolant/moderator makeup, consumable supplies and
equipment, and outside supporting services. In addition to these major
items, there are miscellaneous O&M costs associated with staff
replacement, operator requalification, annual operating or inspection
fees, travel and office supplies, other owner's general and
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administrative overhead, as well as the working capital requirements.
Rather than using these cost categories to analyze the contributions
of the O&M cost elements, one might consider the basic categories of
equipment, labor, material, indirect cost accounts and time, as in the
case of capital cost. It is, however, inappropriate to utilize such a
simple set of five elements, because both equipment and time do not apply
to O&M cost. Large, durable equipment is considered part of the capital
cost, while tools can go under the category of material or indirect cost
accounts. Since the schedule concept does not apply in this case, the
time element has no contribution except in the case of spare parts or
other material delays.
For labor the matter is different. Table 2.1 shows that between 112
to 160 men are needed for a single LWR unit. OMCOST code (E4), a
computer program that computes the O&M cost for steam power plants,
assumes 145 employees as a staff requirement for the same unit. This
code also assumes an annual salary spread of $13,400 to $23,200. Table
2.1 shows a staff average salary of $(24,889 + 5,273) in 1977. On the
basis of 145 workers, Table 2.1 average annual salary gives an annual
labor cost of $3.61 million, or about 0.62 mills/kWehr. This makes the
labor element responsible for about 30% of the O&M cost. The balance
goes to the material and indirect cost elements.
Based on reviews of plant experiences and discussions of estimates
with operating personnel, OMCOST takes the LWR maintenance material cost
to be equal to the cost of the total maintenance-related labor, which is
about 45% of the total staff. The administrative and general (A&G)
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expenses are taken as 15% of the total staff cost and maintenance
materials and supplies and expenses fixed costs.
The above figures total 50% for the labor-dependent portion of the
O&M cost (30% labor, 13.5% maintenance material cost, and 6.5% is A&G
cost part that is related to labor and maintenance material). The
balance of the O&M cost goes to supplies (spare parts, chemicals,
lubricants, etc.) and expenses and to nuclear liability insurance and
operating fees. The last two items, insurance and operating fees, are
about 2.6% and 1.6% respectively. These values are based on the O&M
cost of a 1000 MWe single-unit plant. Therefore, about 46% goes for the
cost of supplies and expenses and is not directly dependent on labor.
The 4.2% of insurance and operating fees depends on the reactor thermal
power. Although the insurance premium decreases with the number of units
per plant, its contribution and that of operating or inspection fees are
too small to be significant.
Some of the maintenance materials and supplies, such as spare parts,
chemicals, lubricants, gaskets, record and report forms, etc., are
consumed in proportion to plant operation. Similar to these is the
routine service maintenance labor. During plant outages such consumption
and service maintenance are interrupted. They are resumed when the plant
is generating electricity. Thus this portion of O&M cost is variable
with the quantity of electric generation; however, there is a continued
O&M cost for other work during the shutdown periods. In conclusion, the
practice of including the whole O&M cost in the fixed cost is a
reasonably sound decision.
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For lack of more detailed information, we have to alter the
direction of discussion at this point. One can clearly observe that the
quantities of labor and material are highly related, and thus their costs
and also that of indirect cost accounts cannot be assumed as
independent. Another set of O&M elements or components may seem more
appropriate. A logical one is the Federal Power Commission O&M cost
reporting categories (F2). These categories are as follows:
1. Operation supervision and engineering; covers the cost of labor
and material for general supervison and direction of the power
generating station.
2. Coolants and water; includes the cost of labor, material, and
expenses incurred for heat transfer materials such as handling
of coolants and operating of water supply facilities and also
costs of chemicals, lubricants, pumping supplies, etc.
3. Steam expenses; covers the associated costs of operating the
steam supply system.
4. Steam from other sources; if it is purchased from other
departments of utility.
5. Steam transferred-credit; almost the opposite of No. 4.
6. Electric expenses; includes costs of operating the electric
plant to the points where electricity leaves for transmission.
7. Miscellaneous nuclear power expenses; includes items not
covered in categories 1 to 6, one of which is plant security.
8. Rents of others' property.
9. Maintenance Supervision and engineering; similar to category 1.
10. Maintenance of structures.
11. Maintenanace of reactor plant equipment.
12. Maintenance of electric plant.
13. Maintenance of miscellaneous nuclear plant.
Note that in each of these categories there are labor, material, and
indirect expense costs. Supervision of specific operating and
maintenance tasks are included in their appropriate accounts rather than
in accounts 1 or 9.
Taking these FPC reporting categories as O&M cost elements, Table
9.2 presents the contribution of these elements to the O&M cost. The
results shown there represent data taken for a sample of 43 LWRs
operating in 1975 (D2).
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Table 9.2 Contribution of FPC O&M Cost Reporting Categories
to the total O&M Cost Value in 1975 (D2)
Mean Value Standard
Account O&M Cost Category Deviation
No. mills/kWehr % mills/kWehr
15 Operating supervision
and engineering 0.228 10.5 0.161
16 Steam expenses 0.312 14.4 0.189
17 Coolants and water 0.098 4.5 0.100
19 Electric expenses 0.077 3.6 0.45
20 Misc. nuclearpPower
expenses 0.452 20.8 0.292
21 Rents 0.030 1.4 0.010
23 Maintenance super-
vision and engineering 0.064 3.0 0.061
24 Maintenance of
structures 0.087 4.0 0.147
25 Maint. of reactor plant 0.520 24.0 0.559
26 Maint. of electric plant 0.230 10.6 0.175
27 Maint. of misc. nuclear
plant 0.077 3.6 0.046
29 Total O&M cost 2.16 100 1.26
Therefore, the costs are those of 1975. The characteristics of this
sample are:
1. Generating unit capacity is at least 450 MWe. The only
exception is that of Dresden 1 unit (200 MWe) whose data could
not be separated from that of the Dresden Station. This may be
the reason for the high O&M costs of the Dresden Station.
Indian Point 1 (270 MWe) is another exception.
2. Unit operating age is more than 8 months by the end of 1975.
3. The sample has 43 operating units at 30 power stations.
4. The average unit generating capacity is 891 MWe.
5. The average capacity factor is (59.0 + 12.4)%. Two plants with
three operating units did not report their capacity factor
values.
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6. Unit age is 41.9 + 35.6 months or 35.6 + 22.9 months, if
Dreseden 1 and Indian Point 1 are excluded.
The annual O&M expenditure was found to be $10.82 + 5.02/kWe.
Together with the 2.16 mills/kWehr, the $10.82/kWeyr shows that the
capacity factor value should be 57.2%, which indicates that the units
whose capacity factors were not reported had low capacity factors.
The first column of Table 9.2 shows the FPC account number for each
O&M cost category. Account 18 is missing because no 'steam was
transferred'. There was no 'steam from other sources'; instead coolants
and water cost were reported in account 17, thus leaving account 22
blank. Account 28 is redundant. Account 21 is seldom used; only four
stations with five LWRs reported rent cost of 0.03 + 0.01 mills/kWehr, as
shown.
The main observation is that about 60% of the O&M cost comes from
accounts 25, 20 and 16; with accounts 26 and 15 ranking next of
importance. The other six categories make up less than 20% of the total
O&M cost. Account 25 is the maintenance of reactor plant. It includes
the cost of labor, material used, and expenses incurred in the
maintenance of reactor plant equipment. Account 20 is the miscellaneous
nuclear power expenses. It includes the cost of labor engaged in general
clerical and stenographic work, plant security, building service, care of
grounds, and other activities that are not specifically included in
accounts 15 through 19. It also includes the costs of materials and
expenses of general operating supplies, such as tools, gaskets, hose,
lamps, record and report forms, first aid supplies and safety equipment,
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employees' service facilities, building service supplies, communication
of office expenses and needs, traveling, and incidental expenses.
Account 16 is Steam Expenses. It covers the cost of labor for
supervising steam production, fuel handling, instrument testing,
monitoring and decontamination activities that are health and
safety-related, waste disposal, and reactor operation. In addition, it
covers the related material and expenses as well as chemical supplies,
lubricants, and reactor inspection fees. Account 15, the operation
supervision and engineering was explained earlier. Maintenance of
electric plant, account 25, includes the costs of labor, material, and
expenses incurred in the maintenance of the turbine generator,
accessories, and other electric plant equipment.
It is clear that the FPC O&M cost breakdown considers the areas of
specialized activities rather than the basic elements of labor, material,
etc. This, in turn, helps in identifying the major cost areas, as we
have just seen.
A recently published study (Al) draws similar conclusions about the
above five cost categories. This study selected ten single-unit plants
and considered data covering the period 1971-1976, inclusive. The study
used linear regression analysis as the major calculation tool. It
identified the above five categories (accounts 25, 20, 16, 26, and 15) in
the same order as the major contributor to the O&M cost. More about this
study is considered in the next section where it will be referred to as
the S&W (for Stone & Webster) Study.
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9.3. Present Trend of the O&M Cost
The O&M cost of LWR power plants is rising. The main conern of this
section is to clarify the rate of increase of the O&M cost and its main
components. The first part of this section discusses the time-related
behavior of O&M cost for all plants. The second part presents a brief
analysis of age (years of commercial operation) effects on O&M cost of
individual plants.
9.3.1 Time-Behavior of O&M Cost
Based on three data points, Table 2.1 shows that the O&M cost
escalation rate is (8.67 + 3.60)%. The mean value is slightly higher
than that of the capital cost direct labor escalation rate (shown in
Table 5.1). It is substantially higher than that of capital cost direct
material, shown in the same table. The values of escalation rates for
capital cost labor and material presented in Table 2.1 are even less than
those of Table 5.1. Thus, the O&M cost has been increasing at a rate
higher than the rate attributable to cost escalation.
The S&W Study has some further interesting results. As mentioned
earlier (Chapter IV and Section 9.2), this study considered only 10
plants. These plants were chosen to have either GE or Westinghouse
reactors of 430 MWe or larger and to be single unit-plants. In 1975
there were 13 plants that satisfied these conditions. Three of them were
omitted because apparently they started commercial operation in 1974, and
thus have only a short operating experience. The S&W Study yielded the
following results. The average O&M cost in 1971 was 0.97 mills/kWehr.
It increased to an average of 2.72 mills/kWehr by 1976. The average
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annual rate of increase was calculated to be 26% for the 1971-1976
period. In comparison with 14 coal-fired stations, the Study found the
average O&M cost for those coal plants increased by 21% annually. This
figure is slightly higher than the combined rates of increase of all
fossil plants in the early 1970s (see Table 9.1).
On a per-plant basis the ten LWRs' O&M average cost was $3.2 million
in 1971 and increased to $9.2 million in 1976 at an average rate of
increase of $1.30 million/yr. Note that the contribution of the five
most expensive O&M categories (Table 9.2) to the O&M cost was 80% of the
total in 1975; the S&W Study attributes 90% of the total O&M cost
increase to increases in these five categories over the five-year period.
On the other hand, variable 68 of Table 2.1 shows that the average
staff salary is predicted to rise by 6% per year in 1977-88, while it
indicates that the same rate of increase is 12.5% per year for the
1977-82 period. Since these two values were based on data obtained from
two different. utilities at different regions, one cannot anticipate a
sharp increase in the next five years followed by a mild increase for
1983-88. It is more appropriate to consider 6.0% to 12.5% as the most
probable range of annual wage increase for the next decade. Because this
increase is related only to wages, rather than to the total labor cost,
it is highly independent from the escalation of other O&M cost elements.
Notwithstanding, the range of wage increase rate (6-12.5%) coincides
reasonably well to the overall O&M escalation rate of 8.67 + 3.60%.
The analysis of the O&M cost increases is discussed in the following
sections and is summarized in Section 9.4.4, where the major reasons for
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the difference between the escalation rate and S&W reported increases are
quantified. From the definitions of the five major O&M cost categories,
one can notice that they are labor intensive. The future behavior of
each of the individual major categories may be anticipated by
extrapolating the data presented in Figure 9.1, using the range of future
wage increases as a guideline.
As a final remark, it should be noticed here that the rate of O&M
cost increase is higher than that of capital cost. Although this may be
compensated by the rising fixed charge rates, the O&M cost is gaining
more relative importance.
9.3.2 Age Effects on O&M Cost
In the area of capacity factor, improvement has been observed in
many power plants as the plant becomes more mature and passes the
shake-down period. The following analysis is a brief statistical
investigation of whether the age of an individual plant has any effect on
the O&M cost.
Of the 43 LWRs operating in 1975, the following four samples are
considered:
Sample 1: 7 units, 800 MWe or larger and older than 2 years
Sample 2: 9 units, 800 MWe or larger and have been in commercial
operation for 2 years or less
Sample 3: 11 units, between 400 to 799 MWe, and older than 3 years
Sample 4: 7 units, between 400 to 799 MWe, and have been in
commercial operation for 3 years or less.
The remaining units in the original 43 unit sample have O&M cost
data that is distorted by either mixed sizes or ages (for multi-unit
plants.)
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The O&M cost for each of the four samples is as follows:
Sample 1: 1.68 + 0.38 mills/kWehr
Sample 2: 1.75 + 0.97 mills/kWehr
Sample 3: 2.41 T 0.82 mills/kWehr
Sample 4: 1.99 T 0.76 mills/kWehr
By considering the mean values only, it may be concluded that the
O&M cost decreases with age for large units while it increases with age
for the small units. There is no physical explanation to such conclusion
except that the reported values of O&M cost are distorted by back-fitting
expenses, which tend to be higher for older, smaller units than for the
modern, larger LWRs. On the other hand, when the uncertainty in the data
(the Standard Deviations) is considered between two samples of the same
size (MWe) category, no clear trend can be observed between the
respective O&M cost values.
9.4 Causes of O&M Cost Increase
As in the capital cost case, O&M cost increase causes are of two
categories. The unit cost increase is merely due to escalation. The
last section shows that the escalation rate is mostly below 10%, while
the O&M cost has increased at a rate above 25%, annually. Although the
escalation rate of the O&M cost is higher than that of the capital cost
it is only 2 to 3 percentage points above the general inflation rate. It
is still, therefore, within the range of escalation of other commodities
mentioned in Section 6.1.
Of more importance is the category of increased requirements.
Unlike the case of capital cost, causes in this category are only limited
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to regulatory factors. The more stringent regulations in the areas of
safety, environmental, and plant security provide the dominant causes of
O&M cost increase. The detailed characteristics of the three causes are
discussed below. Other causes, such as financial problems and labor
productivity, as discussed in capital cost, have not been found to play a
significant role in the O&M cost. This is because of the relatively
small magnitude of the O&M cost and the overwhelming effects of the other
causes.
9.4.1 Increased Safety Requirements
The additional systems that are introduced in new design or
backfitted in old operating units require additional manpower, if not to
operate, at least to carry out inspection and preventive maintenance
tasks. Examples of these systems are the emergency core cooling system
and the radioactive waste system. Although for operating units
backfitting expenses are primarily of a capital cost nature, they often
show up as annual O&M charges (E4). For utilities lacking adequate
financial resources annual expensing of such capital costs is quite
convenient. Undoubtedly, such action causes a distortion in the reported
values of O&M cost.
Safety procedures also require certain tasks or plant employees.
For example, manning certain plant areas at all times has increased in
the control room and guard houses for security reasons.
9.4.2 Increased Environmental Requirements
Additional systems have been installed in the plant in order to meet
environmental requirements. Examples of these are the condenser cooling
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system (towers), and the off-gas system for BWRs. These have effects on
O&M cost similar to those of the increased safety requirements on O&M
cost.
In addition, the Environmental Protection Agency and other
regulating agencies concerned with discharges to the environment require
on-site utility company personnel (E4). The mechanical draft cooling
towers decrease the net electric output and hence increase the specific
O&M cost.
9.4.3 Increased Security Requirements
Plant security of nuclear power stations is currently gaining more
importance and has become one of the hottest issues between the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission and LWR owners. All nuclear plants are required to
prepare and implement security plans that meet NRC approval.
A new rule, 10OCFR 73.55, has been enacted and has required some
immediate compliance of utilities with operating plants since February
24, 1977. This rule has requirements for organization, physical
barriers, access, detection, communication, testing maintenance, and
response to threats (G2). Full compliance with hardware requirements has
been expected 18 months later. Clearly such regulations involve plant
design changes, which requires backfitting, and hence they affect the
busbar cost in a way similar to that of the first two causes. In
addition, the operation and maintenance burden is increased by the
additional security devices and instrumentation as part of material used
and expenses incurred in related activities. The 10CFR 73.55 defines a
"Threat level" as follows (B5).
247
The plant's security apparatus has to be able to stop an armed,
well-trained group of attackers that includes one plant
employee or "insider".
In addition to the hardware and structural requirements, this
criterion increases the labor requirements in two ways. In a passive way
it increases interference with workers' movements at check points and
inside vital areas, thus reducing the productivity per manhour. On the
other hand, the number of plant employees is increased to meet active
security duties. The new regulation stipulates between five to ten armed
guards per shift (B5). This can tie up about 40 employees or 25% of a
single unit plant staff to this job.
Another proposal to enhance plant security is the "buddy system".
This requires that no one be unescorted in a vital area of the plant. So
for tasks that need one worker, another worker should be present for
"watching" him. There are cases when about 800 to 1000 people are
present at the plant for special maintenance purposes. The related
outages are conceivably responsible for 5% of plant unavailability. If
only 20% or 200 "watchers" are then required, an average of 10 employees
would be added to the plant staff. Aside from administrative and other
expenses, this results in an increase of no less than 2% of the O&M cost,
and may go as high as 10%.
Although at the time of this writing, final resolutions of all
security requirements is not known, it is clear that significant
increases in the O&M cost are expected.
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9.4.4. Analysis of Increased Requirements
The increased requirements due to safety, environmental, and
security considerations contribute to increasing labor requirements.
Maintenance material and related A&G expenses increase proportionally, as
discussed in Section 9.2. Certainly, supplies and expenses increase as a
result of the three causes, although in a non-uniformly proportional
manner to labor. The S&W Study is in agreement with this conclusion,
which indicates that there have been 10.5 additional station employees
per year for the 1971-76 period. The average number of employees in the
S&W sample is 102 workers; the average annual increase is, therefore,
about 10.3%. Since 50% of the O&M cost is directly labor-related as
opposed to the labor cost of 30% of the O&M cost, this makes the average
annual increase in labor responsible for a 17.1% average increase of the
total O&M cost. The remaining 9% of the total 26% computed in the S&W
Study is due to increased supplies and expenses.
9.5 Strategies for O&M Cost Improvement
The set of strategies discussed in this section is by no means
exhaustive. Due to the lack of an adequate data base, the analysis is
mostly qualitative. Three improvement schemes are identified. They
are: 1) optimization of current practices, 2) improved accounting, and
3) co-location of units.
9.5.1 Optimization of Current Practices
This is a generalized improvement scheme. For plants in the design
stage, plant layout can be optimized to improve communication between the
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various parts of the plant. Such a strategy would contribute largely to
decreasing the time-to-repair, which is directly proportional to
maintenance labor cost. It is also limited by the expected capital cost
increase. In addition, optimization of O&M procedures helps the O&M
cost. Such optimization should be oriented toward conservation of labor
requirements, inspection and preventive maintenance to reduce future
maintenance requirements in case of system or component failure or an
outage, and optimizing spare-parts and supplies inventories. There have
been cases of cooperation among neighboring utilities in exchanging
supplies and spare parts. Such movement could be more beneficial in the
cases of standardized plants. It is also one step toward implementation
of the concept of large Utility Systems, discussed as an organizational
improvement in Section 7.4.1. Reduction of O&M outside-support expenses
can be attained by in-house expertise for large Utility Systems.
The non-productive fraction of time plant staff can be reduced by
minimizing non-productive tasks such as security checks and clothing
changes. The definition of the boundary of the vital area can make a
considerable difference in this respect. A tool room in the reactor
building to reduce the number of clothing changes is another example.
Of course, all this is balanced by an opposite change in capital
cost, either in the stage of construction or in later backfitting. Cost
optimization among capital cost, O&M cost, and also capacity factor
(and perhaps fuel cost) is the main objective, since all these costs
affect the busbar cost.
250
9.5.2 Improved Accounting
The target here is how to account for backfitting expenses.
Backfitting is any alteration of the pnysical plant (i.e., components or
structures) with addition, removal, or replacement according to new, or
partial, plant design. When this occurs during the construction period,
the backfitting expenditure is automatically added to the capital
investment. During commercial operation, backfitting is ordinarily done
to meet evolving regulatory requirements. It is also done to upgrade
component performance and availability. Backfitting is not to be
confused with interim replacement of components with intermediate lives.
The latter is usually capitalized.
Because of unfavorable financial situations some utilities expense
the backfitting expenditure as part of the annual O&M costs. There have
been cases when utilities told us that the O&M cost contributes to 25%,
rather than to 8 or 10%, of the busbar cost. When asked about the
difference, they pointed to backfitting expenses. Such accounting
behavior goes along very well in the UAD financial method, with a UAD
fraction of unity, as explained in Section 7.4.2.3. Unfortunately, this
distorts the O&M cost picture and may divert attention from the real
situation.
This matter can be resolved in one of two ways. The first is
adopting a financial method that reduces utility dependability on outside
capital resources, such as the UAD method; this helps utilities to
finance backfitting expenditures as well as other capital-type
expenditures. The other way is to regulate the way utilities report
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their expenses to prevent mixing backfitting expenses with other annual
O&M expenses. Enforcement of such regulation may not be a simple manner.
9.5.3 Co-location of Units
This is when two or more units are located on one site, thus having
a multi-unit station. This has been widely used in fossil units, and in
a large number of nuclear stations under design or construction. The
obvious benefit comes from sharing common facilities for operation and
maintenance purposes. Again standardization of plant design can have a
sound effect on this improvement scheme.
Of the same sample of LWRs operating in 1975 described in Section
9.2, there are 9 plants, each of which has two units, and two plants with
three units each. Their O&M cost is 2.00 + 1.51 mills/kWehr. This is
compared to 2.16 + 1.26 mills/kWehr for the whole sample. Because of the
large standard deviation, one cannot draw a firm conclusion. A better
result can be obtaianed by modifying the sample. The largest O&M cost is
reported by Dreseden Station (3 units) of 5.64 mills/kWehr. The second
largest is 3.95 mills/kWehr, and the data fluctuate between this value
and 0.81 mills/kWehr. By looking to the sample (see Table 9.3), one may
notice that the Dresden value is atypically high. (It was included in
earlier analyses to enhance the randomness property of the data, since we
only have data for 1975.) By omitting Dresden Station from the sample,
one obtains the following results:
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Table 9.3 LWRs Operating in 1975: O&M Cost and Number of
Units per Plant (D2)
O&M Cost
Plant mills/kWehr No. of Units
Arkansas Nuclear One 0.84 1
Calvert Cliffs 1.18 1
Maine Yankee 1.40 1
Robinson 1.53 1
Arnold, Duane 1.68 1
Nine Mile Point 1.91 1
Cooper 1.92 1
Vermont Yankee 2.15 1
Ginna 2.18 1
Conn. Yankee 2.28 1
Three Mile Island 2.57 1
Kewaunee 2.68 1
San Onofre 2.69 1
Pilgrim 2.84 1
Fort Calhoun 2.89 1
Monticello 3.03 1
Millstone I 3.09 1
Oyster Creek 3.91 1
Palisides 3.95 1
Point Beach 0.92 2
Prarie Island 1.05 2
Peach Bottom 2,3 1.22 2
Zion 1.31 2
Browns Ferry 1 & 2 1.42 2
Surry 1.70 2
Turkey Point 1.85 2
Quad Cities 2.19 2
Indian Point 2.71 2
Oconee 0.81 3
Dresden 5.64 3
o O&M cost for all 40 units is 1.90 + 0.84 mills/kWehr
o O&M cost for 19 single unit plants is 2.35 + 0.85 mills/kWehr
o O&M cost for 21 units in 10 plants is 1.48 + 0.59 mills/kWehr
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From these figures one notices the following:
1) The 1975 mean value of 1.90 mills/kWh, when escalated by 8% per
year, gives 2.22 mills/kWh for 1977; a good agreement with
Table 2.1 value of 2.15 mills/kWehr (variable 69).
2) The standard deviations are smaller than when Dresden data was
included and the mean values are further apart. This is a good
justification for excluding the nontypical datum of Dresden
Station.
3) The main conclusion is that O&M cost savings of as much as 37%
can be attained by colocation.
9.6 Concluding Remarks
The O&M cost, whose 1977 value is about 2.15 mills/kWehr with a 50
to 60% standard deviation, seems to be increasing beyond its current 10%
share of the fixed cost and hence gaining in relative importance. In
addition to safety and environmental considerations, the security issues
are expected to be dominating factors on its future behavior. The age of
the LWR unit has not been shown to be a significant factor over the time
span studied.
At the very late stage of this study the 1976 steam electric plant
data became available (D4). Preliminary calculations based on this set
of data were carried out. They revealed that the mean value of the 1976
O&M cost was about 13% higher than that of 1975. The rest of the results
were in a close agreement with the findings presented in this chapter.
As in the area of capital cost evaluation where several studies have
been conducted with variable depth, more attention should be paid to O&M
cost in order to evaluate the current condition and resolve future trends
with sophisticated analytical and/or statistical techniques.
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CHAP TER X
SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
In this closing chapter, the first section is a summary of the
material presented in the first nine chapters. It presents the
highlights of the discussions and results and ends by discussing the
areas of interface with other groups working on the same project. The
remaining sections describe the areas of interest for related future work.
10.1 Summary and Interface with Other Groups
This section is divided into three parts. The first part
concentrates on capital cost. O&M cost summary is in the second part.
And the third describes the interface with other groups of the MIT LWR
Study. The first part, therefore, is a review of Chapters II through
VIII, while the second part covers Chapter IX. The third part is a
compilation of the different remarks presented at various points in the
text about the interface areas together with some supplemental
information.
As an introductory remark, the following is a clarification of the
term "fixed cost," which has been used extensively in this study.
Capital cost is the major component of the fixed cost. A second
component of the fixed cost is the Operation and Maintenance (O&M)
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cost. The term "fixed" is used for those costs that are independent of
the quantity of electricity generated. This is strictly true for capital
cost and the operation part of the O&M cost; the maintenance portion of
the O&M cost, though often described as variable, is included here since
it is convenient and in any case is a small portion of the total cost.
It is also recognized that "fixed cost" varies with other parameters, the
most important of which is time. Such parameters are included in the
following assessment of the fixed cost. When the cost of fuel is added
to the fixed cost, the sum is related to the busbar (i.e., generation)
cost of electricity prior to transmission and distribution.
10.1.1 Capital Cost Assessment of LWR Power Plants
Capital cost accounts for about 90% of the fixed portion of the
electricity busbar cost. This has been reflected in the way the effort
of this work was allocated, which has concentrated on capital cost, while
relatively minor attention was paid to the other fixed cost component,
the O&M cost.
Early in the study, a survey was carried out, including most LWR
equipment vendors and architect/engineer and constructor firms, and also
about 30 utilities in the United States. The questions were presented in
the form of defined variables that would be evaluated under a set of
applicable assumptions. These variables describe the current status of
the LWR capital cost, its future trend, the effectiveness of the various
improvement options are, and the influence of the limiting factors.
Variables related to the O&M cost were also included. Additional
comments were requested. The results of the survey were tabulated in
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statistical format and used where needed in the report. The overall
results indicate a mean value of $592/kWe in 1977 dollars for the capital
cost, as explained in the following section.
10.1.1.1 Capital Cost Base Case
The first application of the survey data was the formulation of the
base case for LWR power plant capital cost. A computation was done by
use of CONCEPT Code, Phase 5, as it was in February 1978 (H2). The
calculated results were found to be in good agreement with the survey
data. The base case problem was then prepared describing the 1977 status
of capital cost, from which variations could be investigated as
conditions changed for each other problem. The following table specifies
the base problem and summarizes the computed results.
The base case problem:
Plant power capacity, MWe 1200
Number of generating units 1
Reactor type PWR
Cooling system Mech. Draft Tower
Location Boston, MA
Date of NSSS commitment 1/1/77
Date of CP issue 1/1/81
Date of commercial operation 1/1/88
AFDC effective annual rate, % 9.0
Results:
Fore Cost (1977) $/KWe %
Equipment Cost 216 16.1
Labor Cost 129 9.6
Material Cost 67 5.0
Indirect Costs 180 13.4
TOTALS 592 44.1
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Results (continued):
Tail Cost (1988) $/KWe %
Overall Rate of Escalation
during Construction 6.76%
Cost of Escalation during
Construction 312 23.2
TOTAL TAIL COST 903 67.3
Allowance for Funds used
During Construction 438 32.6
Commercial Cost (1988) 1342 100
The FORE COST of a particular year is the cost of the plant if it
could be completely built in that year (i.e., essentially overnight on
July 1, and hence this cost has also been called the "overnight
continuation cost" (J1)). Since the plant construction takes several
years, the fore cost value changes with escalation. The TAIL COST is the
sum of the fore cost at the beginning of the project and the cost of
escalation during construction, CEDC. When the allowance for funds used
during construction, AFDC, is added to the tail cost, the sum is called
the COMMERCIAL COST, which is the sum of all expenditure until the date
of commercial operation. Similarly, the 1977 fore cost for coal plants
with scrubbers is $515/KWe.
10.1.1.2 Contribution of Capital Cost Elements
Five elements constitute the capital cost. Four of them are the
fore cost components, equipment, labor, material, and indirect cost
accounts. The fifth is time. The contribution of each of the first four
is shown on the right column of the base case results as a percentage of
the commercial cost. The time contribution is the sum of the CEDC and
the AFDC, which makes about 56% of the commercial cost. CONCEPT code
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calculations show that the commercial cost variations are linear
functions of the element variations, whose slope is nearly the fraction
of the element contribution to the commercial cost. This clearly shows
the independence of the five elements. For the first three elements this
result is true when the cost variations are caused by price variations
rather than by changing required quantities. The major items in indirect
cost are the home-office engineering and construction facilities and
equipment, which are responsible for 3.5% and 3.2% of the commercial
cost, respectively. Their influence on capital cost is similar to that
of the first three elements.
The fifth element, time, has peculiar characteristics. It is the
largest contributor when it is measured as the sum of CEDC and AFDC,
whose quantity is the years of the project lead time modified by the
project cash flow, and its unit cost is in terms of the annual rates of
CEDC and AFDC. It is not a completely independent element that merely
adds to the fore cost; it also augments the fore cost. The major
contribution of time comes in the case of project delay, i.e., when the
date of NSSS commitment is fixed. The commercial cost variation is still
linear, but has a large slope. One year's change makes a difference of
about 10% in the commercial cost, and 1% change of the AFCD rate makes
about 5% change in the same. The interesting result emerges when the
date of commercial operation is fixed and the project lead time varies.
Here no significant change in the commercial cost occurs, because the
resulting opposite variations of the CEDC and AFCD (at present rates)
almost cancel each other.
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10.1.1.3 Capital Cost Trend
A result of a study that covers the 1967-87 period shows a steady
increase in the commercial cost at an average annual rate of 10.2%.
Lately, the change in commercial cost has been even more drastic. The
past 4 1/2 years have shown an increase in fore cost from $211/kWe to
$592/kWe, or about a 26% annual rate of increase. In addition, the
project lead times have increased on the average by about 50% over the
same period. Throughout the 1970s project lead time has increased at a
rate of 9 to 10 months/yr. Estimates up to 1990 indicate that the
capital cost may rise at an average rate of $56/kWe/yr. This is in spite
of the fact that the plant sizes have doubled during the first half of
this period and the specific cost of large plants is about two-thirds of
that of plants of their half size, if built simultaneously.
10.1.1.4 Causes of Capital Cost Increase
The various causes are related to one of two categories: increased
unit-cost or increased requirements. The first category is associated
with an increase in, say, wages or steel prices, while the second is
associated with an increase in quantity required. The unit cost increase
is merely due to general escalation, and no specific commodity required
for LWR plant construction has shown any sign of resource depletion. The
escalation of LWR capital cost, though about 1% higher than that of
general inflation, is mild when compared to other essential commodities
such as housing whose rate of escalation in the 1960-78 period was 8.54%.
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The causes under the increased requirements category are many.
Larger unit size has increased, among other things, the amount of capital
investment required for a power plant project. This results in many
cases of schedule delay due to financial difficulties, which only makes
the matter worse. Design improvements to up-grade the plant availability
and meet the evolving safety and environmental requirements have added
more equipment, material, and associated labor as well as increasing the
indirect costs and stretching lead times. In the cases of equipment and
material, both quantity and quality requirements are increased. Lower
productivity is another cause that is associated with increased paper
work, design complexity, and schedule irregularities, as well as the
faster increase of demand on labor force relative to the increase in
supply of qualified workers. Public intervention is another cause that
affects the lead time at the various stages of the project, although
primarily before the CP is issued. There are also other factors such as
changing accounting methods by regulatory ammendments, which at least in
one case resulted in increasing the AFDC by 33%.
10.1.1.5 Possible Improvement Alternatives
Several alternatives have been identified or proposed. Their main
target has been the time element of capital cost. For convenience they
are divided into three sets, designated as 1) optimization of current
practices, 2) standardization, and 3) improved utility structure and
finance.
Optimization of Current Practices: The first element in this set is
to pursue a scheme of design optimization that concentrates toward cost
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minimization. As a relevant example, use of remote multiplexing in plant
(non-safety) control systems may reduce commercial cost by close to
0.5%. Another element is to improve project management in an integrated
manner at all phases of planning, design licensing, and construction of
LWR power plants. Both these schemes require the expertise and resources
of vendors and architect/engineer and construction firms. Given the
current industry structure, this report merely emphasizes actions that
are anticipated by the different industry members with regard to this
type of improvement. In addition to improved design and project
management, alternative licensing procedures are considered. Early
site-approval, as proposed by the NRC, is expected to be beneficial, but
success is limited by state and local governmental influence. The
limited work authorization helps to complete up to 3% of construction
before the CP issue. If the LWA-to-CP period does not exceed a year,
capital cost gain is realized. Otherwise, the associated AFDC can
destroy the benefit, especially if it takes as long as four years after
LWA to obtain the CP. Sad experiences in this option have led several
utilities not to exercise this option. Another proposed scheme in this
area is a Periodic Freeze on regulatory changes, which might help by
reducing the uncertainty in regulation that faces the industry today.
Standardization: Four options under this category have been
investigated. The first is the Flotation. Although this concept has
been around for a decade and was one of the earliest three recognized by
the AEC, no practical success has been cited yet. The first plant under
consideration is expected to be completed by 1988 at the earliest. In
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the meantime, the utility response is affected by the licensing
uncertainties surrounding this option. The current cost estimate shows a
commercial cost of about + 10% from that of the base case. These
estimates may not hold once the first plant is built.
The second option studied is Duplication. This is defined as
several similar plants that are licensed simultaneously. It has been
practiced in two different ways. There are cases when one utility
licenses a package of units, whether they are on one site or at different
but nearby sites. This method has gained a considerable success and wide
use. The other way includes the SNUPPS method, when several utilities
license similar plants at sites that are thousands of miles apart. The
success of this option has been distorted by financial and load reduction
problems. In this case with respect to the CP lead time, the gains were
relatively significant. Independent of site-related and non-technical
factors, the time savings may reach 20%. The cost reduction is in the
range of 6 to 13%, depending on the project intermediate events.
The third option is Replication. It is the last considered by the
AEC, and hence the least exercised. Given the market conditions in the
last few years, this option did not have a fair chance; the few
replication cases have not shown any success, although they do not
provide sufficient evidence for fair conclusion.
The fourth is the Reference System option. This was the one that
met the largest enthusiasm of the industry. Several Reference System
designs have been licensed. They differ in scope of design from NSSS and
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Balance of Plant, to Nuclear Island and Turbine-plant Island. Almost all
recent applications include some aspect of this option. The main target
of relatively reducing the CP lead time has been demonstrated. Once the
CP is issued, the construction schedule could be reduced by 6 to 12
months, with a commercial cost savings of about 10%.
The last three options do not constitute a set of mutually exclusive
alternatives, since they can be applied simultaneously. This in fact
reduces the applicability of replication. Standardization has mainly
addressed the physical portion of plant and could not help with
site-related problems, which have become the critical issues. The site
issue has placed undesirable limitation on standardization.
Improved Utility Structure and Finance: This set of improvement
schemes is expected to play a complementary role to the previous ones.
The first area is a proposal for movement toward large utility
systems, whose activities include all aspects of power generation, aside
from equipment manufacturing. This proposal is supported by the success
of large utilities (Commonwealth Edison, Duke, and TVA) in attaining
lower capital cost, with savings ranging from 4 to 30% of the average
cost in their regions.
The second area is that of improved financing. Conventional
financing alternatives are discussed. Inclusion of the construction work
in progress (CWIP) in the rate base increases the availability of
financial resources better than any conventional scheme. The possible
exception is increasing the depreciation allowance by considering the
replacement cost of last-in/first-out depreciation.
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The CWIP method is shown to be a special case of a more general
method under the designation of Ultra-Accelerated Depreciation (UAD)
method. The basic idea is to include only part of the CWIP in the rate
base and expense the balance of the CWIP expenditure as an early
depreciation, which is matched by an equivalent amount of revenue from
the current generating facilities. A mathematical model to investigate
this alternative has been developed. ULTRA is a computer code based on
this model. ULTRA calculations show that it is possible with UAD
financing to reduce the future electricity price to less than it would be
if conventional financing continues. The CWIP method and conventional
depreciation schemes exhibit the opposite result. All these methods are
associated with a large initial increase in electricity price that
discourages demand and relieves the external capital supply market.
10.1.1.6 Limiting Factors
Seven major factors are identified as follows:
Size: An upper limit on size, imposed by regulatory and
technological considerations, diminished any further benefits
of economics of scale.
Regional Characteristics: Population density, climate and
topography affect the capital cost, which varies between the
regions of U.S. by 15% of median value.
Constitutional Division of Authority: This prevents any
imposition of coordinative programs to reduce licensing
conflicts among various government levels.
Public Acceptance to Improved Finance: Public acceptance,
either directly or through the regulatory bodies, is a
prerequisite to implementing any financial improvement scheme.
O&M Considerations: Capital cost reduction via decreasing
special and material requirements by tightening plant lay-out
may distort the fixed cost through increased 0 & M requirements.
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Growth of Power Generating Capacity: This affects the site
availability and more cost is involved in upgrading sites.
Manufacturing of Equipment: Project schedule improvements are
limited by equipment delivery time. For instance, the delivery
times of major pieces of equipment make the reduction of time
between the NSSS commitment and the start of construction to
less than two years of questionable advantage.
10.1.1.7 Conclusion
Current LWR capital cost, although still economically attractive,
has risen to the point where predictable variations and cost over-runs
exceed the acceptable level of uncertainty associated with such increased
financial burden. Such initial investment, when met by inadequate
financial resources, may lead to a situation in which society is deprived
of an economic electric energy source, the LWR, that is adequately safe
and environmentally acceptable.
The main point here is that this problem is not unique to large LWR
plants. Other types of power plants of similar financial characteristics
encounter this problem. In 1977 coal-fired plants are estimated to be
15% less than LWR plants in specific capital cost. The breeder is
estimated to have at least 1.5 times the LWR capital cost (S5). And in
the future, the fusion technology is not expected to be less capital
intensive.
A comprehensive improvement strategy is needed. Standardization
cannot help without improved site licensing. Upgrading current practices
in all phases of power plant projects is emphasized. The move to large
Utility Systems is desired. Financial improvement is urgent. The
Ultra-Accelerated Depreciation financing is an example of one potential
for increasing internally generated funds and decelerating the
electricity price rise.
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10.1.2 O&M Cost Assessment of LWR Power Plants
The 1977 value of O&M cost is 2.15 mills/kWehr with a standard
deviation between 50 to 60% of this value. This corresponds to about
$10.8/kWe yr, or about 10% of the busbar fixed cost. It seems that the
O&M cost is gaining more importance relative to its current share of
fixed cost. Although the O&M cost for LWR plants is a little higher than
that of O&M cost for fossil plants, both types are experiencing similar
escalation patterns.
Labor wages and requirements exhibit an important contribution to
O&M cost. Although the labor share is only about 30% of the O&M cost, it
influences a total of about 50% of the O&M cost through related
expenses.
Activity-wise, the most important O&M categories are the maintenance
of reactor plant, miscellaneous nuclear power expenses, steam expenses,
operation supervision and engineering and maintenance of electric plant,
whose contributions to O&M cost are 24.0, 20.8, 14.4, 10.5, and 10.5%,
respectively. While these five categories have a total contribution of
80% of the O&M cost, they dominate 90% of the O&M cost increase.
The major causes of O&M cost increases have been the increased
safety and environmental requirements; security issues are gaining more
importance and are expected to have a dominating effect on the future O&M
cost behavior.
Optimization of current practices is the general strategy for O&M
cost improvement. This is concerned with items such as plant layout
improvement regarding O&M tasks, O&M procedures, and plant supplies and
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spare-parts inventories. Accounting measures that exclude, or
specifically categorize backfitting expenses that are charged as annual
O&M expenses, is another step that would provide more realistic O&M cost
values. Co-location has been found to provide savings of as much as 37%
of O&M cost.
The trend toward increased O&M cost makes it appropriate to
recommend a future study and analysis of O&M cost current and future
conditions in order to provide better understanding of causes and
improvement strategies.
10.1.3 Interface with Other Groups
The Fixed Cost section of the Technical Group carried out the
necessary calculations for the 1977 fore cost estimates for LWR and
coal-fired plants. These estimates were then passed to the Economics
Group. This section also contributed to the scenarios related to capital
cost changes in the economic model (REM).
The impact of capacity factors improvement on capital cost was
assessed. The capacity factor section of the Technical Group prepared
the capacity factor information presented in Table 6.4. The new values
of capacity factor improvement and the associated capital cost increase
were passed to the Economics Group as another scenario.
Several institutional and regulatory problems of importance to the
capital cost assessment have received more attention by the two sections
of the Institutional/Regulatory Group. The I/R Group has focused on
strategies related to the acceptance of the LWR technology, while the
cost assessments discussed here concentrated mainly on organizational and
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procedural alternatives directly related to fixed cost improvement.
These alternatives were presented in Sections 7.3 and 7.4.1.
10.2 Recommendations for Future Work
In the course of this study, several areas have gained special
interest. This section is dedicated to describing these areas and
outlining plans to pursue their objectives. The areas that deserve
further investigation include the UAD financing method, quantitative
analysis of Periodic Freezing of regulations and their impact on fixed
cost, detailed analysis of O&M cost trend and causes that contribute to
this trend, and the impact of commercialization of other reactor types on
the LWR technology in an extended future horizon.
10.2.1 The UAD Method
The basic concept of the Ultra-accelerated Depreciation method was
presented in Section 7.4.2.3. The Appendix describes the ULTRA code.
This code can be modified to accept a wider variety of input. It also
can be modified to simulate precisely, rather than approximately, as
shown in Section A.6 (the case of CWIP method).
The current version of ULTRA is static. There is no feedback
between future electricity price changes (through changes in capital
return requirement) and future growth and escalation data. Room for such
a major modification is left at the end of subroutine RETREQ and in the
dummy subroutine FUTGRO. Before implementing such a modification,
mathematical development in the related area of the model is needed.
Econometric expressions relating future growth data on the price of
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electricity are needed to close the feedback loop. The price of
electricity depends on the busbar cost and transmission and distribution
costs. The busbar cost depends on production (fuel plus O&M) costs and
on capital return requirement, which depends on previous and current
growth data. Thus a large amount of effort could be involved if this
route is to be pursued further.
Even without this proposed dynamic structure of the code, the
current version of ULTRA is sufficient to investigate more sensitivity
cases. With minor modifications, particularly in cash flow data for
non-steam electric plants, the current version permits further assessment
of the current model input parameters. For example, the case of zero (or
negative) inflation economy has not been examined and may require
reevaluation of the code. Introduction of separate mix functions for
each of the investment growth and the generating capacity growth enhances
the model. The proposed future work in the UAD method area, therefore,
allow a better understanding of the concept and the appropriate way to
implement it once the signs of possible improvement are observed.
10.2.2 Periodic Freezes on Regulations
This area deserves attention similar to that proposed for the UAD
financial method. Unless the evolution of regulatory actions is
stabilized, any other related improvement strategies will have limited
effectiveness. Sections 6.2, 7.2, and 7.3 clarify this remark.
A study, better than that of WASH-1345, could then investigate the
plant increased requirements due to regulations. Such a study would be
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concerned with the instantaneous effects of the various regulatory
actions on the capital costs of an adequate sample of power plants. A
model that accounts for the various aspects of the regulatory process and
its interactions with plant marketing, licensing, and construction could
be developed. Interpretations of such a regulatory/plant interaction in
terms of capital cost variations due to changing plant requirements would
also be included in the model. Sensitivity studies can then be conducted
to evaluate the concept of Period Freezes and its impact on plant cost.
10.2.3 O&M Cost Analysis
There have been several attempts in Chapter IX to quantify the
various aspects of O&M cost. The S&W study (Al) makes a notable start in
this direction. A more thorough study is needed that utilizes a larger
data base and more sophisticated statistical techniques in order to bring
a better understanding to the various factors that can conceivably
influence the O&M cost. Perhaps the capital cost analysis in the Rand
Study (M1) is a good example in this respect. Undoubtedly, the O&M cost
has characteristics different from those of capital cost. This can be
noticed by comparing the analyses of Chapters III through VIII and
Chapter IX of this report. A comparison of the S&W Study and the Rand
Study emphasizes this fact. Therefore, the necessity of carrying out
this work to fill the currently existing gap is quite obvious.
10.2.4 Extended-time Horizon
The scope of this study was bounded by the year 1997. Several
interesting events are expected to occur toward the end of this 20-year
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period, which may have pronounced effects well into the 21st century.
One of these possible events is the commercialization of the
advanced reactor types -- the High-Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor and the
Breeder Reactor. There has been an interest among several utilities
regarding the utilization of the HTGR and LMFBR technology, which look
more efficient for power generation than the current LWR plants. Higher
fuel utilization, higher thermal efficiency, and more load-following
flexibility are cited as the major advantages for, especially, the direct
cycle HTGR. Successful results in this area will have considerable
influence on the LWR market. For example, it is noted that one of the
utilities participating in the HTGR has postponed two of its planned LWR
plants until the 1990s. Another participant has cancelled two LWR plants
after considerable design and licensing efforts when it became certain
that these LWIRs will not come on-line until the late 1980s.
Another development is the proposed Consolidated Nuclear Steam
System, presented in Section 7.2.4.4. This concept of LWR design is not
expected to be commercialized before the mid-1990s. Flotation may become
another important aspect by the beginning of the last decade of this
century. Such events could be of considerable interest to the
continuation of this study if the time horizon were extended beyond 1997.
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GLOSSARY
A/E
AEC
AFDC
A(j,L)
A&G
BOP
BWR
CC
CEDC
Co-location
Commercial
Cost
CP
CP lead time
CT
CWIP
CWIP method
d
DOE
Duplication
Eq.
ESR
Flotation
FNP
Architect/engineer
Atomic Energy Commission (U.S.)
Allowance for funds used during construction = opportunity
cost of investment
AFDC factor = CC/CT (see below)
Administrative and General
Balance of Plant
Boiling Water Reactor
Commercial cost
Increase in plant cost due to escalation during
construction
Several units at one site, i.e., multi-unit station
Book value of plant at commercial operation = tail cost +
AFDC
Construction permit
Time from NSSS commitment to CP issue
Tail cost
Construction Work in Progress
The financial method of including the CWIP in the rate base
Debt fraction of capital
U.S. Department of Energy
Several similar plants licensed simultaneously
Equation
Early Site-review
Nuclear power plant is "manufactured" on barge
Floating nuclear plant
Fore Cost
FPC
9
G
hr
HTGR
I(t)
K
kWe
L
1
LIFO
LWA
LWR
MIT
MWe
MWt
net cumulative
investment
NRC
NSSS
O&M
PDA
Project lead
time
PSAR
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Cost of the plant if it could be completely built in one
year
U.S. Federal Power Commission
Gross growth rate (annual)
Generating capacity
Hour
High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor
Net cumulative investment at time t
Capacity factor
Kilowatt of electric power
Project lead time
Average expenditure lead time
Last-in, first-out
Limited Work Authorization
Light Water Reactor
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Megawatts of electric power
Megawatts of thermal power
Total cumulative investment that is not
depreciated yet
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Nuclear Steam Supply System
Operation and Maintenance
Preliminary Design Approval
Time from NSSS commitment to commercial operation
Preliminary Safety Analysis Report
PSAR review
time
PWR
Rate base
Reference
System
Replication
Return
requirement
Rs(t)
S
S.D.
Tail Cost
T-G
TVA
U
UAD
yr
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Time from docketing to CP issue
Pressurized Water Reactor
Net valuation of generating equipment plus related
properties and working capital
Approved standardized NSSS or BOP design for reference in
CP application
Referencing already licensed similar plants in current
application for CP
Required return related to capital investment
Return requirement at time t per unit generating capacity
Depreciation life
Annual escalation rate
Standard deviation
Cost of plant at end of construction = Fore cost at start
of construction + CEDC
Turbi ne-generator
Tennessee Valley Authority
Useful life of equipment
Ultra-accelerated Depreciation
Year
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A.1 Introduction
This appendix describes the development of the ULTRA code, a
computer program that assesses the impact of Ultra-Accelerated
Depreciation (UAD) financing on the capital cost component of the
electricity busbar cost. This appendix records the mathematical
development of the Code and presents the current version of the computer
program. Starting with the basic mathematical expressions for electric
utility cost accounting, the relationship between the notion of the
levelized fixed charge rate and the basic electricity cost formula is
demonstrated. In Section A.3 the ultimate output of the Code, the Return
Requirement Ratio, is described. In the following two sections
expressions for the two elements of the ratio are developed. Section A.6
discusses the special case of including the construction work in progress
in the rate base. After that the Expenditure Density function is
discussed along with the relevant parameters. A general description is
given for the ULTRA Code in Section A.8, and a program listing is
provided in the last section of this appendix.
A convention has been established in this appendix regarding the
mathematical presentation. The parentheses ( ) are used to express the
functional dependence, while the square brackets, [ ], and the braces,
etc., are used for algebraic purposes.
A.2 The Capital Return Requirement
Early in Chapter I of this report, the cost of electricity
generation, or the busbar cost, was written as (see Eq.1.1):
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Cb = [R + 0] + F (A.1)
In a more detailed fashion, the busbar cost may have the more appropriate
expression of:
1000 I 0 1000 Cf
Cb 8760K [(G) + ( )] + (A.2)
where
Cb = busbar cost of electricity, mills/kWehr,
K = capacity factor, actual kWehr/rated kWehr,
f = annual fixed charge rate, per year,
I/G = specific cost of unit; $/kWe,
O/K = annual specific O&M cost, $kWe yr,
Cf = total fuel cycle cost, $/kg fuel fed to plant,
n = plant thermal efficiency, kWe/kWt, and
B = fuel burnup at discharge, MWtD/T of fuel.
Going back to the simple form of Eq. A.1, but using the subscript "s" for
specific values, i.e., $/kWe, we obtain:
Cb = [Rs + s] + F (A.3)
And if time dependence is allowed, it becomes:
Cb(t) = I[ERs(t) + Os(t)] + F(t) (A.4)
K(t), the capacity factor, depends on the state-of-the-art, and it is
always intended to be maximized. The operation and maintenance cost,
Os(t), and the fuel cost, F(t), are largely independent from R(t),
and hence, their indirect dependence on financial methods is
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insignificant. That leaves Rs(t), the capital cost factor. Throughout
this study, R(t) will be referred to as the specific return
requirement on capital investment or return requirement, for short. It
is the part of sales revenue that is required by the utility to recover
its capital investment and pay for all costs associated with the use of
this investment. Hence, it would be more appropriate to refer to R(t)
as "Specific Required Return Related to Capital Investment." The word
"specific" is retained because R(t) is associated with specific
capital investment, i.e., investment per unit of generating capacity,
IS(t). Thus R(t) may be written as:
Rs(t) = Is(t)f(t). (A.5)
Is is the same as I/G in Eq. A.2, and f(t) is known as the fixed charge
rate. It is a sum of several factors, such as return on investment,
depreciation allowance, and taxes. Some of these factors depend on the
fraction of the equipment useful life that has elapsed; hence, f is
time-dependent. If the present worth of the various I(O)f(t) made over
the length of the service life is computed at t = 0, and equal payments,
based on that present worth, are made over the same period, then each
payment will be equal to I(O)f. This f is known as the levelized annual
fixed charge rate. It is more convenient to use the levelized fixed
charge rate, especially in analytical analysis, and from a macroscopic
point of view, no informaton will be lost in the process. In addition,
if I(t) represents an investment associated with several units at
different stages of service life, then the relevant f(t) has nearly a
constant value and is close to f, the levelized rate.
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The cost of electricity to the ultimate consumer, Ce, is given by
the following expression:
Ce = Cb + Ct + Cd (A.6)
where
Cb = busbar (generation) cost,
Ct = transmission cost, and
Cd = distribution cost.
Each of Ct and Cd consists of capital related charges and operation
and maintenance expenses, while Cb has the third component of fuel
charges.
Utilities are allowed to sell electricity at prices equivalent to
the cost of service (G3). The cost of electricity is then:
Ce = E + X + T + [V - D]rw. (A.7)
The various symbols on the right-hand side of this equation are as
follows.
E = Production expenses; includes O&M cost plus fuel charge!
X = Depreciation expense,
T = Taxes; mainly income and property taxes,
V = Gross valuation of the ower plant in service and relate
D
r
The last
allowed
earning
S
dd
properties,
= Accrued depreciation, and
= Weighted rate of return.
term, [V - D]rw, is sometimes referred to as the earnings
on the rate base. rw is the sum of interest rates and equity
rates weighted by the respective debt and equity fractions of the
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capital. The rate base [V - D] represents the net valuation of the power
plant in service and related properties. The rate base often includes a
third term, W, such as
Rate base = V - D + W (A.8)
where W is the working capital (K2). In this study, because it is
related to operation and maintenance expenses, its allowed earning is
included in E and hence it does not appear in Eq. A.7.
Each term in Eq. A.7 can be written as a sum of three terms, each of
which corresponds to one of these terms on the right-hand side of Eq.
A.6. The busbar cost, therefore, may be written as:
Cb = Eb + Xb + Tb + [Vb - Db]rw. (A.9)
Costs related to transmission or distribution, such as capital investment
in transmission lines or meters or wages of meter readers, are excluded
from any of the terms on the right-hand side of Eq. A.9. The tax term,
Tb, may be split into two parts. Tbl represents taxes relevant to
production, and Tb2 represents taxes related to capital investment.
Cost of property insurance may be included in Tb2. Therefore:
Cb = Eb + Tbl + Xb + Tb2 + [Vb - Dblrw.
(A.10)
When K, the capacity factor, is constant, Eq. A.4 may be written as:
Cb = R + Os + F
- Isf + s + F. (A.11)
By comparing Eq. A.10 and A.11, we have:
Os + F = Eb + Tbl (A.12)
and: Isf = Xb + Tb2 + [Vb - Db[rw. (A.13)
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Eq. A.12 relates the two expressions for production expenses; it will not
be discussed further.
Equation A.13 gives an expression for the specific return
requirement in terms of the variables of Eq. A.7. This makes the
right-hand side variables of Eq. A.13 to be evaluated on the basis of a
unit of generating capacity, kWe. This equation is appropriate for
calculating the fixed charge rate, f, as it changes from year to year.
This can be done as follows. There are several ways to evaluate the cost
of the generating facility, Vb; one of them is the "actual cost" (G3),
which is Is as we define it. The depreciation terms, Xb and Db,
are computed according to the straight-line method, which gives them the
values of Xb = Vb/Sk and Db = [n/Sk]Vb where Sk is the
depreciation life of plant k and n is the number of years since it
started commercial operation. The value of Tb2 is the sum of income
and property taxes. The property tax is based on its rate, which is a
fraction of the plant net value. Property insurance can be included in
the same term with property tax. The simplest expression for the
weighted rate of return is given by:
rw = [1 - d]re + drd (A.14)
where d is the debt fraction of capital, re is the rate of return on
equity and rd is the interest rate. Income taxes are based on the
income from return on equity; it has the following expression:
b2 income 1 -y b b)(- d)re (A.15)
where y is the (federal plus state) income tax rate.
If p is the property tax rate plus insurance rate, then Eq. A.13 becomes:
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I f S + t y[1 - dre+ [1 d[r + drdt [1 - n/S]I
(A.16)
Hence, the fixed charge rate is:
f = +[ 1 r + drd + p] [1 - n/S] (A.17)
n S 1 - y e d
where the index k is omitted, for simplicity. It is obvious that this
fixed charge rate depends on n, the age of the operating unit. By
considering the average value of accrued depreciation over the plant
depreciation life an approximate value for the levelized annual fixed
charge rate, f, the average accrued depreciation is:
S S
= [LE nIs/S]/ n
n=1 n=1
: [S + 1]Is/2S (A.18)
Substituting Eq. A.18 into Eq. A.17 gives
f + 2S 2 - - ]r e + drd + p. (A.19)
2S2 -S- 1The coefficientS - 1 has the values from 0.903 to 0.979 as S
2S
changes from 6 years to 25 years.
The averaging of the accrued depreciation over the life of the
asset, Eq. A.18, decreases the cash flow sharply at the beginning of the
asset life and increases it sharply toward the end of the asset life,
relative to the true cash flow. Using Present-Worth analyis, such as
that of reference (S6), the following expression for the levelized fixed
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charge rate can be readily derived:
f 1 1 [(A/p, r', S) - S] (A.20)1 (A.20)
This expression assumes a straight-line depreciation with zero salvage
value. The term in the parenthesis is the annuity/present-worth factor,
evaluated at an annual rate r' for S years. For large S this term
reduces to r', which is given by
r' [1 -l d[r e + [1 - y] d (A.20a)
Except for re and r all other symbols are as defined before.
The value of re is the rate of return on the equity capital that
includes an allowance for recovery of this portion of the capital
investment. Similarly, the value of r accounts for both the
interest rate and the rate of recovery of debt capital. This makes the
expression [1 - d]re + dri equivalent to the 'capital recovery
factor,' rather than being simply the weighted cost of capital, rw,
defined by Eq. A.14. The EPRI Study (El) defines the capital recovery
factor as the sum of rw plus a sinking-fund depreciation term, where
re and rd have the ordinary definitions of this report. This means
that the values of re and r are larger than those of re and
rd, respectively.
The above fixed charge rate expressions, Eq. A.19 and Eq. A.20, are
useful in assessing the economics of alternative projects, when the
initial investment, Io, is known. This makes Iof' the capital return
requirement for each of the various projects. In such fixed charge rate
expressions, the reduction in the initial asset value due to depreciation
is included. In ULTRA code the investment of all the utility operating
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plants is accumulated with time and depreciation is subtracted in
parallel fashion, leaving only a net cumulative investment I(t) (see Eq.
A.35). It is more appropriate, therefore, to use the following
expression for the levelized charge rate:
1 d 1f = [ L y] re + drd + + P (A.21)
In ULTRA code, this fixed charge rate is multiplied by I(t), the net
cumulative investment (i.e., total utility investment less
depreciation). The return requirement, R(t) = I(t)f, is the sum of the
following four capital return allowances:
1) Before-tax return on equity capital:
Rd(t) = I(t)[ d re (A.21a)
where I(t) [1 - d] is the equity portion of the net cumulative
investment. This allowance includes corporate income tax, dividends, and
retained profits. re is the rate of return on equity capital with no
recovery allowance.
2) Interest on borrowed capital:
Ri(t) = I(t)drd (A.21b)
This is merely the interest paid to bondholders at the bond face value of
rd; it includes any other "friction" costs, but no bond retirement
allowance.
3) Depreciation allowance:
Rd(t) = I(t) . 1/S (A.21c)
Based on the straight-line method, this is the depreciation allowance for
the utility plant whose net value is I(t) and whose effective life is S.
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If each type of power plant is considered separately, then Sk is used
instead. This allowance is used to restore the equity capital and pay
for bond retirement.
4) Property tax and insurance:
Rp(t) = I(t)p (A.21d)
where p is the sum of property tax and insurance rates. All of the above
allowances are in terms of current dollars with respect to time t.
A.3 The Return Requirement Ratio
As discussed in the text of this report, the final output of ULTRA
code is the ratio of the value of return requirement based on the UAD
financial method, Rsu, to the value of return requirement if the UAD
method is not implemented, that is, return requirement according to
conventional financing, Rsc. This ratio serves as a measure of the UAD
method success. When this ratio is less than unity, the cost of
electricity becomes less than it would be if conventional financing were
continued. Mathematically, this ratio is given by:
Rsuc(t) = Rsu(t)/Rsc(t). (A.22)
The intermediate steps are concerned with evaluating both the numerator
and denominator of the right-hand side of this equation. Substituting
Eq. A.5:
Rsi(t) = Isi(t)fi(t)
= Ii(t)fi(t)/Gi(t) ; i = u, c. (A.23)
G(t) is the generation capacity of the Utility System as a function of
time. In the current version of ULTRA code the levelized annual fixed
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charge rate, or simply the fixed charge rate, f, is assumed to be
independent of time, i.e., the various tax, return, and interest rates as
well as the other factors are time-independent. Eq. A.21 gives an
expression for the fixed charge rate for the case of conventional
financing. The fixed charge rate expression for the UAD method is not
too complicated and will be presented later. This leaves the
determination of Ii(t) and Gi(t). The following section discusses
the case of conventional financing, while Section A.5 is concerned with
UAD financing. At this point it is appropriate to consider the following
definitions, which will be helpful with the remainder of this paper.
s = Escalation rate.
Because of design improvements, resource depletion and other
economic factors related to the general inflation, project cost
increases with time, i.e., cost escalates. This has the effect
of increasing the investment magnitude with time. It is highly
unlikely that the value of this parameter will be zero or
negative.
g = Gross growth rate.
This is the rate at which new units are added to the utility
generating capacity to replace retiring units and meet new
levels of demand. g > ; it cannot be negative.
When g = 0 the utility capacity decays, and vanishes by the end
of the lastly-installed unit life.
S = Depreciation life of equipment.
This is the period over which the entire investment is written
off.
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U = Useful life of equipment, which is the expected actual
service life.
L = Lead time necessary to complete the project.
It is the difference between the date of commercial
operation and the date of investment for the same plant
starts. Because a small fraction of investment is made
before the date of commitment to specific major equipment
over a relatively short period, the AFDC associated with
this fraction is neglected. Hence, L will be referred to
as the project lead time. (In the case of nuclear power
plants, this is the period between the date of NSSS
commitment and commercial operation.)
1 = Average lead time of the expenditure.
Since different fractions of expenditure have different
lead times, this is the average of these lead times. In
other words, this is the lead time for the center of
gravity of project expenditure.
A.4 Return Requirement-Conventional
From Eq. A.23 the return requirement for conventional financing is:
Rsc(t) = Ic(t) fc/Gc(t). (A.24)
Ic(t) is the level of investment in current dollars. It is the sum of
the capital costs of all operating units at time t less any accrued
depreciation. The capital cost is the commercial cost plus any
additional backfitting or improvement expenses. In general these
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expenses are small compared to the commercial cost, and can be added to
the commercial costs of plants under construction if necessary. This
means that I(t) is the sum of commercial costs related to the net
cumulative growth of the utility system. The values of the elements of
this sum, Ic(t), can be actual or adjusted commercial costs; the choice
is irrelevant to ULTRA code.
Consider the reference time, t = O, when the utility system starts
to implement UAD financing. In calendar time, t = 0 coincides with the
beginning of the first year when UAD financing starts. At t = 0 the net
cumulative growth of investment is I(O), which is based on the sum of
commercial costs for plants operating at t = O. Recall the definition of
the capital cost levels presented at the beginning of Chapter III. For
the purpose of this code it is more appropriate to evaluate I(t) in terms
of the tail cost, CT, rather than the commercial cost, CC. The
relationship between the two capital cost levels is as follows:
CC = CT + AFDC. (A.25)
At any time, m, during project lead period the differential costs are
related according to:
dCc(m) = CT i(m)dm [1 + rw]L- m. (A.26)
m may take any value in the interval [O,L]. L is the project lead
period. i(m) is called the Expenditure Density and is defined such that
i(m)dm is the fraction of CT spent during the interval [m, m+dm].
Hence, by this definition, for any generator type k:
Lk
ik(m)dm = 1 (A.27)
TO
rw is the weighted rate of return, or may be referred to here as the
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AFDC rate. It is defined by Eq. A.14. To simplify the notation, rw
will be replaced by j. Integration of Eq. A.26 gives:
L
CC=CT / i(m)[1 + j]L-mdm. (A.29)
0
Let
L
A(j,L) = i(m)[1 + j] -mdm. (A.29)
0
Then Eq. A.28 becomes:
CC = CTA(j,L). (A.30)
A(j,L) is called the AFDC factor. Obviously it is the ratio of the
commercial cost to the tail cost. Once the type of the generating units
is given, and hence i(m) and L are specified, and the AFDC rate, j, is
determined, the AFDC factor can be computed as a pure fixed number, using
Eq. A.29. Both j and L can be time-dependent, but this will be
considered later.
Going back to the net cumulative growth of investment I(t), we have,
at time t = 0:
I(O) = IT(O) A(j,L) (A.31)
where IT(O) is the net cumulative growth of investment based on the
summation of tail costs only.
At any time t the total (not specific) return requirement is
Rc(t) = [net cumulative investment in operating units] * [Fixed
Charge Rate]
= [total cumulative investment until time t - investment
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in units depreciated by time t] * [Fixed Charge Rate]
= [It(t) - Ir(t)]f (A.32)
The total investment grows according to the annual escalation and gross
growth rates, s and g, respectively, which are generally time-dependent.
Therefore:
It(t) = IT(O)A(j,L)[1 + s(t) + g(t)]t (A.33)
S years ago this level of investment was:
It(t - S) = IT(O)A(j,L)[1 + s(t - S) + g(t - S)]t- S
= Ir(t) (A.34)
which corresponds to the investment of all units depreciated by time t.
Substituting the last two expressions into Eq. A.32 gives the expression
for the total return requirements:
RC(t) = IT(O)A(j,L)I[1 + s(t) + g(t)]t
- [1 + s(t - S) + g(t - S)]t-S (A.35)
In order to obtain the specific return requirement, Rc(t) is divided by
the generation capacity G(t) according to Eq. A.24. Starting at time t =
O with G(O), the net generating capacity is:
G(t) = G(O) [1 + g(t)]t - [1 + g(t - U)]t-U (A.36)
where units are retired from service after U years.
Smooth Growth Assumption
So far equations A.35 and A.36 are rigorous with escalation and
growth rates being evaluated appropriately. Because the dominant portion
of generation capacity growth is made through construction of large units
with lead times of many years, the growth of investment related to
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operating units and capacity are dominated by a series of irregular large
jumps. This is because during plant construction investment is made over
an extended period; however, this investment is not added to the rate
base until the plant is completed. The generation capacity exhibits
similar behavior. During the project lead time, if only one plant is
under construction, g(t) remains zero. At the year of commercial
operation it takes a large value (less than unity, of course), then
returns to zero in subsequent years. Modeling such growth behavior
requires a large effort in determining the date of commercial operation
of each plant, its capacity and its capital cost. To overcome this
difficulty the following assumption is made:
The capacity growth and net cumulative investment growth follow the
growth of the cumulative expenditure on new generation units without
paying attention to project lead times. This requires the gross
growth rates to be evaluated annually based on the growth rate of
cumulative expenditure on power plant construction.
To explain this assumption consider the example of constructing a power
plant of 1000 MWe for $500M over a period of 8 years. This leads to an
assumed growth of generation capacity of 125 MWe every year of the plant
project lead time with an annual increase in investment of $62.5M over
the same period. Then the values for s and g are based on these figures
of $62.5M and 125 MWe throughout the project lead time. At the year of
commercial operation only a small fraction, rather than the total, of the
values of plant investment and capacity are included in the cumulative
values.
Figure A.1 describes this matter. A typical actual capacity growth
is represented by the solid line. According to this assumption, the
capacity growth should follow the curve of the actual cumulative
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Fig. A.1 Simulation of growth of capacity in ULTRA
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investment growth. A large discrepancy from reality results from this
representation. To bring this assumption closer to reality another
parameter is considered. This parameter is the average expenditure lead
time 1, which was defined earlier. Mathematically:
1 - L - m i(m)dm / i(m)dm
O0
where i(m) is some appropriate expenditure density. Because of the
condition of Eq. A.27 and since L depends on the generator type, this
definition is reduced to
LK
1k Lk - f m ik(m)dm. (A.37)
0
The need for this parameter arises from two causes:
1) The expenditure density is not a constant, therefore the increase in
cumulative investment fluctuates from year to year, unlike what we
have seen in the previous simple example.
2) In conventional financing the return requirement is computed on the
basis of cumulative investment relative to the completed units, not
those under construction. (In the UAD method this condition does
not hold true.)
When this parameter is introduced in the model we have the following
situation. The system continuously grows according to annual rates. The
new capacity is not utilized until 1 yearslater. This means that at any
time t, the specific return requirement, Rsc(t), is based on
investments and capacity levels of I(t - 1) and G(t - 1), respectively.
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This situation is represented by the equally-dashed curve in Figure A.1.
How close the model simulates reality depends on the length of 1. At m<
L - 1 no investment is added to the rate base and no capacity is added to
the system, which is real. For L - 1 < m < L, the model assumes
increases in the levels of capacity and cumulative investment, which
unrealistically overestimates these levels. This is balanced by the fact
that when at m = L the plant becomes fully on-line, in reality, the model
waits 1 years,during which the levels of capacity and cumulative
investment are underestimated. This results in an error period L - 1 <
m < L + 1, or 21 interval.* The computer output estimates the value of 1
to be about L/2 for the various generator types. The main contribution
of introducing the average expenditure lead time parameter, 1, into the
model is, therefore, to obtain a better match with reality. In Figure
A.1 the error is reduced by a factor of 2; this is the ratio of the area
of the small trianges to that of the large triangle.
By dividing Eq. A.35 by Eq. A.36 and substituting t - 1 for t on the
right-hand side of the resulting equation, we have the following
expression for the specific return requirement:
Rsc(t) = ITs ()A(j,L)[l+s(t-l)+(t-)1 l+s(t-l-S)+g(t-l-S)]t-l-S
sc [1 + g(t - 1)]t1 -[1 + g(t - 1 - U)]
(A.38)
*It has been adopted as convention in this study that t refers to natural
time, while m refers to time during construction. So m is defined on the
interval [O,L]. This condition has been relaxed for this part of the
study because the time involved is related to the construction time.
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where ITs(O) = IT(O)/G(O), the net cumulative investment per unit
capacity at time t = 0.
This expression is good for a Utility System that utilizes one type
of generator. If more than one type is considered then the matter
becomes more complicated because each generator type has its own
characteristic values of S, L, and therefore of 1. Although the
escalation rates may be similar, the growth rates are different for each
generator type, since the latter depends on technological developments
and fuel availability, among other things. To incorporate this actual
behavior into the model the following two steps are taken:
1) The right-hand side is summed over k, the generator type index,
using Sk, Lk, lk.
2) Rather than using different growth rates in the form of gk, the
right-hand side of Eq. A.38 is multiplied by Fk(t), the generator
mix function. This function has the following characteristic
property:
N
Fk(t) = 1 , for all t (A.39)
k=1
where N is the number of generator types during the period of
consideration. An expression of the form Fk(t)[1 + g(t)]t means
that the system grows at an overall rate of g(t) at time t, and Fk
of the growth is associated with type k of generators. (Note that
Fk(t) is used for both I(t) and G(t) expressions; this assumption
is true only if the specific capital cost is the same for all k.)
The final expression of the specific return requirement is then:
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N t-1
Rsc(t) = ITs() Fk(t l) )[1 + (t- l) g(t -lk)]
t-lk kt-l -U
[1 + s(t -1 k - Sk) + g(t - k - Sk)l
k- l Ft k) 1 + g(t- ]
t-lk-U k f
- [1 + g(t - - Uk)] (A.40)
A.5 Return Requirement - UAD
In the Ultra-accelerated Depreciation financing, a fraction of the
current power plant construction expenditure, called the UAD fraction and
denoted as B, is matched by an equivalent amount of revenue in the form
of a depreciation expense. The remainder is added as a construction work
in progress to the rate base and treated in identical manner as other
capital investment accounts. In the current version of ULTRA code, for
the balance of the UAD fraction of expenditure, the AFDC with the
associated taxes as well as debt retirement and depreciation (straight
line) allowances are collected. In the early years after the
implementation of the UAD financing some of the revenue is still
collected on the basis of conventional financing, the way old power
plants were financed. Therefore, the UAD specific return requirement is
a sum of three terms:
Rsu(t) = [Rl(t) + R2(t) + R3(t)]/Gu(t) (AS.41)
The UAD generation capacity growth function, Gu(t), is identical with
the conventional one, in the denominator of Eq. A.38, except that the
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gross growth rate, g, may assume a different value, g'. The first return
requirement term, R(t), is that of conventional financing, which
decays out by the time the last generator that was financed
conventionally retires. This term is given by:
R1(t) = IT(O) L Fk(t- Sk)A(j,k)fk +g(t- )] ktw (t)
where for 0 < t < Sk: wlk(t) 1
and for t > Sk: Wlk(t) = . (A.42)
This term contains the AFDC factor (Aj,Lk) and represents
generators that started Sk operations years ago. It uses the
conventional fixed charge rate f.
The second return requirement term, R2(t), is given by:
N
R2(t) = IT(O) LE Fk(t)fu l+s'(t) + g'(t)] t
k= t-S k -
- W2k[l+s'(t-Sk)+g' (t-Sk] - 1
where for 0 < t < Sk: w2k(t) = 0
and for t > Sk: w2k(t) = 1 (A.43)
This term represents the portion of expenditure that is added to the rate
base. It reflects the generator mix condition at time t. The UAD fixed
charge rate has the format
fk = [1 - B [l ]re + drd + P(A.44)
where if the UAD fraction, B, vanishes, this fixed charge rate becomes
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identical with the conventional one (shown in Eq. A.21). The first term
in the braces of Eq. 43 reflects the new growth (with s' and g') of the
reference net cumulative investment IT(O) and when 1 is subtracted from
it, as shown, we obtain the net growth of IT(t) after the UAD financing
is implemented, i.e., after t = O. Note that the IT(O) is not
multiplied by the AFDC factor because the AFDC is expensed immediately
without any delay; the time variable on the right-hand side of Eq. A.43
is t not t - k. (This is why the average expenditure lead time, lk,
had to be introduced earlier.) The middle term in the braces represents
the generators that become fully depreciated after having been financed
according to the UAD method. This term is not activated until t exceeds
the smallest Sk, the depreciation life for generator type k.
The third return requirement term, R3(t), represents the amount of
current project expenditure that is to be treated as a depreciation
expense and is to be matched by an equivalent amount of revenue. It is
given by:
R3(t) = BIT(O) E Fk(t)[1+s'(t)+g(t)] - Fk(t-1)[l+s'(t-)+g'(t-)] t-
(A.45)
Obviously the first term represents the level of the cumulative
investment, IT(t), at year t, and the second term represents the same
quantity a year earlier, IT(t-1). The difference between IT(t) and
IT(t-1) is the expenditure during year t; and part of this expenditure,
B, is the one to be matched by revenue, R3(t). Substituting Eq. A.42,
Eq. A.43, and Eq. A.45, along with the appropriate value for Gu(t),
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into Eq. A. 41, the specific return requirement for UAD financing is:
N t-S
Rsu(t) = ITs(O) F(tSk)A(i,Lk)fk [1-[1+s(t )gt-Sk)+g(tSk)] wlk(t)
N f rt-SIt
+ Fk(t)fukL +s'(t) + g'(t)] - w2k(t)[+s'(t-Sk)+g(t-Sk)] k -1
+ B E [Fk(t ) [l+s'(t) + g'(t)] - Fk(t-1)[1+s'(t-1)+g'(t-1)]t l]k=1l
N t-l t-lk-Uk
k (t-lk)1 + 'l(t - k)] [1 + g'(t - lk- Uk)]l
k=1
where for 0 < t <Sk: wlk(t) = 1, 2k(t) = 0
and for t > Sk: wlk(t) = 0, w2k(t) = 1. (A.46)
When this equation is divided by Eq. A.40, the desired ratio,
Rsuc(t), of Eq. A.22 is obtained. Note that the reference net
cumulative specific investment, ITs(O), which is equal to IT(O)/G(O),
drops out of the final expression.
A.6 The CWIP Method
Another financial method that has gained some acceptance is the
inclusion of Construction Work in Progress in the rate base. Going back
to Eq. A.7 notation the new rate base becomes:
RB = V - D + VC (A.47)
where VC is the value of the CWIP. When the new rate is multiplied by
rw, the revenue is increased by the simple allowance for funds used
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during construction, AFDC, which is equivalent to the cost of financing
the capital investment that goes into the CWIP. The word "simple" means
that the AFDC is not allowed to be compounded; this makes it less than
the usual AFDC. Additional income taxes are also paid on the equity
return part of the AFDC. Property insurance and taxes are paid in any
case. This makes the fixed charge rate of Eq. A.21 adequate for
representing the return requirement of the CWIP, except for one factor,
the depreciation term 1/S.
There are some cases where the utility requested additional revenue
to match only the interest expense associated with the CWIP. This
reduces the CWIP fixed charge rate to drd plus (possibly) d/S.
However, this is a rare case and will not be discussed further.
When B = O, Eq. A.46 gives a third way of including the CWIP in the
rate base. This involves straight-line depreciation of the CWIP
immediately (before plant starts operation) by leaving the term 1/S in
the UAD fixed charge rate expression (Eq. A.44). To correct for this
error another term must be added to Eq. A.46 which includes a fixed
charge rate without the depreciation term. In addition, the time
variable, t, in the fuk term should be replaced by t - lk. The
resulting expression for Rsu(t) will be more complicated.
For CWIP method calculations, the current version of ULTRA code
utilizes expression Eq. A.46. When B = O, it thus requires a larger
depreciation allowance in the return requirement than if CWIP is simply
added to the rate base without depreciation charges. The increase in the
depreciation allowance is about 2% of the return requirement for
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generator types with depreciation lives of about 25 years; it rises to
about 5% for generators with depreciation lives on the order of 6 years.
Because the generator mix function is usually small (< .10) for the
latter type, the error remains in the vicinity of 2%. Since earlier
studies, as cited in the text, showed that Rs(t) for CWIP in rate
remains larger than that of conventional financing, which also was
confirmed by ULTRA code with B = O, Figure 7.15 of the text, there is no
need to change the current expression of Eq. A.46 to correct this small
error of 2%. After all when B = 0, the depreciation term in fuk is
only 0.04 (for SK = 25 years) and B may be 0.5 or more. The main
purpose of ULTRA Code is to investigate the UAD financing, and 4%
Ultra-accelerated Depreciation, when B = O, is a good start.
A.7 Expenditure Density
This function describes the project cost distribution over the
project lead time. This was defined prior to Eq. A.27, which expresses
an obvious property:
Lk
O ik(m)dm = 1. (A.27)
This means that ik(m)dm is the fraction of cost incurred during the
interval [m, m + dm].
The most convenient way to construct this function is to start from
the cash flow data of power plant construction projects. The power plant
cost models of CONCEPT code (H2) include integrated cash flow data that
are based on constant dollars. Let the expenditure density that can be
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extracted from such data be i(m). Since this expenditure density
is described as that of constant dollars, it is a fore cost expenditure
density, or:
iFk(m) = i(m) (A.48)
The fore cost fraction of expenditure at time m is:
iFk(m)dm = i(m)dm.
The corresponding tail cost fraction is:
!k(m)dm [1 + s]m ,
where s is the average escalation rate during construction. The overall
tail cost based on a fore cost of unity is:
fLk
0
ik(m)[1 + s] mdm= C lk (A.49)
where Ck is
gives
Lk
0
a constant. Dividing both sides of this equation by C1
(A.50)i k(m)[1 + s] dm = 1.
Clk
Let iTk(m) be the tail cost expenditure density. This density must
satisfy the condition of Eq. A.27, or:
Lk
iTk(m)dm = 1.
Comparing this equation with Eq. A.50 yields:
i k(m)[l + s]
iTk(m) C1k (A.51)
where C1 is defined in Eq. A.49.
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Considering the next level of capital cost, the function of
commercial cost incurred at time m during construction is:
iTk(m)dm [1 + j]Lk-m
where j is the effective AFDC rate. Integrating this expression as in
Eq. A.49 yields:
Lk
0
Lk-m
iTk(m) [1 + j] dm = Clk.
Substituting Eq. A.51 gives
Lk
0
i k(m) [1 + s]m [1 + j]Lkm
Clk
dm = Clk
or:
Lkk ,Lk'mI i k(m) [1 + 5s [1 + j
0
dm = ClkClk 
where C2k is another constant. In a similar fashion,
cost expenditure density, ik(m), is:
iCk(m) = [l/C2k] i'k(m)[1 + s[ m [1 + j]Lkm
the commercial
(A.53)
Both Clk and C2k are normalization factors.
The AFDC Factor, A(j, Lk)
This factor was defined by Eq. A.29 for one generator type. The
appropriate expenditure density function is that of tail cost, since
C2k (A.52)
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A(j,Lk) is merely the ratio of the commercial cost to the tail cost as
shown in Eq. A.30. Therefore:
Lk Lk-m
A(j, Lk) iTk(m)[l + j] dm
0
1 Lk m k
C1 i k(m)[1 i + s] dm (A.54)
Or, from Eq. A.52,
A(j, Lk) = C2k/Clk (A.55)
The Average Expenditure Lead Time, lk
This parameter was defined by Eq. A.37, which states that:
Lk
k = LK m ik(m)dm (A.56)
0
for the kth generator type.
This parameter was first introduced in the expression for the total
return requirement for the conventional method, and for the expression
for the generating capacity, G(t) (Eq. A.38). Since in the conventional
method R(t) must match G(t), lk must have the same value in the related
expressions. In addition, in order to make a fair comparison between the
specific return requirements of the UAD method, Rsu(t), and that of the
convenional method, Rsc(t), the same time variable in G(t) is used for
both Rsu(t) and Rsc(t). This implies that the same ik(m) should be
used for all k in the relevant return requirement expressions. It is
obvious that for the Rsc(t) expression, lk must be defined in terms
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of the commercial cost expenditure density, ick(m), defined in Eq.
A.53. This leads to the specific definition of this parameter as:
Lk
1k = LK -a m ick(m)dm (A.57)
0
which is used in ULTRA Code.
A.8 The ULTRA Code
This section describes how the mathematical model that was developed
in the past sections is programmed into a computer code. The ULTRA code
is divided into seventeen subprograms, each of which performs a separate,
or a set of related function(s). Figure A.2 shows the flow of control
among the subprograms, with control transferred to the leftmost ones
before the ones on the right at each level. The following is a
description of the subprograms.
MAIN: In this part of the Code most of the documentation is
presented. It includes a brief description of the Code, the output, and
the input along with the input variables. It reads most of the input
data, including the number of problems to be worked in each run. When
the input has a changeable format it is left to be read by special
subroutines. The Code has accommodation for eight types of generation
facilities. (Note that for reasons related to the historical development
of the code, the UAD fraction is called UAD Beta fraction, or Beta
fraction relative to Greek symbol Beta.)
RATES
AFDCTR
CASHLW
OR 
CASHFS
CASHHD
CASHIN
CASHIN
L CASHGT
CASHJT
m inJ
RETREQ ]
IFUTGRO
Fig. A.2 First-call sequence of ULTRA subprograms
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MAIN
7I7
WINPUT GROWTH FINPUTGUMIX
'I
CHEKMX
CASHFO
OR
II I
- 1 1 1
_ 
_ 
i ii i
-- i J 
__
_
--
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WINPUT: Prints out most of the input data.
GUMIX: Reads the data describing the generator type mix function
for historic and extrapolated time horizons. Historic data start forty
years ago, while the length of the future interval is specified by the
user. The generator mix function data are read in five-year intervals.
This subroutine assumes that each five-year period has a constant mix
function (to reduce the input size).
CHEKMX: This subroutine checks if the generator mix data are
consistent, i.e., if Eq. A.39 holds over the period of interest.
GROWTH: Reads growth and escalation
financing methods. It has three options.
annual intervals throughout the period of
given only for the past 40 years, whereby
data are to be estimated by the Code. Or
specified as constants.
data for conventional and UAD
Data are given versus time for
interest. Annual data are
future growth and escalation
growth and escalation rates are
FINPUT: Prints out financial input data.
RETREQ: Computes the specific return requirement ratio, the
ultimate output of the current version of the Code. It also has a
provision for future programming by which the corresponding ratio of the
cost of electricity to the ultimate consumer (price of electricity) is
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estimated. It then can transfer control to FUTGRO to estimate future
growth and escalation rates data based on the price of electricity
ratio. To compute the return requirement ratio it separately computes
each term of Eq. A.31 and Eq. A.40 for each generator type, k, at each
time step, t.
RATES: Calculates the levelized annual fixed charge rates for both
conventional and UAD financing methods, based on the financial input data.
AFDCTR: Computes the AFDC factor, A(j,Lk), and the average
expenditure lead time, lk, based on the various expenditure densities
of generator types, k. The expenditure densities are obtained by
differentiating integral cash-flow data.
FUTGRO: This is a dummy subroutine in the current "static" version
of the Code. It is intended to estimate the growth and escalation data
for next year based on this and past years' price of electricity and
other economic factors at each time step.
CASHFO: Transfers control to the appropriate subroutine, based on
the generator type index.
CASHLW: Compiles integral cash-flow data for Light Water Reactor
plants. These data are taken from CONCEPT Code, Phase 5.
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CASHFS: Compiles integral cash-flow data for fossil-fired steam
plants (gas, oil, and coal-fired). It also uses CONCEPT-5 cash flow
tables.
CASHHD: This is reserved for hydro-electric plant cash flow data.
Currently it uses an integral cash-flow function of the form:
Ik(m) = 3[m/Lk]2 - 2[m/Lk]3.
The expenditure density is then:
ik(m) = [6/Lk][m - m 2/Lk].
CASHIN: This is reserved for internal combustion (diesel) engine
cash-flow data. Currently it calls CASHHD.
CASHGT: This is reserved for gas-turbine (Brayton Cycle)
generator. Currently it calls CASHHD.
CASHJE: This is reserved for the jet-engine type of generators, if
it has characteristics different from those of gas turbines. It also
provides room for any other generator type that is not considered in any
of the above cash-flow subroutines. Currently it calls CASHHD.
A.9 The Listing of ULTRA Code
The following pages list of the ULTRA Code. Each subroutine starts
on a new page. The exceptions are CASHGT and CASHJE, which appear on the
same page with CASHIN.
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ULTRA Code
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